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Summary 
The main purpose of the following inquiry is to emphasise the importance of a 
phenomenon long neglected by the majority of the human sciences, the artefact; each 
one of us, no matter what age, sex or culture, is in contact with artefacts every 
moment of our lives yet despite this they have received scant attention. The study 
begins by outlining a definition of the artefact, highlighting those characteristics which, 
in combination, ensure its centrality to social life before, through a discussion of 
Popper's ideas, proceeding to see how material culture can be conceptualised as 
meaningful. In order to understand how meaning becomes attached to the artefact the 
notion of objectification will be analysed and, consequently, so shall the importance of 
both the type of activity and the physical nature of the materials involved in the 
artefact's production. Picking up on the theme of materiality this aspect of material 
culture will be shown to pose major problems to any interpretation of the artefact 
along semiological lines; language and material culture are evinced to possess 
fundamentally distinct characteristics which make comparisons between them far from 
straightforward. These differences will be analysed further, concentrating specifically 
on the role of context in the establishment of meaning. This leads on to the proposal 
that our understanding of artefacts can occur on three levels; three forms of 
knowledge are thus described of which a linguistically formulated type constitutes just 
one kind. The penultimate chapter tackles the ways in which artefacts affect us, how 
they are active elements in our relationships with them; therefore, a dialectical position 
is postulated in which both artefacts and agents take part. Finally, the study concludes 
by stressing some of its wider implications and suggests a few of the practical 
situations to which it can be applied. 
vi 
The elder Heyst had left behind him a little money and a certain 
quantity of movable objects, such as books, tables, chairs, and pictures, 
which might have complained of heartless desertion after many years of 
faithful service; for there is a soul in things. 
Joseph Conrad, Victory 
Why can't office buildings use doorknobs that are truly knob-like in 
shape? What is this static modernism that architects of the second tier 
have imposed on us: steel half-U handles or lathed objects shaped like 
superdomes, instead of brass, porcelain, or glass knobs? The upstairs 
doorknobs in the house I grew up in were made of faceted glass. As 
you extended your fingers to open a door, a cloud of flesh-colour 
would diffuse into the glass from the opposite direction. The knobs 
were loosely seated in their latch mechanism, and heavy, and the 
combination of solidity and laxness made for a multiply staged 
experience as you tuned the knob: a smoothness that held intermediary 
tumberal fallings-into-position. Few American products recently have 
been able to capture that same knuckly, orthopaedic quality (the quality 
of bendable straws) in their switches and latches; the Japanese do it 
very well, though: they can get a turn-signal switch in a car or a volume 
knob on a stereo to feel resistant and substantial and worn into place - 
think of the very fine Toyota turn-signal switches, to the left of the 
steering wheel, which move in their sockets like chicken drumsticks: 
they feel as if they were designed with living elbow cartilage as their 
inspiration. 
Nicholson Baker, The Mezzanine 
Vll 
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Introduction 
The forgotten artefact 
It has been noted by one commentator that "the focus of intellectual work in the 
human sciences in the second half of the twentieth century has been a theme of 
culture", what Chaney designates `the cultural turn' (Chaney 1994: 1). For the most 
part, culture in this context has been conceptualised primarily along idealistic lines; 
that is, it has been perceived as the `world of ideas', as essentially that part of social 
life consisting of beliefs, values, ideologies, patterns of thought, etc. which are shared 
by a specific group and through which their understanding of the world is formed. 
Many of these elements are, of course, expressed materially, they are made concrete 
by being written, printed, represented in art and architecture, embodied in consumer 
products, etc. - they come to constitute material culture. The analysis of this particular 
field within cultural studies has seen a recent growth, yet, strangely, there seems to 
exist an apparent reluctance to consider in any detail its distinguishing characteristic. 
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its physicality. Material culture studies have concentrated almost entirely on its 
cultural aspects and, concomitantly, to all intents and purposes, ignored the material 
aspects of this phenomenon. As Carlstein points out: 
"Social scientists have commonly refused to see `dead things' as social 
or have left them aside for the natural scientists. Social scientists have 
commonly refused to look upon artefacts as social in the sense that 
they impinge on how individuals interact with one another. These 
`dead things' are, at best, seen as symbols and are not considered to be 
genuine ingredients in social situations and processes" (Carlstein 1982: 
8-9). 
The main purpose of the following study is to redress this situation, to suggest that 
any theory of society which ignores the artefact is necessarily incomplete. To support 
such a position the importance of the artefact in social life will need to be established, 
consequently we will not be so much concerned with a decentring of the subject as a 
centring of the object, material cultural items are to be conceived as fundamental to 
human being. 
Now, on one level this appears a rather obvious point to make, we and our ancestors 
have for the past two to three million years become increasingly dependent upon 
technological innovations for our existence - tools, clothes, equipment of all kinds 
have helped ameliorate the hardships we encounter every day. As such artefacts can 
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be seen to play an essential role in everyone's lives, but this utilitarian aspect of 
material culture is only one among many, our relations with artefacts is multifaceted. 
The word `relations' is used intentionally, because artefacts are not just objects which 
we employ, merely devices we apply in particular circumstances, for this implies that 
we are the only active participants in these events, artefacts thus remaining passive 
things completely subject to the whims of their operators. In opposition to this 
assumption it will proposed that there exists a dialectic relationship between artefacts 
and people in which both have the capacity to act upon the other in a variety of 
manners. On the one hand, we shall see that we understand and manipulate artefacts 
in different ways, from one that is essentially contemplative and reflective in nature to 
one that is habitual and embodied, but still meaningful. On the other hand, material 
culture will be shown to affect humanity through a number of means which emanate 
from both its physical nature and its place within a context. 
Specific attention will be given to the physicality of the artefact for, as we have just 
noted, it is this aspect of material culture which has suffered the most disregard, yet 
brings with it some of the most significant repercussions. Some of these implications 
raise serious problems for any attempt to interpret the artefact semiotically, a method 
often used by those who concentrate on the cultural aspect to the detriment of the 
material. Major difficulties emerge relating to the physicality of artefacts which make 
the comparison between them and language questionable on a number of levels; 
therefore, while not denying that objects can act symbolically, material culture cannot 
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be seen purely as a realm of signs to be decoded, it has a far more complicated nature 
which negates such an approach. 
Another area of inquiry which this study touches upon is the recently emerging 
sociology of the body; here too there seems to be an apparent lack of understanding of 
how the artefact affects the human body. One of the first theorists to explore this topic 
was Marcel Mauss who coined the term `techniques of the body', a phrase which 
relates to his observations that different cultures often possess different styles of 
bodily movement, e. g. particular styles of walking. He also noted how technological 
devices affect these movements, e. g. how shoes affect gait, how the shape of a spade 
affects the motions of digging. It is this factor which appears to have slipped from 
view, how we as physical beings interact with other physical things, things which are 
often the products of other people. Overall, therefore, the artefact will be shown to 
constitute a crucial aspect of human social life and, hence, something which needs to 
be more fully comprehended if we are to gain anything like a proper understanding of 
our activity in the world. 
1 
Towards a definition of the artefact 
Before launching into this study of the artefact we must first come to some kind of 
understanding, however preliminary, of what we will be dealing with, what in fact is 
an artefact? Of all the disciplines that confront artefacts as part of their regular 
activity archaeology appears to be the one most heavily reliant on their analysis as 
they constitute one of the few remaining sources of evidence relating to past societies. 
In their introductory work to this field Renfrew and Bahn provide a good starting- 
point for us when they define artefacts as "humanly made or modified portable 
objects" (Renfrew & Bahn 1991: 41). This definition contains three crucial elements. 
each of which need to be addressed. Firstly, artefacts are distinguished from all other 
material objects by the fact that their final form is the result of human agency. 
Secondly, larger, immobile structures like houses and bridges are excluded from this 
class due mainly to their size. Finally, artefacts are different from other products of 
human agency, such as social systems and institutions, in that they are material, they 
have a physical presence. 
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Artefacts as human products 
Our investigation into the first defining aspect of an artefact, its formation through 
human activity, entails a number of wide-ranging features and the analysis of each of 
them will, together, form a substantial part of the following work. At this early stage, 
however, it would be helpful to emphasise a few basic points in order to orientate 
ourselves. Foremost amongst these is the notion that, in the words of Shanks and 
Tilley, 
"inert matter is transformed by social practices or productive labour 
into a cultural object, be it a product for immediate consumption, a 
tool or a work of art. Objectification - the serial transformation of 
matter into a cultural object - is the inevitable consequence attached to 
and flowing from labour. The image of humanity inscribed in material 
culture is, of course, not a phenomenal image of the self but of the 
powers involved in the transformative social practice. The practice of 
individuals is `written' and imprinted in the world leaving traces of 
varying degrees of solidity, opacity or permanence - material culture. 
Every act of social production is always one involving an 
interconnection between inert materiality, consciousness, action and 
thought. If there were no teleological positing on the part of the agents 
there would be no material culture. Material culture results from a 
productive process and as a production it is the result of purposeful 
activity: it bears the indelible stamp of the positioned subject, 
positioned in relation to social structures and social strategics. The 
social labour congealed in the object is inherently meaningful labour, 
labour which takes place in relation to a symbolically constructed 
social field" (Shanks & Tilley 1994: 130-1). 
That artefacts are meaningful is a sentiment also espoused by Max Weber. As is well 
known Weber's sociology was centred around the interpretation of meaningful social 
action, and, being a result of such action, human products are not excluded from his 
work, they too are open to interpretation. Weber states his position thus, 
"every artefact (e. g. a machine) has a meaning which can be 
interpreted and understood purely because of its having been produced 
by human beings and used in human activities (possibly for very 
different purposes); and unless this meaning is taken into account, the 
use of the artefact remains totally unintelligible. It is intelligible 
therefore in virtue of its relationship with human action, either as a 
means to some end or as an end in itself, which a certain agent or 
agents had in mind and to which their action was directed" (Weber 
1991: 10). 
Such a statement implies a universal conception of human nature which is not 
acceptable to all; however, with respect to our interactions with artefacts this position 
will be endorsed and substantiated throughout this study. The same applies to another 
moot point inferred in the above quote; that which distinguishes artefacts from natural 
objects is the fact that the former are meaningful in two respects. That is, artctacts are 
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meaningful as a consequence of their being the products of human activity and 
because further meanings can be given to them by those encountering them 
subsequently. Natural objects acquire meaning only through the latter process. The 
importance of this dual aspect of meaningfulness will require a great deal of 
elaboration. Surprisingly, little systematic attention has been given to these unique 
qualities which artefacts possess therefore our approach will be fairly eclectic, 
drawing upon a number of traditions including architecture, linguistics, archaeology, 
social theory, anthropology, philosophy and aesthetics. 
Portability 
The second defining feature mentioned above basically refers to the size of the human 
product, limiting artefacts to those objects which can be easily manipulated and 
transported without too much effort by one or a couple of people. Few, if any, 
consequences result purely from this quality. For example, both natural and human- 
niade objects that are portable can be grasped, collected, hidden, thrown, swallowed, 
etc., whilst size does not restrict things from being given, struck, exchanged, 
possessed, destroyed, etc. It is in combination with the other two factors that 
distinctive qualities emerge, a good example being money tokens. 
9 
Material objects 
The final aspect implied in the above definition is the material nature of the artefact 
and here again we come across a lacuna for, despite the pervasive presence of 
physical objects in everyday life both natural and artificial, a paucity of work has 
been undertaken with respect to the attribute of materiality. As Daniel Miller 
rightfully points out, 
"in philosophy ... there are numerous 
discussions of objects which 
refer to some observed attribute or perceptual property pertaining to 
things as such, but books with titles such as Words and Things will be 
found to have very little to say about the social implications of things 
as objects, while having plenty to contribute to an understanding of the 
nature of words. Political philosophy is more concerned with objects 
as properties than the properties of objects, while phenomenology, as 
that branch of philosophy which claims more direct concern with 
everyday objects, considers these mainly as media for addressing the 
role of agency and the nature of subjectivity" (Miller 1993: 85). 
It may, therefore, be helpful to spend some time on discussing the qualities that result 
from the material nature of physical objects at a general level including, for the time 
being, both natural and artificial items. 
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The first obvious characteristic possessed by material objects is that they are 
composed of matter, they have a physical nature and as such they can be said to be 
solid. However, whereas the distinction between an object either possessing matter or 
not is absolute, there are degrees of solidity, a quality which is dependent upon the 
nature of the material or materials which constitute it. Solidity, or hardness, is an 
emergent property not so much of matter itself, but of the way in which matter is 
assembled and the external conditions present. Therefore, an object fashioned out of 
iron owes its solidity to factors such as temperature and pressure. The self-same iron 
object under different conditions can become molten, fluid, losing both its solidity 
and, therefore, its object-like character. Two concomitant results follow on from this 
state of affairs. Firstly, two solid material objects can never occupy the same space 
simultaneously -I cannot sit in exactly the same position as you are sitting at this 
moment in time. Secondly, in normal circumstances solid objects retain their 
individual identity as the possibility of merger is denied. A quantity of metal coins 
gathered together remain a collection of individual items whereas a water droplet 
added to cup of water immediately becomes `lost'. This quality also ensures that, 
instead of us having a ghost-like existence on earth, we can pick up, hold, manipulate 
and carry material objects. Another consequence of the solidity of an object is that it 
can effect other objects. When two such objects meet, because they cannot combine, a 
number of possible results can ensue to one or both of them including damage, 
destruction, modification or just a change of direction as in the case of billiard balls. 
An associated fact is that only through the application of material objects can we alter 
the material world, (and we must keep in mind that we too are physical beings). 
The second characteristic allied to material objects is that they exist through time, 
they are, thanks to their physical character, durable. The nature of this quality is 
dependent upon both internal and external factors. With respect to the former, we can 
make a distinction between organic and inorganic objects each of which have their 
own specific consequences. Living organisms have a finite existence, the amount of 
time that they are present on earth is limited. During their lifetime their continued 
presence as a single organism is due to a perpetual process of regeneration as new 
cells replace old, therefore they are and they are not the same living `thing' over time. 
Some organic matter can, of course, exist for many years after its death through both 
natural and artificial processes. Wood, for instance, can be preserved naturally for 
thousands of years in a transformed state as coal or in a recognisably `wooden' state 
for hundreds of years if certain extreme conditions pertain which prevent deca`'. 
Similar results can be achieved by human activity either intentionally, through such 
techniques as freeze drying, or unintentionally as in the case of the Neolithic timber 
trackways in the Somerset Levels. The make-up of inorganic matter usually entails 
that objects consisting of such substances are relatively more durable than their 
organic counterparts. It is due to this fact that we have some knowledge of our remote 
ancestors in the form of stone flack and pebble tools dating back between two and 
two and a half million years, (unfortunately wooden implements. which in all 
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probability predated these stone objects, have not to our knowledge survived). The 
durability of material objects affects our behaviour towards them. Our dealings with a 
bag of mushrooms, for example, are determined by the fact that they will be useless a 
day or two after purchase, whereas no such concern is needed with respect to a spoon. 
This also highlights another distinction pertaining to the human world; the presence 
of many material objects is dependent upon whether they are items for consumption 
or use. A proper end for the bag of mushrooms is in my consumption of them in an 
omelette, they thus cease to exist. A spoon, however, can be used on a multitude of 
occasions, its presence remains little affected by our use of it, it cannot be consumed 
and this therefore ensures its durability. Another feature allied to the material objects 
continuation through time is that this can occur quite apart from our knowledge of it, 
it can exist independently of human consciousness. If I put down my pen on the desk 
it does not disappear the moment I leave the room and then reappear when I return - 
material objects have an autonomous existence. 
A third characteristic of material objects is that they are three-dimensional. they 
possess height, width and depth. Consequently, material objects have an external 
observable boundary or surface and a, usually hidden, interior. It was this attribute of 
three-dimensionality that was of great interest to the Cubists and to capture it on a 
two-dimensional surface meant the rejection of the one-point perspectivc approach 
employed since the Renaissance. The Cubists realised that our understanding of the 
world is not one formed out of numerous 'snap-shots,; we are 
forever in motion, 
l3' 
perpetually viewing objects from different angles so that our experiences possess 
aspects of depth and movement. To highlight these qualities such artists concentrated 
on the still-life, paintings of everyday mass-produced objects in particular. Picasso 
and Braque especially concerned themselves with these items going so far as to 
incorporate them within their collages. Another aspect of an object's three- 
dimensionality is that, as well as allowing it to be seen from many view-points by an 
individual, it also allows it to be experienced by a number of people simultaneously. 
This, it could be argued, constitutes a further distinct characteristic of material 
objects. As such it can be said that we occupy a world of common objects and thus 
similar experiences, we have a shared and thus social existence. 
These are, then, the four basic or primary characteristics that transpire as an inevitable 
consequence of an object's materiality, they are always and ever present and together 
they help to define its essential nature. However, in themselves they do not add up to 
a complete definition as qualities like texture, elasticity, smell, solubility, colour, 
temperature and fragility are excluded. Some of these, particularly texture and 
temperature, are universal properties, but, like the other 'secondary ' incidental 
features, are not of such great consequence. Now all these characteristics. both 
primary, and secondary, can be divided along different lines, into categorical 
properties and dispositional. The first set contains all those properties that are 
immediately apparent and therefore unconditional, for example shape, size and 
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colour. The latter set, on the other hand, include properties which are conditional and 
need never become manifest, for example fragility, texture and solubility. 
Conclusion 
Hopefully, these brief notes towards the definition of the artefact have helped us to 
gain our bearings for the forthcoming study, we now have some understanding of 
what an artefact is. One is immediately struck by the thought that such a seemingly 
humble object is in fact quite complex. The following work will attempt to unpack 
this complexity and tease out the ensuing implications. The justification for a task of 
this nature lies in the importance artefacts have for all of us in our everyday life; we 
are both continually surrounded by them and spend much of our time interacting with 
them. Consequently, it could be argued that artefacts, if adequately interpreted, can 
offer an insight into our social existence. Yet this possibility need not just be seen as 
applicable to contemporary circumstances; because of their capacity to exist over long 
periods of time the same principle can be applied to societies of the distant past - in 
fact, artefacts often constitute a major part of the surviving evidence of such societies 
and therefore offer one of the few channels of inquiry. The following section will be 
preoccupied chiefly with assessing the way in which information can be said to be 
embedded within the artefact, how knowledge can take on material form. To achle e 
lý 
this we shall begin by appraising the work of a philosopher whose work is often not 
associated with the analysis of material culture, Karl Popper. 
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Material Knowledge 
Introduction 
The intention of the following section is twofold. Firstly, it is to argue that all 
physical products resulting from human activity necessarily `carry' information; and 
secondly, it will propose some preliminary points concerning the actual nature of this 
particular type of information. There has been a surprising neglect of these issues, 
surprising because in essence they are central, or important, to a number of related 
disciplines, i. e. archaeology, anthropology and sociology. Consequently, this chapter 
will begin in the realm of philosophy, more specifically with the work of Karl Popper. 
The almost total neglect of Popper's thoughts by those interested in cultural theory 
appears to be rather unusual, for, at the core of his thoughts lies a novel and explicit 
conceptualisation of an ideational realm, an element of which refers explicitly to 
material objects. Through an analysis of Popper's work in this area a firmer footing 
for a theoretical understanding of material culture vvill hopefully emerge. This 
preliminary task of arguing, for the possibility of information somehow residing in 
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physical objects is one that is not usually tackled, but is often taken as given. Such 
assumptions can lead to an unthinking acceptance of theoretical standpoints which 
have questionable foundations, the following section is an attempt to avoid this 
situation. 
Popper's three worlds 
Let's begin, then, by gaining some kind of understanding of Popper's idiosyncratic 
work. According to this realist approach there exist three ontologically discrete 
worlds that he describes in a number of his papers. These entities he defines thus: 
"first, the world of physical objects or of physical states; secondly, the world of states 
of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; 
and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and 
poetic thoughts and of works of art" (Popper 1992: 106). Popper is well aware that 
this is a contentious scheme, especially his distinction between «vorld two and three 
phenomena, yet this stance is entirely necessary in order to support a formulation of 
an evolutionary epistemology with the commensurate notion of objective knowledge. 
For Popper all knowledge is open to growth, consisting "in the improvement of 
existing knowledge which is changed in the hope of approaching nearer the truth" 
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(ibid: 71). This development is the result of a process analogous to Darwinian 
evolutionism, what Popper calls "the natural selection of hypotheses" (ibid: 261) 
Therefore; "our knowledge consists, at every moment, of those hypotheses which 
have shown their (comparative) fitness by surviving so far in their struggle for 
existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit" 
(ibid: 261). He portrays this whole process schematically; 
"Using `P' for problem, `TS' for tentative solution, `EE for error- 
elimination, we can describe the fundamental evolutionary sequence as 
follows 
... 
TS1 
/ ý. 
Pi 
10 
TS2 
- 
EE 
f 
P2 
TSn 
"This sequence is not a cycle", argues Popper, "the second problem is, 
in general, different from the first: it is the result of the new situation 
which has arisen, in part, because of the tentative solutions which have 
been tried out, and the error-elimination which controls them" (ibid: 
243). 
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World Two 
With respect to world two this procedure applies to subjective knowledge. According 
to Popper all animals, from the time that they are born, possess a type of hypothetical 
knowledge in the form of innate expectations and anticipations. If these are 
disappointed the organism's first problems will arise and from this point knowledge 
begins to evolve via the correction and modification of its previously held knowledge. 
Ultimately, for Popper, "all subjective knowledge is dispositional" and its growth is 
equivalent to asserting that dispositions alter over time as a result of changes in the 
external environment (ibid: 66-7). This is what he defines as learning from 
experience. Therefore, at any one instant in the life of an organism, it can be said to 
possess a certain repertoire of dispositions that "constitute ... its [momentary] inner 
state", that composes its subjective knowledge (ibid: 343). 
What is of fundamental importance to Popper is his belief that world two is 
essentially a realm of activity, formed entirely of a process of production. He argues 
that epistemologists should not concentrate their attention on this productive 
operation, but ought to instead focus on knowledge itself, the product. That is, in 
Popper's teens, priority should be given, not to subjective knowledge, but to 
objective knowledge. His reasoning behind this assertion is as follows: 
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"I admit that the objective structures for which I claim priority are 
caused by human behaviour. Being causal, the subjective approach 
may seem to be more scientific than the objective approach which, as 
it were, starts from effects rather than causes. Though I admit that the 
objective structures are products of behaviour, I hold that the argument 
is mistaken. In all sciences, the ordinary approach is from the effects to 
the causes. The effect raises the problem - the problem to be explained, 
the explicandum - and the scientist tries to solve it by constructing an 
explanatory hypothesis" (ibid: 114-5). Therefore, "we should realise 
that the study of the products is vastly more important than the study 
of the production, even for an understanding of the production and its 
methods" (ibid: 114). 
Here we see the emergence of another element in Popper's thought, that it is through 
the study of world three that a fuller comprehension can be gained, not only of this 
realm itself, but also of world two; the reverse, the ability to understand world three 
by examining world two, according to Popper, does not hold (see ibid: 112). 
Ultimately he justifies this whole approach in the ensuing manner: 
"the subjective act or dispositional state of `understanding' can be 
understood ... only through 
its connections with third-world objects. 
For I assert the following three theses concerning the subjective act of 
understanding. 
1) That every subjective act of understanding is largely anchored in the 
third world 
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2) that almost all important remarks which can be made about such an 
act consist in pointing out its relations to third-world objects; and 
3) that such an act consists in the main of operations with third-world 
objects: we operate with these objects almost as if they were physical 
objects. 
This, I suggest, can be generalised, and holds for every subjective act 
of `knowledge': all the important things we can say about an act of 
knowledge consist of pointing out the third-world objects of the act -a 
theory or proposition - and its relation to other third-world objects.... 
the activity of understanding consists, essentially, in operating with 
third-world objects" (ibid: 163-4). 
World Three 
What precisely are, then, third-world objects? In essence they are the "objective 
contents of thought", they are such things as theoretical systems, scientific and poetic 
thoughts, works of art, problems and problem situations, the contents of journals, 
books and libraries, and critical arguments (ibid: 106). All these possess objective 
knowledge in the form of their logical content. The crucial element that makes such a 
world possible, the phenomenon that transforms subjective into objective know ledge, 
is language. Subjective knowledge becomes objective "when we say what .e think: 
and even more so when we write it down, or print it" (ibid: 25). Two of the most 
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significant features of human language, to Popper's mind, which endow it with such 
an ability are its descriptive and argumentative capacities. As he explains: 
"Without the development of an exosomatic descriptive language -a 
language which, like a tool, develops outside the body - there can be 
no object for our critical discussion. But with the development of a 
descriptive language (and further, of a written language), a linguistic 
third world can emerge; and it is only in this way, and only in this third 
world, that the problems and standards of rational criticism can 
develop. It is to this development of the higher functions of language 
that we owe our humanity, our reason. For our powers of reasoning are 
nothing but powers of critical argument" (ibid: 120-1). 
Popper leaves us in little doubt, therefore, over the importance which he places upon a 
linguistically formulated world three. 
The evolution of objective knowledge proceeds along the lines shown in the previous 
diagram, through a process of error-elimination or systematic rational criticism. 
However, this procedure has one fundamental advantage over and above the 
comparative process in the animal world; because our theories are exosomatic they 
can be proven wrong and eliminated with, in most cases, no actual harm coming to 
those people holding them. To paraphrase Popper, our hypotheses can die in our stead 
(ibid: 244). 
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The idea that the contents of world three have an external existence apart from those 
people who did or still do hold them does, of course, tie-in with his assertion that 
world three is an ontologically distinct realm. Although it is a human product once 
formulated it takes on an autonomous existence, it transcends its makers, and then has 
the capacity to act back upon them or others. Popper argues thus: 
"In our attempts to solve ... problems we may invent new theories. 
These theories ... are produced by us: they are the product of our 
critical and creative thinking, in which we are greatly helped by other 
existing third-world theories. Yet the moment we have produced these 
theories, they create new, unintended and unexpected problems, 
autonomous problems, problems to be discovered. This explains why 
the third world which, in its origin, is our product, is autonomous in 
what may be called its ontological status. It explains why we can act 
upon it, and add to it or help its growth, even though there is no man 
who can master even a small corner of this world. All of us contribute 
to its growth, but almost all our individual contributions are 
vanishingly small. All of us try to grasp it, and none of us could live 
without being in contact with it, for all of us make use of speech, 
without which we would hardly be human" (ibid: 161). 
What Popper is, therefore, arguing is that objective knowledge, once formed, exists 
apart from any of us, it is "knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge without a 
knowing subject" (ibid: 109). 
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One of the most important characteristics possessed by world three inhabitants is their 
logical content for, whereas the occupants of world two stand in causal relationships, 
those of world three stand in logical relationships. These relations exist regardless of 
whether they are known of or not. In fact, Popper asserts, it is because of the very 
impossibility of our ever extrapolating all of the logical consequences associated with 
a theory that its full potential is never comprehended, even by its creator. This is 
further evidence, he notes, that a theory; 
"in its logical sense, is something objective and something objectively 
existing - an object that we can study, something that we can try and 
grasp. It is no more paradoxical to say that theories or ideas are our 
products and yet not fully understood by us than to say that our 
children are our products and yet not fully understood by us, or that 
honey is a product of the bee, yet not fully understood by any bee". 
Consequently, "the student of the history of ideas will find that ideas 
have a kind of life (this is a metaphor, of course); that they can be 
misunderstood, rejected, and forgotten; that they can reassert 
themselves, and come to life again. Without metaphor, however, we 
can say that they are not identical with any man's thought, or belief; 
that they can exist even if universally misunderstood, and rejected" 
(ibid: 299-300). 
If wie return to Popper's evolutionary scheme one can see that the relationship 
between the tentative solutions and the problem is a logical one. Consequently, the 
progressive evolution of objective knowledge occurs through the continuous 
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operationalisation of world three entities, a process of conjecture and refutation. 
dependent ultimately on the logical nature of such entities. By testing the logical 
consistency between solutions and problems, by attempting to eliminate logical 
contradictions, we can move ever nearer, though never attain, the truth. 
Sub-Worlds 
Now it may have been noticed that an apparent discrepancy exists in the description 
of Popper's world three represented above. At one point he argues that the transition 
from subjective to objective knowledge occurs when an idea is expressed 
linguistically, when it is affirmed sensuously. However, elsewhere Popper states that 
world three contains all knowledge that is a logical consequence of already created 
knowledge, even if it has not been or never will be discovered by humankind, i. e. 
objective knowledge also contains non-objective elements. He subsequently clarified 
his position to deal with this difficulty by proposing three sub-divisions of world 
three. Firstly, there exists world 3: 1 which he describes as "the materialised, the 
stored-up part of world three ... 
Libraries belong to it, and probably certain memory- 
carrying parts of the human brain" (Popper 1974: 1050). Then there is world 3: 2 that 
consists of "the part of world three which has been grasped or understood by some 
people ... , the world of 
thoughts consciously thought" (ibid: 1051). Finally, there is 
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world 3: 3 which encompasses the remaining non-materialised, non-cogitated, items of 
objective knowledge. Popper uses the example of natural numbers to illustrate this 
particular sub-division; because there are an infinite amount of such numbers 
consequently there will always be some that never enter worlds 3: 1 or 3: 2. World 3: 3 
is described by Popper as "a kind of shadow world", but, he assures us, "shadows 
exist in a physical sense" (ibid: 1051). 
What Popper appears to imply is that world three items acquire greater efficacy the 
more sensuous or material they become. So either an individual, through the 
manipulation of world 3: 2 elements, creates a new world 3: 2 item or they discover 
one already extant in world 3: 3. This having happened, such phenomena can be 
`crystallised' into sensuous/material form through speech or text, i. e. through being 
transformed into world 3: 1 objects. The actual form such things take does not affect 
the nature of the knowledge which it carries, the medium is not the message. It is only 
after this transmutation has occurred that world three items can be discussed and 
criticised, can become forces in the evolutionary progress of objective knowledge. 
Once formed a world 3: 1 article may never again be recognised as such, be seen to 
carry knowledge, but this does not mean, therefore, that it loses its world three status. 
Popper uses a book to illustrate this point: 
A book "contains objective knowledge. true or false, useful or useless: 
and N\-lhether anybody ever reads it and really grasps its contents is 
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almost accidental. A man who reads a book with understanding is a 
rare creature. But even if he were more common, there would always 
be plenty of misunderstandings and misinterpretations; and it is not the 
actual and somewhat accidental avoidance of such misunderstandings 
which turns black spots on white paper into a book, or an instance of 
knowledge in the objective sense. Rather, it is something more 
abstract. It is its possibility or potentiality of being understood, its 
dispositional character of being understood or interpreted, or 
misunderstood or misinterpreted, which makes a thing a book. And 
this potentiality or disposition may exist without ever being actualised 
or realised" (Popper 1992: 115-6). 
Problems in world three 
It can be seen that Popper lays before us a bold and explicit set of hypotheses and 
rightly so if he is to satisfy his own methodological criteria. Not surprisingly they 
have attracted a fair amount of criticism; however, I do not want to dwell on the 
problems that have been highlighted generally in this area, but instead concentrate on 
some of the issues that specifically concern the study of material culture. 
Popper's thesis refers to the ideational realm purely in the singular, world three is a 
universal phenomenon, one that is indivisible. Therefore, the presence of a plurality 
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of cultures, based say on linguistic differences, is denied. Although world three owes 
its evolution to language it is not structured by it, distinct languages do not result in 
divergent types or forms of knowledge. The language within which a piece of 
knowledge is expressed offers no insurmountable barrier to its being understood by 
others from a different linguistic tradition, for translation, although occasionally 
problematic, is never impossible. Consequently; 
"words 
... play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation 
of theories. Thus ... words are mere means to ends (different ends). 
And the only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of 
problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the 
critical discussion of the competing theories" (Popper 1974: 15). 
However, at first glance, the proposal that there exists for all intents and purposes just 
one culture seems rather strange, we often talk of the differences and, less often, the 
similarities between separate cultures and the concomitant notion of cultural identity. 
Now more than ever, it seems, peoples are asserting their own specific culture, 
frequently centred around their language. Therefore, while not wanting to enter into 
the debate over what actually constitutes the boundary of a culture, it does seem 
commonsensical to believe that distinct cultures do exist. Yet, on one level, Popper is 
not denying that this is in fact the case. What he does say is that all propositions can 
be assessed rationally, logic offers a universal criterion through which world three 
29 
entities can be appraised no matter what their origin. For Popper, then. we could 
argue that the sum of world cultures comprises a world Culture, world three. 
So all objective knowledge occupies a single realm, at any one particular moment in 
time world three is comprised of the totality of objective knowledge, all knowledge so 
far formulated by humankind and all knowledge implied by these formulations. 
Popper likens world three to a cathedral, one that, like Gaudi's Sagrada Familia, is in 
a state of continuous construction. Indeed, Popper's cathedral does seem to possess 
truly spiritual qualities; firstly, if we include, as he does, all implied but }'et 
undiscovered knowledge, then large parts of the building have already been 
completed without our realisation and may remain unknown to us forever; secondly, 
there is, as we have seen, but one cathedral - Popper denies that in the past, now or in 
the future there may be different construction projects. 
Problems arise when we try and apply this theoretical scheme to historical 
investigations. As we saw earlier Popper's evolutionary epistemology always begins 
with a problem situation, a combination of the problem in hand and its third world 
background. The latter "consists of at least a language, which always incorporates 
many theories in the very structure of its usages ... , and many other theoretical 
assumptions, unchallenged at least for the time being" (Popper 1992: 165). 
Popper 
argues that "the aim of all historical understanding is the hypothetical reconstruction 
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of a historical problem-situation" and he himself demonstrates this by using Galileo's 
formulation of a theory of the tides as an example (ibid: 170). Difficulties emerge 
when the limits of a problem situation try to be defined and Popper admits that this a 
"complex affair" (ibid: 172). If it is to contain all those world three elements that bear 
on the specific problem itself then we would have to include all those items that 
Galileo, in this example, could have had no knowledge of at all. If we restricted 
ourselves to including that we know Galileo had access to at that particular time then 
we seem to approach a more realistic position, but in so doing we are challenging the 
relevance of perceiving world three as a universal phenomenon. The `problem 
situation' for Galileo was not world three in totality, nor even that part of world three 
that he could know, but that portion which he did know at the time. The limits of his 
knowledge rested on factors such as his own mentality and environmental 
determinants in the shape of mountains and seas that denied him access to related 
knowledge in other parts of the world, i. e. world two and world one phenomena. This 
is not a negation of world three, just a questioning of Popper's assertion that it is the 
most significant aspect in historical understanding. One possible answer to this 
problem is to concentrate on analysing Galileo's own perceptions concerning the 
problem situation, but this reduces historical understanding to a world two task which 
is precisely the position Popper wanted to get away from. 
I'he promotion of world three universality within socio-historical studies is also 
compromised in another very important way. Popper does not take into account the 
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effect that certain power relations can have on the access to knowledge for various 
sections of a society, the view that he presents reflects a society in which every 
individual has equal access to all world three items, a culturally egalitarian society. 
As an ideal this is commendable, but in reality it is plainly not the case. No matter 
how we conceptualise the relationship between power and culture there is no escaping 
the fact that one exists, one that has actual and fundamental consequences in all areas 
of life. In fact, it could well be argued that, under circumstances where the 
mobilisation of power is at its greatest, the presence or absence of logical 
inconsistencies is of little or no consequence. World three items do not compete 
between themselves, isolated from human agency they can do nothing. Once again, 
this- argument does not deny the existence of world three, just its practicality as the 
most consequential factor in research. 
Returning to the notion of problem situations, Popper argues that they do not just 
exist for scientists like Galileo, we all confront them in our everyday 
life as 
difficulties, petty or major, that have to be resolved somehow. The difference between 
our approach and that of the scientist is mainly one of degree; "the evidence on which 
we ... act 
is accepted after the most cursory examination; and the crucial 
discussion of 
competing theories which is characteristic of good science goes 
(as a rule) far beyond 
the kind of thing with which we are perfectly satisfied in practical 
life" (ibid: 80). The 
theories that scientists produce must also be open to testing and possible 
falsification, 
the more open they are to such circumstances the more scientific 
the theory. This is 
;ý 
not, obviously, how people behave day to day, I do not drink a bottle of bleach to try 
and falsify my belief that it is poisonous. This, or rather the idea behind it, can be 
extended to the scientific community and this is precisely what Thomas Kuhn 
describes as `normal science', i. e. scientists accepting theoretical assumptions rather 
than continually questioning them. Popper would accuse such scientists of acting in 
bad faith, of undertaking bad science. The majority of lay people can therefore be 
described as bad scientists. 
At the end of the day what Popper seems to be asserting is that to understand any 
human action we must first build up a picture of the problem situation confronting 
them, that is both the problem itself and the cultural items available that can help 
them in overcoming it. We have already seen the difficulties associated with 
constructing such a picture with respect to scientific problems, yet it appears an even 
greater task when dealing with the seemingly more mundane actions of everyday life. 
Because `the evidence on which we act is accepted after the most cursory 
examination' the theories we employ are in no way analysed rigorously before being 
employed, therefore the choice of such ideas is not usually the outcome of a logical 
process. Also, the range from which we choose appears to be the result of chance 
more than anything else, they constitute a ragbag collection of preconceived notions, 
prejudices, superstitious beliefs, etc. - they do not seem to be suitable candidates for 
inclusion in a logical problem situation. 
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The presence of numerous illogical elements suggests that we could get further 
towards an understanding of a person's actions by trying to comprehend their 
particular subjective state, what they perceive to be their reasons, motives, beliefs. 
etc. behind the actions they perform. To be fair to Popper he does not dismiss such an 
approach, but he does believe in "the superiority of the third-world method of 
critically reconstructing problem situations over the second-world method of 
intuitively re-living some personal experience (a limited and subjective yet at the 
same time indispensably suggestive method whose value I do not wish to deny)' 
(ibid: 170). To Popper, then, the second-world approach is of a speculative rather than 
a validatory nature, but his view of this method is rather blinkered, confined to one 
that reflects a radical form of hermeneutics which by itself offers a soft target. 
Popper and material culture 
The implications of Popper's work with respect to the conceptualisation of material 
culture are interesting. Let's go back to his thoughts concerning the nature of books. 
fie argued that it is "neither its composition by thinking animals nor the fact that it 
has not actually been read or understood [that] is essential for making a thing a book, 
it is sufficient that it might be deciphered" (ibid: 116). There are two related 
aspects of this line of argument that need to be addressed. Firstly, Popper is implying 
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that objective knowledge does not have to be the outcome of our intentional activity. 
Theories, beliefs, suppositions, etc. can come about as the unintended by-products of 
other theories, beliefs and suppositions; even language itself can be seen as "an 
unintended by-product of actions directed at other aims" (ibid: 117). Secondly, it does 
not, in fact, even require the presence of humans to produce objective knowledge - "a 
series of books of logarithms, for example, may be produced and printed by 
computer" (ibid: 115). It is the second proposition that seems, to my mind at least, the 
most contentious and the one that ultimately presents difficulties for Popper's own 
theory. 
To begin with, one could argue that his proposal that a computer can produce 
objective knowledge does not actually mean that such knowledge is a non-human 
product. Computers only operate as a consequence of the human knowledge 
programmed into them. Anyway, without getting too involved in the whole artificial 
intelligence debate Popper's example is not as cut and dried as he appears to suggest. 
Another example which lie uses to illustrate this same point is that of D. N. A. or, more 
specifically, "the logical content of our genetic code" (ibid: 73). At first sight this 
seems to be a better example than that concerning the computer, yet here again there 
emerge distinct problems. If Popper is to argue that the content of our genetic code 
constitutes part of world three then, of course, this means that in some respects world 
three has been around a lot longer than the human race and that the evolution of 
objective knowledge is actually, and not just metaphorically. tied to biological 
35 
evolution. There are two points that need to be made about this position. Firstly, this 
comes very close to conflating worlds two and three when we remember that world 
two includes innate expectations and anticipations, certain dispositions that have their 
origins in the genetic makeup of an organism. Secondly, it seems to contradict many 
of the other statements that Popper puts forward in this area. He nearly always uses 
biological analogies to explain his evolutionary epistemology and that is what they 
usually remain, analogies. Now, for the most part, the growth of objective knowledge 
is inseparable from language; "it is only within a language ... that ... 
knowledge in the 
objective sense become[s] possible" (ibid: 122). Obviously, then, following this tack 
objective knowledge cannot exist before the emergence of humankind and, even then, 
not until the first language to possess both descriptive and argumentative functions 
develops. This contradiction is not easily resolved within his system, yet it should not 
be seen as specific to Popper; such problems occur, as we shall see later, whenever 
knowledge is too closely bound up with language. 
Conclusion 
l'o sum up then, world three is comprised of autonomous items of objective 
knowledge whose defining characteristic is the logical content they possess. The most 
important and active of these items are those which are linguistically formulated and 
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hence open to description and debate. As such they have a physical presence either as 
speech or, more usually, as text - these are world 3: 1 phenomena, objects of material 
culture. Now we have already mentioned that for Popper it makes no difference as to 
what the actual form these world 3: 1 phenomena take as long as they can be 
deciphered, as long as they still have the dispositional character of being open to 
understanding. However, when he writes about such items it is nearly always with 
reference to texts, objects whose logical content is already linguistically arranged and 
so usually offers relatively little resistance to be comprehended. Concomitantly, 
books are produced for the express purpose of communicating ideas; although this 
intention of the author is not in itself a criterion for inclusion within Popper's world 
three. So why does he, in the main, restrict himself to the example of books for, 
following his own guidelines, there is no rational argument for so doing? Is it just 
mere coincidence that he illustrates his position with an example from which the 
retrieval of information is typically a straightforward business? Yet ease of 
interpretation cannot act as an adequate explanation. At the end of the day it does 
seem odd that when Popper talks of world 3: 1 objects he cites D. N. A. molecules at 
one extreme and books at the other. I have already stated why I do not agree with 
extending the limits of world 3: 1 to include the former, but I do want to go beyond 
those objects which are intentionally produced purely for communicative purposes 
within a linguistic framework. Language does not provide a limiting criterion for 
material culture as Popper regularly implies, the vast majority of artefacts cannot be 
viewed as passive signifiers in some form of linguistic code. Consequently, artefacts, 
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as possessors of meaning, differ radically from texts or speech and as such are unable 
to be analysed along purely semiotic lines, (in the Saussurean sense at least). It will be 
a main aim of the following study to describe how information is stored in artefacts in 
a non-linguistic fashion and how it can be recovered. 
However, this is not to say that there is nothing in Popper's work which is of 
relevance to our own study. Firstly, Popper must be commended for attempting to 
explain the presence of information within material objects; even if we disagree over 
its actual nature the very fact that he tackles a subject that has been, for the most part, 
ignored by others deserves some recognition. Secondly, the controversial assertion 
that such knowledge, once produced, has an independent existence requires further 
consideration as the physicality of artefacts implies that this proposition contains an 
element of truth. In other words, material culture may indeed, under certain 
conditions, constitute `knowledge without a knowing subject'. Thirdly, following on 
from this we can argue that, as Popper does with reference to world three items, 
artefacts have the dispositional capacity to be understood; as humanly inscribed 
objects material culture possess the potential to be interpreted. The term `humanly 
inscribed' is utilised here both to limit our inquiries to those objects resulting from 
human agency and to extend them beyond the boundaries set by language so as to 
include all those material products made by humankind. Finally, artefacts, as humanly 
inscribed phenomena, have the ability to affect our activity in the world on a number 
of levels. An important idea that will be developed later in this study is that we 
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understand artefacts not only in a reflective way, but also through our physical 
involvement with them; we possess practical and embodied knowledge of artefacts 
which influences our behaviour towards them in different ways. Furthermore, these 
forms of understanding correspond not only to the artefact itself, but also to the 
relationships which exist between them and the contexts which they help compose. 
However, before we discuss these issues we must first pay some attention to the 
process whereby information is made material, how it enters a physical object. This 
will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Objectification 
Introduction 
The previous discussion of Popper's work has, hopefully, moved us closer to a 
position which accepts the association of information with all human material 
products. The following section will attempt to formulate and describe how this 
occurs, that is, how information `enters' an artefact. Central to this task will be the 
elaboration of the concept known as objectification which was first advanced by Hegel 
and Marx, a notion central to their philosophies, although, not surprisingly, differences 
emerge over its nature and consequences. However, it can be safely argued that both 
saw objectification as an essential process, one whose absence severely effected the 
possibility of humanity's development. As such we shall discuss both theorists' work 
concerning this concept in order to gain a better understanding of it and then use this 
understanding as a basis for a modified interpretation of objectification; the claims that 
I shall be making for this conceptualisation will be of a more modest kind than those 
formulated by Hegel and Marx. Therefore, it will not be seen as a vital operation to be 
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undertaken by all, but rather it will be confined in its application and refer primarily to 
a process whereby human thought can be perceived as being allied to physical objects 
during their manufacture, how, in fact, material culture is possible. 
Hegel: Objectification as alienation 
The inclusion of Georg Hegel in a study of material culture may seem a little 
incongruous as he is usually seen as the epitome of an idealist philosopher. This is 
indeed true, but it need not inevitably lead us to the conclusion that he attached little 
importance to physical objects. There are certain sections in Hegel's work where the 
presence of such items plays a key role, most notably in The Phenomenology of Mind 
(where objects are discussed in the abstract), The Lectures on Aesthetics (where 
particular objects are analysed) and The Philosophy of Right. Much of what is relevant 
to our concerns is to be found in the former two texts and it is upon these that we shall 
concentrate. 
Much of Hegel's mature work can be seen to revolve around the exposition of a 
notion central to his whole philosophy, the absolute idea. This essentially spiritual 
phenomenon, often equated with God, is involved in a dynamic process whose 
ultimate goal is self-comprehension. To achieve this aim development takes place on a 
number of levels, namely logic, nature and mind or spirit (Geist). The philosophy of 
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the latter level is itself divided into three main phases: subjective spirit, approximately 
synonymous to individual psychology; objective spirit, related to the state, social and 
economic institutions, etc.; and absolute spirit, which encompasses art, religion and 
philosophy. Within and between each phase spirit's knowledge of itself increases 
through a dialectical process whereby consciousness continually externalises itself and 
then sublates this posited otherness. This scheme is summarised by Hegel near the end 
of The Phenomenology of Mind: 
"The surmounting of the object of consciousness ... 
is not to be taken 
one-sidedly as meaning that the object showed itself returning into the 
self. It has a more definite meaning: it means that ... the emptying of 
self-consciousness itself establishes thinghood, and that this 
externalisation of self-consciousness has not merely negative, but 
positive significance ... 
for in doing so it establishes itself as object, ... 
sets up the object as its self. ... there 
is also this other moment in the 
process, that self-consciousness has just really cancelled and 
superseded this self-relinquishment and objectification, and has resumed 
them into itself, and is thus at home in its otherness as such" (1964: 
789-90). 
"The terminus", of this process for Hegel, "is at that point where knowledge is no 
longer compelled to go beyond itself' (ibid: 137). Therefore, "consciousness will come 
to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign 
to it ...; 
it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence ... 
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And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute 
knowledge itself' (ibid: 145). This whole operation is neatly summed up by 
Christopher Arthur: 
"Spirit learns what it truly is (and its relationship to the world of 
objectivity) at the same time, and in exact proportion, as it becomes 
what it truly is through manifesting itself in objective form (in morality, 
in bourgeois life, in the state, in religion), and in so doing it eventually 
ends its estrangement from its world through identifying itself in it" 
(1986: 52). 
The presence of an external `otherness' to consciousness, it can be seen, is a necessary 
aspect of Hegel's theory and such phenomena are present in all three phases of spirit's 
development. As the quotation from Arthur states otherness usually refers to non- 
material objects, but physical things are alluded to on occasion. The most explicit of 
which are to be found in those sections of his work that deal with the emergence of 
consciousness and the importance of art. 
According to Hegel self-consciousness is not an inherent quality possessed by humans, 
instead it is attained through an anthropogenetic process. Basically this requires the 
establishment of a relationship characterised by mutual recognition. Without going into 
the niceties, the formation of the first stable association that comes anywhere near this 
requirement is an inherently violent process that inevitably leads to the emergence of 
43 
unequal associations between parties This is the renowned master-servant 
relationship, one that determines how both protagonists interact with, amongst other 
things, the material world. The master's experience of physical reality is merely 
second-hand, one that occurs only through the servant; "the master relates himself to 
the thing mediately through the bondsman" (Hegel 1964: 235). Due to the fact that the 
servant has to work in order to provide for the master the master is inevitably detached 
from the material world, as they have no need to labour they have no real contact with 
it. Ultimately, their relations with the physical world are reduced to ones of an 
essentially vicarious and ephemeral nature distinguished by the immediate gratification 
of their desires. This gratification, "this satisfaction, however ... is itself only a state of 
evanescence, for it lacks objectivity and substance" (ibid: 238). The master only acts 
on things in a negative manner, purely as a consumer, a connection that is necessarily 
transient and unfulfilling. This situation, combined with the fact that the master 
perceives the servant only as another object, a possession, thus denying any chance of 
mutual recognition, obstructs the master from reaching self-realisation. 
The relationship between the servant and physical reality is of a quite different nature, 
one that rests firmly on the fact that they are obliged to work on the material 
environment. It is through the activity of labour that spirit progresses, because it is 
through labour that the "consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself' (ibid: 238). 
As Hegel explains, "in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as 
his [i. e. the servant's] own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he 
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himself exists in its own right and on its own account" (ibid: 239). The situation in 
which this transpires occurs when the servant begins to work on the physical world 
and immediately confronts its materiality, it offers resistance to his wishes. "Labour", 
therefore, "is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed" 
(ibid: 238). It is this scission between desire and its satisfaction that is of importance to 
Hegel, a gap that consists of conscious activity. During this activity the servant is 
continually reminded of the physicality of the world which reinforces an emerging 
awareness of the distinction between him and the external environment, an awareness 
that constitutes the emergence of self-consciousness. 
A correlative aspect of this process is that in the act of production the resultant object 
acquires certain qualities possessed by the labourer. In Hegel's own words: "this 
activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure 
self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externalised and 
passes into the condition of permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves 
accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as 
its self' (ibid: 238). One outcome of labour, therefore, is that the resultant product 
contains and exhibits in a permanent manner the consciousness or aspects of the 
consciousness that helped create it. In other words, the worked-upon material world 
comes to reflect, to a degree, the nature of humanity, a reflection that is solid, 
objective and enduring; Peter Singer uses the ubiquitous chair as an illustration of this 
point - if someone "carves a log of wood into a chair, his design and his efforts remain 
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a part of the world" (1991: 61). It is precisely due to this objectification of 
consciousness that artefacts have the capacity to act back on the servant. He 
recognises that the qualities embodied in the object are in fact his own qualities and 
through this recognition he is able to see himself as a self-conscious being. As Hegel 
explains: "by the fact that the form is objectified, it does not become something other 
than the consciousness moulding the thing through work; for just that form is his pure 
self-existence, which therein becomes fully realised. Thus precisely in labour ... the 
bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having 
and being a `mind of his own"' (1964: 239). 
Yet for the servant too full self-realisation is not forthcoming, because, according to 
Hegel, the bondsman's consciousness; 
"the repressed and subordinated type of consciousness ... 
becomes, in 
the formative activity of work, an object to itself, in the sense that the 
form, given to the thing when shaped and moulded, is his object; he 
sees in the master, at the same time, self-existence as a real mode of 
consciousness. But the subservient consciousness as such finds these 
two moments fall apart - the moment of itself as independent object, 
and the moment of this object as a mode of consciousness, and so its 
own proper reality" (ibid: 242). 
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This partial realisation is, therefore, due to two related factors. Whereas the servant 
perceives the master as an independent self-conscious being the reverse is not the case. 
Consequently mutual recognition is denied and this entails that the servant can never 
become fully aware of himself as an autonomous person. This also means that the 
possibility of recognising their own qualities within their products is to a degree 
negated. It transpires that neither master nor servant reach full self-realisation because 
neither participate totally in the dialectic of externalisation and sublation, or, in more 
everyday economic language, production and consumption. The servant externalises 
himself in an object, but cannot then sublate this externalisation, whereas the master 
does not externalise himself, but consumes the externalisation of another. This being 
said, it seems enough in Hegel's opinion that the servant experiences the activity of 
labour for him to gain some kind of self-consciousness and thus enable the progression 
of spirit. 
What needs to be stressed at this juncture is that even though the master-servant 
relationship signals an important point in the progress of spirit it occurs at a relatively 
early stage in this process and in the totality of the Phenomenology it takes up just 
over ten of more than eight hundred pages. Also, although material objects have a part 
to play it is the role of conscious activity that Hegel views as being of most 
consequence in this section. More specifically, it is the realisation of the transformative 
capacity of labour that enables the emergence of self-consciousness. More emphasis is 
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placed on artefacts in the higher phase of absolute spirit where he deals with the 
function of art. 
Hegel gave a series of lectures on aesthetics which were later collected and published; 
it is to these that we shall now turn, especially the introductory lectures. Here we find 
one of the most accessible and succinct expressions of his position and it is worth 
quoting at length: 
The active self-realisation of humanity is obtained "in a twofold way: in 
the first place theoretically, in as far as he has inwardly to bring himself 
into his own consciousness, with all that moves in the human breast, all 
that stirs and works therein, and, generally, to observe and form an idea 
of himself, to fix before himself what thought ascertains to be his real 
being, and, in what is summoned out of his inner self as in what is 
received from without, to recognise only himself. Secondly, man is 
realised for himself by practical activity, inasmuch as he has the 
impulse, in the medium which is directly given to him, and externally 
presented before him, to produce himself, and therein at the same time 
to recognise himself. This purpose he achieves by the modification of 
external things upon which he impresses the seal of his inner being, and 
then finds repeated in them his own characteristics. Man does this in 
order as a free subject to strip the outer world of its stubborn 
foreignness, and to enjoy in the shape and fashion of things a mere 
external reality of himself. Even the child's first impulse involves this 
practical modification of external things. A boy throws stones into the 
river, and then stands admiring the circles that trace themselves on the 
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water, as an effect in which he attains the sight of something that is his 
own doing. This need traverses the most manifold phenomena, up to 
the mode of self-production in the medium of external things as it is 
known to us in the work of art" (1993: 36). 
This passage contains a number of interesting points. There are, not surprisingly, 
noticeable similarities between the situation described above and the master-servant 
relationship. Yet in the present case circumstances that restrict its smooth-running are 
less apparent, now once an artefact has been created its potentialities can be more 
easily realised. In other words, we can now fully acknowledge that human products 
are manifestations of conscious activity, that they therefore exhibit consciousness in an 
objective manner and by recognising these characteristics, these elements of 
consciousness, humanity gains a greater awareness of itself. This comes about, of 
course, through the dialectical process of externalisation and sublation described at the 
beginning of this section, although, as we shall see, in this context material objects play 
a central role. The actual nature of the artefacts involved is, consequently, of some 
significance. 
Hegel distinguishes between natural objects and artefacts and also between artefacts 
themselves. With respect to the former distinction it needs to be understood that the 
progress of mind can only be accomplished through the activity of humankind, the self- 
realisation of the absolute is thus contemporaneous with the self-realisation of 
humanity. Consequently, according to Hegel; 
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"God is more honoured by what mind does or makes than by the 
productions or formations of nature. For not only is there a divinity in 
man, but in him it is operative under a form that is appropriate to the 
essence of God, in a mode quite other and higher than in nature. God is 
a Spirit, and it is only in man that the medium through which the divine 
element passes has the form of conscious spirit, that actively realises 
itself' (ibid: 34). 
What this means, then, is that although all things have their origins in God the 
products of humanity are assigned a `higher rank' than those of nature. This is because 
artefacts are the outcome of conscious activity and God, being mind, can relate more 
adequately to such objects because they share a common factor, i. e. consciousness. 
The odyssey of mind is, obviously, an essentially ideal process that requires an 
appropriate medium. Humanity, being self-conscious, and its products, being the 
outcome of conscious activity, are therefore more apt channels for this operation than 
the `unconscious' phenomena constituting nature. 
However, returning to the second distinction noted at the beginning of the last 
paragraph, not all human products are seen to be of equal merit in this respect. The 
circles created by the boy throwing stones lie at the lower end of a continuum that 
reaches its apex with the creation of religious art. An artefact's position on this 
continuum appears to rest on how closely integrated the two components of self- 
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realisation, theory and practice, are. In Michael Inwood's view, "at lower levels (e. g. 
stone-throwing), practice is distinct from theory. But at higher levels, practice involves 
the production of meaningful objects (painting, poems, etc. ) that are similar to such 
theoretical products as textbooks" (1993: 122). The more fully theory and practice are 
combined within an artefact the greater its importance for the progression of mind. It 
is significant that this formula does not exclude any human product, however meagre, 
from this process; it is just that "art, especially religious art or at least art that 
expresses a vision of the whole world-process rather than some peripheral aspect of it, 
contributes more to the development of man's, and thus God's, self-consciousness 
than do the production, use and contemplation of knives and forks" (ibid: 119). 
Yet, even religious art does not provide a perfect medium for self-realisation, a pure 
reflection of the qualities that we and the absolute possess. This is due ultimately to 
the sensuous nature of art and artefacts: "the work of art is not yet pure thought, but 
despite its sensuousness it is no longer mere material existence, like stones, plants and 
organic life. The sensuous in the work of art is itself an ideal sensuous, but since it is 
not the ideality of thought, it is still there externally as a thing" (Hegel 1993: 127). The 
absolute being ideal can only achieve full self-realisation through an ideal medium, 
through conceptual thought, through philosophy. So even though art and artefacts 
operate in the same sphere as philosophy, i. e. in absolute spirit, they represent "even 
the highest ideas in sensuous forms, thereby bringing them nearer to the character of 
natural phenomena, to the senses, and to feelings" (ibid: 9). Consequently, "art is not, 
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either in content or in form, the supreme and absolute mode of bringing the mind's 
genuine interests into consciousness. The form of art is enough to limit it to a 
restricted content. Only a certain circle and grade of truth is capable of being 
represented in the medium of art" (ibid: 11). Charles Taylor summarises Hegel's 
position like this; 
"the central contrast between conceptual description and artistic 
presentation of the absolute can thus be seen in this way: in philosophy 
my awareness of the absolute is couched in concepts, the inner, 
transparent vehicles' of thought whose function is to point beyond 
themselves to a domain of objects they correctly portray or 
characterise. In art, my awareness is embodied in a work, an external, 
sensuous object, which by no means simply refers me beyond itself to 
something it describes, but rather lets us see the absolute only through 
its presence in a sensuous object. In descriptive discourse, we 
frequently remember what was conveyed while forgetting the words 
used or even what language was spoken. But the `message' of a work 
of art does not survive the eclipse of its sensuous medium, or only in an 
emasculated way" (Taylor 1978: 471-2). 
It would seem that, from the discussion that we have already undertaken, the latter 
part of Taylor's final sentence is closer to the truth. For Hegel art, and human 
products in general, act like a corroded mirror in which both we and the absolute can 
recognise aspects of ourselves, but due to the condition of the glass the reflection we 
perceive is only partial and forever incomplete. Yet art and artefacts should not be 
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dismissed for this failing for through them comes an awareness that other means of 
self-realisation are possible. Objects of human creativity offer a bridge between the 
material and the spiritual, because they combine elements of the two; art is "the first 
middle term of reconciliation between pure thought and what is external, sensuous, 
and transitory, between nature with its finite actuality and the infinite freedom of the 
reason that comprehends" (Hegel 1993: 10). 
Finally in this exegesis the rather obvious point concerning the circumstances above 
needs to be highlighted, they all occur within social contexts. Social experience is of 
major importance as the individual is primarily seen as an abstraction from the social. 
The production of artefacts is firmly rooted within social relations, people are 
immanently linked through productive activity and, under circumstances of universal 
recognition, they are conscious of these ties. In Hegel's words; 
"the labour of the individual for his own want is just as much a 
satisfaction of those others as of himself, and the satisfaction of his own 
he attains only by the labour of others". He goes on, "he also performs 
the universal task as his conscious object. The whole becomes in its 
entirety his work, for he sacrifices himself, and precisely by that means 
receives back his own self from it" (Hegel 1964: 377). 
We move towards self-realisation partly through the production and consumption of 
objects that are, due to the circumstances mentioned above, essentially social in 
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character. By externalising and sublating ourselves in these socially constituted 
artefacts we come to recognise that we are necessarily social beings. 
Before moving on to discuss Marx's views in this area it may be worthwhile just to 
highlight a few aspects of Hegel's work that appear to be significant for our study. It is 
interesting to note that he sees artefacts as occupying an ambiguous middle ground 
between the material and the ideal, human products appear to possess components of 
both which supplies them with a unique character. More significantly the process of 
objectification always contains an element of loss, of alienation. The moment after we 
have acted our deed is no longer purely our own so that "language and labour are 
outer expressions in which the individual no longer retains possession of himself per 
se, but lets the inner get right outside him, and surrenders it to something else" (ibid: 
340). Our deeds now become the property of others and can be interpreted and 
manipulated without regard to the intentions or desires that we originally attached to 
them. We shall come back to the reasons and implications of Hegel's thoughts over 
this matter later on. It is now time to discuss Marx's ideas on this topic beginning first 
with his critique of Hegel. 
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Marx: Objectification and alienation 
The final section of Marx's third Economic and Philosophic Manuscript contains this 
appreciation: 
"The importance of Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the 
dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle - lies in 
the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, 
objectification as loss of object, as alienation and supersession of this 
alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives 
objective man ... as the result of his own labour" (Marx 1992: 385-6). 
There are a number of different points within this quotation that have important 
consequences with respect to the conceptualisation of artefacts. The two that we shall 
concentrate on are; firstly, that Marx apparently agrees with Hegel over the 
importance of labour and alienation, and secondly, that he also agrees with the 
association of alienation with objectification. Now it is true that Marx believed that 
labour, objectification and alienation are related concepts for, as the extract asserts, 
objectification and alienation occur in and through activity, they are both modes and 
outcomes of labour. The importance of labour for Marx is illustrated in the following; 
"productive life is species life. It is life-producing life. The whole 
character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its 
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life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes the species- 
character of man". He goes on, "man makes his life activity itself an 
object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is 
not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life 
activity directly distinguishes man from animal life activity" (ibid: 328). 
The stress on `conscious life activity' bears similarities to Hegel's position, but the two 
differ radically over its actual nature. For although Marx agrees with Hegel as "he sees 
labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence, of man" (ibid: 386), he parts 
company with him due to the fact that "the only labour Hegel knows and recognises is 
abstract mental labour" (ibid: 386). Conscious life activity for Hegel, in Marx's view, 
is activity that occurs purely in the realm of consciousness, in the mind. Now, at first 
glance, this criticism appears a little misplaced, Marx seems to have overlooked such 
passages as the master-servant relationship where activity does take place in the 
material world, (see Arthur 1983: 71). However, as we noted earlier, not only does 
this section constitute just a small part of the Phenomenology, a work where the whole 
purpose is to describe the development of an ideal entity towards self-knowledge, but 
also, concomitantly, its real importance rests on its spiritual rather than material result. 
The activity that Hegel is primarily concerned with is that undertaken by the absolute, 
activity that can be expressed in a number of different ways as the Phenomenology 
illustrates. 
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Marx, obviously, sees things somewhat differently - instead of ascribing activity to a 
spiritual entity it is attributed to `Man'. As he asserts; "the first premise of all human 
history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals ... real 
individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find 
already existing and those produced by their activity" (Marx 1970: 42). Labour is 
firmly rooted in the material world, because we are real, objective beings. Our very 
existence depends upon our interaction with the world as "life involves before 
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The 
first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the 
production of material life itself' (ibid: 48). Ultimately, "to say that man's physical and 
mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a 
part of nature" (Marx 1992: 328). Therefore, whereas conscious activity for Hegel is 
activity that is purely conscious in its origins for Marx it is conscious activity on and in 
the physical world carried out by physical beings. In sum, then; 
"it is ... 
in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself 
to be a species-being. Such production is his active species life". Marx 
continues, "through it nature appears as his work and his reality. The 
object of labour is therefore the objectification of the species-life of 
man: for man reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his 
consciousness, but actively and actually, and he can therefore 
contemplate himself in a world he himself has created" (ibid: 329). 
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We have now reached an important point; how Marx differs from Hegel over his 
interpretation of objectification, and especially its relationship with alienation. Much 
has already been written on this subject so I shall endeavour to confine myself to that 
which appears directly relevant to our study. A major aspect of Marx's critique of 
Hegel in the final Manuscript of 1844 concerns itself with the accusation that the latter 
made no distinction between objectification and alienation, but, in fact, conflated the 
two. To backtrack slightly, it may be recalled that spirit moves towards self- 
knowledge by, in the first instance, externalising or alienating itself in a variety of 
objective forms, usually of a non-material nature. Alienation is, therefore, responsible 
for the creation of objectivity and this is what Hegel describes as the positive side of 
alienation. Yet simultaneously in this very act the negative side of alienation is also 
realised for in creating the objective world spirit moves into a realm which it did not 
formerly inhabit. Alienation thus also involves an act of relinquishment, a 
relinquishment of spirit into an 'otherness', for it is only by expressing itself in a 
medium other than itself that spirit can come to self-knowledge. The progress towards 
self-realisation results from the sublation of spirit's product, of objectivity. Hegel 
makes good use of the ambiguity surrounding the term sublation in the German 
language where it can mean both to abolish and to preserve. Therefore, in this process 
alienation is at the same time both annulled through internalisation and retained 
through the recognition of objectivity's. otherness. Consequently at the heart of 
Hegel's work there exists an inherent tension between seemingly contradictory 
elements. It follows that we are presented with a position in which both objectification 
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and alienation occur, or rather where objectification inevitably entails alienation, 
objectification is alienation. 
This is where Marx and Hegel are fundamentally opposed, because for Marx alienation 
is a particular form of objectification, one that is tied to particular historical and social 
circumstances. The basis of his criticism, again, lies in his rejection of Hegel's idealism. 
Alienation is alienation of spirit. Spirit can only come to know itself through alienating 
itself in different spheres such as religion, civil society, etc. But, argues Marx, these 
`objective' phenomena can not be anything of the sort due to the fact that they are 
ultimately the product of purely cognitive processes. "Self-consciousness", he writes, 
"through its alienation, can only establish thingness, i. e. an abstract thing, a thing of 
abstraction and not a real thing" (ibid: 389). Consequently; 
"when, for example, Hegel, conceives wealth, the power of the state, 
etc., as entities estranged from the being of man, he conceives them 
only in their thought form ... 
They are entities of thought, and therefore 
simply an estrangement of pure, i. e. abstract, philosophical thought ... 
The appropriation of man's objectified and estranged essential powers 
is therefore firstly only an appropriation which takes place in 
consciousness, in pure thought, i. e. in abstraction" (ibid: 384). 
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Sublation, the simultaneous abolition and preservation of alienation, is an act of 
consciousness, a change of mind, a process, argues Marx, that leaves reality 
untouched. 
Now, Marx seems to have pushed his criticism too far for, as we have already noted, 
Hegel saw it is an essential requirement that spirit objectify itself. Yet, on the other 
hand, nothing can exist which is not related to spirit. The result, then, is not so much a 
denial of objectivity by Hegel, but instead, as Arthur defines it, an attitude of 
`ambivalence' towards it for "spirit requires another in which to find its being, 
reflected, while at the same time requiring that there be nothing that is not it" (Arthur 
1982: 18). 
Marx's views on objectivity appear far from ambivalent - "to say that man is a 
corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural powers means that he 
has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vital expression, or that 
he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects" (Marx 1992: 390). The existence 
of an external, material world is a prerequisite for our very being, not only literally, but 
also as human beings; we can "create nothing without nature, without the sensuous 
external wtworld ' (ibid: 325). Objectification is therefore firmly rooted in the physical 
world, a process that is carried out by real people in the real world through real 
activity. Through labour, through activity on and in the world we objectify ourselves, 
we see ourselves reflected in the world which we help to create; "the practical creation 
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of an objective world, the fashioning of inorganic nature, is proof that man is a 
conscious species-being" (ibid: 328-9). Marx's conception of objectification is 
summed up in his Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Philosophy. Here 
he contends that; 
"in my production I ... have objectified the specific character of my 
individuality and for that reason I ... both have enjoyed the expression 
of my own individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating 
the object, I ... experience my personality as an objective sensuously 
perceptible power beyond all shadow of a doubt". Also, "in your use 
and enjoyment of my product I ... have the immediate satisfaction and 
knowledge that in my labour I ... gratified a human need, i. e. that I had 
objectified human nature and hence ... procured an object 
corresponding to the needs of another human being". Consequently, 
"our productions ... [are] as many mirrors from which our natures shine 
forth" (ibid: 277-8). 
The importance Marx placed on artefacts is now apparent. Objects that we create play 
a vital role in our self-creation, our essential being is "established by objects" (ibid: 
389), for it is through them and their manufacture that we objectify ourselves. Marx 
believes in the possibility that "all objects [can] become for [Man] the objectification 
of hiniself, objects that confirm and realise his individuality, his objects" (ibid: 352-3). 
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However, it is not inevitable that artefacts play such a positive role, they can just as 
well act in an extremely negative way. The part they do play is determined by the 
nature of the social relations present in a society at a particular point in time. One of 
the defining features of present day society is that social relations, based on the 
division of labour, establish an inherent state of alienation in all aspects of everyday 
life. Alienation, in Marx's opinion, is a distorted form of objectification, not as in 
Hegel's opinion, a necessary aspect of it. It contains no redeeming features, it is "a 
flaw, a weakness, something which ought not to be" (ibid: 399). For Marx, in very 
general terms, alienation is seen as loss. Only the first part of the equation of 
objectification occurs in that humanity externalises itself, but then this externalisation is 
separated permanently from its makers. Consequently any possibility of internalisation 
is denied. This situation has its origins in actual social circumstances and as such is 
open to change. Alienation is, therefore, a historical not, as Hegel thought, an 
ahistorical phenomenon. 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx asserts that alienation affects 
all aspects of human existence and this is explained by defining four interrelated modes 
that help constitute it. Alienation thus involves estrangement from productive activity, 
estrangement from the product, estrangement from other people and estrangement 
from our species-being. Marx argues that as a logical consequence of our being 
alienated from our labour (i. e. labour activity, as a commodity, becomes out of 
necessity the private property of someone else) so, it follows, are its products - "the 
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estrangement of the object of labour merely summarises the estrangement, the 
alienation in the activity of labour itself' (ibid: 326). 
Marx's views on the artefacts manufactured under capitalism are neatly summed up in 
one sentence from the first Manuscript. "The externalisation of the worker in his 
product means not only that [i] his labour becomes an object, an external existence, 
but that [ii] it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to 
confront him as an autonomous power; [iii] that the life which he has bestowed on his 
object confronts him as hostile and alien" (ibid: 324). Let's take each aspect in turn. 
We are already familiar with the following point; "the product of labour is labour 
embodied and made material in an object' (ibid: 324). This occurs no matter what kind 
of social relations are in place, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for both 
objectification and alienation. It is only in combination with remaining two factors that 
the process of objectification is transformed into that of alienation. 
For Marx, the products of capitalist production exist `independently' as the inevitable 
consequence of the fact that the worker does not own, at any moment during the 
manufacturing process or afterwards, the product; it is always the private property of 
the capitalist, (this is also the case with regards to the raw materials and the machinery 
needed for its production). Consequently, the worker has no control over the 
commodity after its production, what becomes of it is entirely out of their hands even 
if it is essential for their very survival. It is because of this very real rupture between 
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producer and product that Marx believes there is an inevitable impoverishment of 
humanity as it is forever expending itself, externalising itself, and receiving very little in 
return, the reciprocal act of internalisation is denied. As he says; 
"the more the worker exerts himself in his work, the more powerful the 
alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over against 
himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, and the less they 
belong to him ... 
The worker places his life in the object; but now it no 
longer belongs to him, but to the object. The greater his activity, 
therefore, the fewer objects the worker possesses. What the product of 
his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he 
himself' (ibid: 324). 
In essence what Marx is proposing here is an existential zero-sum equation which 
results in the enhancement of commodities and simultaneously the impoverishment of 
its maker. This occurs to such an extent that products seem to take on a life of their 
own so that "in bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while 
the living person is dependent and has no individuality" (Marx 1978: 485). In capitalist 
societies social relations appear to be primarily between commodities and it is only as 
owners of commodities that people can enter such relationships. 
So we conic to the third point noted above, the hostile confrontation between 
producer and product. Under capitalism artefacts become the dominant partner in this 
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relationship, they are active whereas their makers are reactive. In Marx's words; "this 
fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an 
objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, 
bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical 
development up till now" (Marx 1970: 53). The domination of artefacts as 
commodities occurs both in production and consumption. In manufacturing an object a 
worker's actions are determined by the productive process and its associated 
machinery so that they do not, "use the instruments of labour, but the instruments of 
labour use the worker ... 
Through its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of 
labour comes to confront the worker during the labour process as capital, as dead 
labour, which controls the living labour power and sucks it dry" (Marx 1957: 451). 
Once made the product has the ability to manipulate the behaviour of humanity 
through the creation of needs and new desires and this rather obvious state of affairs is 
fully exploited under capitalism. Consequently; 
"each person speculates on creating a new need in the other, with the 
aim of forcing him to make a new sacrifice, placing him in a new 
dependence and seducing him into a new kind of enjoyment and hence 
into economic ruin. Each attempts to establish over the other an alien 
power, in the hope of thereby achieving satisfaction of his own selfish 
needs. With the mass of objects grows the realm of alien powers to 
which man is subjected, and each new product is a new potentiality of 
mutual fraud and mutual pillage" (Marx 1992: 358). 
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Miller: Objectification in the modern world 
At this point the relevance of the foregoing surveys of Hegel and Marx needs to be 
made more explicit. It is the aim of this section to move towards a notion of 
objectification which can act as part of the theoretical foundations for an analysis of 
material culture. A similar undertaking has recently been carried out by Daniel Miller 
and it through a brief critique of his work in this area, specifically his interpretation and 
use of Hegel's and Marx's ideas, that progress can hopefully be made. Miller's work is 
of importance due not only to the fact that it is one of a very limited number of 
contemporary examinations of material culture, but also because of the breath and 
strength of the analysis offered. 
The opening section of his Material Culture and Mass Consumption concerns itself 
with formulating a theory of objectification which corresponds, in simple terms, to "a 
series of processes consisting of externalisation (self-alienation) and sublation 
(reabsorption) through which the subject of such a process is created and developed" 
(Miller 1993: 12). Miller's distinctive conceptualisation of objectification is attained 
through an act of abstraction, primarily from Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind. By 
lifting Hegel's notion of objectification from its philosophical context he believes that 
it can then be applied as a tool in the analysis of culture, and material culture in 
particular. The characteristics of Hegel's theory that Miller is most keen to retain are 
those with "dynai c, positive and non-reductionist implications" (ibid: 30). According 
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to Miller, Hegel gave priority to neither subject nor object, but insisted that the two 
emerge simultaneously as a result of a process of mutual construction. Consequently, 
objectification denies the independence of subject and object, hence its non- 
reductionist character. Also, this process by its very nature is in perpetual flux, the 
relations between subject and object are never inert. Finally, Miller believes that 
objectification is inherently contradictory in that it incorporates an irreconcilable 
tension between positive and negative elements. On the positive side the subject, 
humanity, progresses as a consequence of this process, but, paradoxically, only 
through the negating act of self-alienation. Miller places much importance on this 
situation and we shall come back to it shortly. At the end of his discussion of Hegel, 
Miller sums up his own position: 
"Primarily then, objectification is intended as the foundation of a theory 
of culture. Indeed, if culture is defined as the externalisation of society 
in history, through which it is enabled to embody and thus reproduce 
itself, objectification and culture may be defined with respect to one 
another. The use of the term objectification then asserts the necessity 
for a particular kind of relationship between human development and 
external form. This relationship is never static, but always a process of 
becoming which cannot be reduced to either of its two component 
parts: subject and object" (ibid: 33). 
The next section of Miller's study concerns itself with an investigation of Marx's 
critique of Hegel and the conceptualisation of the former's own notion of 
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objectification. One may be forgiven for assuming that Miller would come down in 
favour of Marx's perspective, due to the latter's emphasis on the importance of the 
material world and especially the part played by the product. It is, therefore, surpri-in`T 
to discover that this is not the case, rather in Miller's opinion it is Hegel's theory that 
offers more to our understanding of material. How does he come to reach this 
conclusion? 
Much of Miller's dissatisfaction appears to stem from Marx's thoughts on alienation. 
As we have already noted, Marx perceived alienation not as an inevitable aspect of 
objectification, but a distorted form of objectification tied to a certain type of social 
circumstance existing under capitalism. Miller disagrees; aligning himself with Hegel 
he believes that objectification combines both positive (the creation of the objective) 
and negative (a feeling of relinquishment) moments which are inseparable and this is an 
ahistorical phenomenon always and ever present. As he acknowledges, the basis for 
this argument is taken from Jean Hyppolite's piece on Lukac's The Young Hegel. In 
his critique Hyppolite asserts the following: 
"By objectifying himself in culture, the State, and human labour in 
general, man at the same time alienates himself, becomes other than 
himself, and discovers in this objectification an insurmountable 
degeneration which he must nevertheless try to overcome. This is a 
tension inseparable from existence, and it is Hegel's merit to have 
drawn attention to it and to have preserved it in the very centre of 
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human self-consciousness. On the other hand, one of the great 
difficulties of Marxism is its claim to overcome this tension in the more 
or less near future and hastily attribute it to a particular phase of 
history. It is surely an oversimplification to imagine that this tension can 
be reduced to a super-structure of the economic world. It is undeniable 
that the capitalist system represents a form of human alienation, but it 
can hardly be the only one" (Hyppolite 1969: 87). 
For Miller this line of reasoning points to our adopting Hegel's notion that "self- 
alienation is an inescapable part of a positive process, but one which has an 
intrinsically contradictory nature" (Miller 1993: 43). To add weight to his argument he 
draws upon the anthropological work of Nancy Munn. Miller's premise is that by 
showing that objectification, along Hegelian lines, exists in the non-industrial 
aboriginal societies of Australia and the Melanesian islands one can, therefore, safely 
propose that it is not restricted to a particular socio-economic context, i. e. capitalism, 
but instead is universal and ahistorical. In contradiction to Marx, Miller proposes that 
the possibility of objectification occurring without self-alienation is an untenable 
assertion. Such a process, as would occur under communism, is regarded merely as a 
Romantic notion. 
Now my contention is that Miller is misguided in his preference for He`el's 
conceptualisation of objectification; I believe Marx's is the most fruitful in it,, provi'ion 
of a basis for our understanding of material culture. Fundamental problems arise with 
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Miller's notion of objectification because however `violent' he is with the act of 
abstraction he can not but help allow some elements of Hegel's idealism from being 
carried over, elements that entail certain difficulties. It will be recalled that the first act 
within objectification for Hegel, Marx and Miller is that of externalisation. However, 
for Hegel and Miller this act is synonymous with self-alienation, yet for Marx while 
this can indeed be the case, it need not necessarily be so, much depends upon socio- 
historical circumstances. The reasoning behind Hegel's position is that for him 
objectivity itself is an important problem due to its apparent otherness to spirit. The 
resolution of this difficulty is accomplished by asserting that objectivity is in fact 
nothing but the externalisation of spirit itself. This self-alienation of spirit results in the 
creation of external forms that, in the act of sublation, are not abrogated but continue 
to exist whilst losing their quality of otherness. Objective structures remain rather like 
a residue, a by-product of this process and this is what Hegel refers to as the positive 
achievement of spirit's self-alienation. Now the primary reason why this is described as 
self-alienation by Hegel is that objectivity is viewed as in some way contradictory to its 
source, it is necessary for spirit to create an opposite in which it can be reflected in 
order for a dialectical process to occur. 
However, for Marx, of course, objectivity presents no such problems, it is not the 
creation of an ideal entity, but of objective human beings; physical artefacts and social 
institutions are the result of active material entities. Therefore, there is no need for the 
products of human activity to become alienated from them so that they can take part 
in 
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the dialectics of objectification, all that is required is that humans form real objects in 
the world. It is not the case that just because these objects then have an external 
existence distinct from their producers that they must consequently possess alien 
characteristics, that they are destined to become alienated and alienating. The 
realisation that alienation is a contingent phenomenon occurring within particular 
circumstances is Marx's distinct achievement, and, ironically, the presence of these self 
same circumstances is one possible reason why Hegel overlooked this eventuality. 
According to Arthur: 
"Hegel's tragedy is that, though objectification and alienation are 
conceptually distinct, and are distinguished brilliantly by Marx, Hegel 
cannot grasp this possibility, for it depends upon a historical potential 
beyond the limits of his bourgeois standpoint. Thus he collapses them 
together so that the necessity of spirit's odyssey of self-objectification 
becomes at the same time its self-estrangement, and scientific criticism 
is powerless to do more than point to the content hidden behind the 
forms of estrangement and pass off this insight as their sublation" 
(Arthur 1986: 68). 
So what of Hyppolite's defence of Hegel that Miller endorses, which proposes that 
alienation produces a "tension inseparable from existence" and that this is at "the very 
centre of human self-consciousness"; alienation under capitalism is but one instance of 
an ever present phenomenon (Hyppolite 1969: 87)? Here again we find the association 
of externalisation with alienation, that the former invariably implies the latter and that 
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this inexorably leads to Hyppolite concluding, "objectification and alienation are 
inseparable" (ibid : 88). Unfortunately he adds little more to justify this position over 
and above that offered by Hegel. If, as Hyppolite suggests, Marx can be accused of 
being too strict in his application of alienation by applying it to just one phase of 
history then, likewise, he himself must face the accusation of diluting its analytical 
importance by asserting its universal presence. Concomitantly, if alienation is so 
ubiquitous there seems little point in the appeal that we ought to try and overcome it, 
this is merely a moral proposition doomed to failure (see Meszdros 1970: 240). 
Finally, there is Miller's invocation of Munn's anthropological studies. It does appear 
slightly odd to use this body of work in support of a Hegelian position when Munn's 
approach draws explicitly from Marx. The proposition that Miller wants to make is 
that self-alienation is present in pre-capitalist societies and one illustration of this 
comes from Munn's study of aboriginal myth. As Miller summarises; 
"in the myths, the ancestors undergo several forms of transformation 
from sentient beings into objects. First, the ancestors may transform the 
whole of their body into some visual feature such as a rock outcrop 
(metamorphosis); secondly, they may leave their imprint upon the 
ground through the impression of a part of their body, such as a 
footprint (imprinting); and thirdly, they may take out from within their 
body an object which then is transformed into a natural 
feature of the 
land (externalisation). Although the ancestors are perpetually in motion, 
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they may leave behind a number of such permanent and static signs of 
their transformations" (Miller 1993: 56-7). 
It is within this pre-constituted world that humans objectify themselves, so that 
whereas their ancestors were involved in a process of objectification that was 
unrestrained, human objectification is both enabled and constrained by their ancestors' 
activities. "As a result of this projective process", Munn explains, "the material world 
comes to provide the individual with images or `fragments' of himself. In the normal 
personality these `images' are recognised as being outside the person and separate 
from him, and yet are experienced as inextricably bound up with him" (Munn in Miller 
1993: 66). It is this `separation' that Miller interprets as alienation yet there appears to 
be no strong justification for reaching such a conclusion. Munn's work does not show 
that alienation is inevitable, rather it is the less extreme act of externalisation that she 
endorses. Objectification involves externalisation, alienation is the outcome of a 
distorted form of objectification. By reducing alienation to a moment within a process 
we are refused the use of a concept which could be utilised to describe a `pathological' 
relationship with material objects. In opposition to Miller I want to suggest that 
alienation, far from being a universal ahistorical phenomenon, is instead not only 
confined to capitalist forms of production, but even here it is not all pervasive. It is still 
possible under such conditions for objectification to occur although the opportunities 
for such an eventuality are limited by the socio-economic factors present. This 
potentiality is, in fact, recognised by Marx, not all artefacts created within capitalist 
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societies are necessarily commodities and thus alienated products. "One who satisfies 
his wants with the product of his own labour ... does not make a commodity" (Marx 
1957: 9). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to formulate a notion of objectification that would 
enable us to come to some kind of understanding as to how an aspect of humanity 
becomes associated to the objects people create. This being the case the significance of 
such a concept is relatively modest in comparison to that proposed by Miller. Unlike 
Miller objectification will be used in the following study only with reference to material 
culture, it is not seen as a concept that is applicable across the board to understanding 
culture in general. This is because there exist irreconcilable differenccs between the 
two major cultural forms that human productivity can initiate, between social 
structures, systems and institutions on the one hand and material artefacts on the 
other. Most obviously artefacts do not require the continued presence of human 
agency for their subsequent existence whereas societies cannot exist independently of 
human activity. We shall discuss this dissimilarity and its implications in more detail 
shortly. 
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Likewise, the notion of objectification expressed here is far more limited than Marx's, 
thus it is no longer seen as a necessary ontogenetic process which humanity per se 
must experience in order to develop fully. Instead, objectification is perceived as a 
process that occurs whenever an artefact is made whereby meaning enters the object; 
the nature of this meaning is contingent not only, as Marx argued, on the 
circumstances surrounding the act of production, but also on the characteristics of the 
resultant object, (this second point will be developed in the following section). It is 
because an `element' of the producer enters the artefact that it can be recognised as a 
product of human activity and only because of this factor that it can be interpreted. 
The elucidation of this element, for the moment let's call it knowledge, will take up 
much of the remaining study, but one point can be made at this stage; knowledge need 
not necessarily be linked with reflective, intentional activity. The unintended 
consequences of human activity can also be read as meaningful, pollution, waste 
products and refuse are all open to interpretation - the archaeologist, for example, 
often has little else to go on other than the dross left by previous cultures. Take the 
activity of flint knapping in which a tool and waste products are formed, both help us 
to understand the nature of lithic technology. As Nicole Pigeot explains; 
"each percussion act is `expressed' into a flake and its negative, and 
each debitage sequence leaves on the ground a series of products and 
b\'-products. These elements retain, to a various degree, some evidence 
of the succession of gestures carried out prior to their own detachment. 
On this basis, it become,,, possible to decipher and reconstruct, with 
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great precision, the coherence of the knapping process, the techniques 
employed, and the aims of the actor" (Pigeot 1990: 126-8). 
Furthermore, by-products are open to re-interpretation by their originator, they can 
become products themselves; small flint debris may be collected and then embedded in 
bone or wood to form a saw-like implement, they are thus transformed from waste 
products into useful objects with no modification to their physical nature. The 
distinction between intended products and refuse is, therefore, open to interpretation, 
the smoke produced by burning wood shavings may be pollution to one person, but be 
seen by another as an essential ingredient in the manufacture of kippers. By extending 
knowledgeable activity beyond that of discursive thought, as was hinted at in the 
previous chapter, all material products created by us can be seen as possessing 
meaning; again this will have to be substantiated presently. However, in the following 
chapter we will concentrate on the implications arising from the artefact's materiality 
with reference to the work of Hannah Arendt. 
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Physicality 
Introduction 
In the previous section we encountered Daniel Miller's conceptualisation of objectification 
which he saw as applicable to the study of culture per se. In this chapter it shall be argued 
that this cannot be the case, a single theory cannot be used to understand both material 
and non-material culture, because of material culture's very materiality. The physical 
nature of artefacts brings with it specific problems and consequently these need to be 
addressed in their own right, this distinct quality must be confronted. 
In that all social life, no matter where or when, is undertaken in the presence of artefacts it 
is surprising to find that scant attention has been paid to their nature within sociology. 
What still seems to be of primary importance to contemporary social theorists, as it was 
for Comte, is the need to establish a definite object for investigation, in other words to 
objectify society in such a way that it forms a valid item for study. Now, it might be as a 
consequence of this preoccupation that little thou`; ht has been given to artefacts, yet this 
does not mean that present theorising has nothing to say on the subject. Ultimately both 
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society (social structures, institutions, systems, etc. ) and artefacts are the outcome of 
socially constituted human actions so ideas concerning the former may shed light on the 
atter. 
The products of human agency 
Probably the most influential of contemporary social theories is that of a type most notably 
formulated by those such as Roy Bhaskar and Anthony Giddens (see especially Bhaskar 
1989 & Giddens 1986,1990,1991) which centre around notions of duality. At the outset 
it must be stated that this is not the place to argue for or against the overall adequacy of 
such an approach as an explanation of social phenomena , rather we want to ascertain 
what insights it can offer us with respect to material objects created by people. That being 
said a general outline of this position is provided by Bhaskar which essentially asserts that 
individuals and society exist in a relationship of mutual interdependence. He explains this 
as follows; 
'`people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and it is a 
necessary condition for their activity. Rather, society must be regarded as 
an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals 
reproduce and transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. 
Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of 
reitication). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism). Now 
the process whereby the stocks of skills, competencies and habits 
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appropriate to given social contexts, and necessary for the reproduction 
and/or transformation of society, are acquired and maintained could be 
generically referred to as socialisation. It is important to stress that the 
reproduction and/or transformation of society, though for the most part 
unconsciously achieved, is nevertheless an achievement, a skilled 
accomplishment of active subjects, not a mechanical consequence of 
antecedent conditions. This model of the society/person connection can be 
represented as below" (Bhaskar 1989: 36). 
" Society 
socialization 
Individuals 
reproduction/ 
transformation 
According to this scheme, despite their interdependence, people and society are `radically' 
different things, ontologically distinct, and it is sociology's task to investigate the latter in 
all its aspects. As the above quotation states society is seen as an `ensemble of structures, 
practices and conventions' which owe their existence to certain enduring relationships. 
Bhaskar, therefore, argues for a relational conception of sociology's subject matter, 
relations of which the social agents involved may or may not be aware. 
In Oddcns's case thin,,.,, are less clew-, especially over the nature of society; social systems 
aw not given as much ontological solidity in comparison to Bhaskar, they appear more 
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ethereal in quality. This difference seems to lie in the amount of `externality' given to 
social structures, Giddens allowing less than Bhaskar. One explanation for this difference 
between the two theorists is that although they are dealing with a similar subject their 
agendas are slightly different. Whereas Bhaskar is attempting to formulate the basis of a 
valid methodology for sociological investigations, Giddens is more concerned with 
undertaking an ontology of social being. However, both endorse the notion of the duality 
of structure, structure being simultaneously "medium and outcome of the conduct it 
recursively organises" (Giddens 1991: 374). 
Consequently, we encounter the extremely obvious, but nevertheless crucially important 
distinction between two outcomes of human agency. Firstly, we have those products 
which rely on the chronic recursive activity of people for their continued existence, i. e. 
social systems and institutions. Secondly, we have those products which owe their 
existence, not to recursive behaviour, but to activity of a specific duration which 
terminates with the emergence of finished articles, i. e. artefacts. The incessant presence of 
human agency is therefore a necessity for the continuation of social structures, either in 
the sulze form or transformed in some way. The continual existence of an artefact, once 
made, requires no such human intervention. This distinction rests, of course, on their 
material nature, vet what else does this quality entail, what are the consequences of 
physicality? 
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To approach this substantial topic let's begin by returning to the end of the preceding 
section. In the closing part of Miller's critique of Marx he draws upon an argument 
espoused by Jean Baudrillard. According to Baudrillard Marx gave undue priority to the 
activity of labour, to the process of production. As we have already seen Marx did indeed 
place heavy emphasis on labour, because, in his eyes, it lies at the very centre of 
humanity's self-creation; "the object of labour is ... the objectification of the species-life of 
man" (Marx 1992: 329). What Baudrillard proposes is that by forwarding such a view 
Marx is implicitly endorsing a position that he sets out to refute, that of the political 
economists. For all these theorists' work is comprehended as the only real means through 
which humanity can realise itself, (a belief which, of course, Max Weber attempted to 
explain). Works ontogenetic status, it could be argued, is perceived to rest on ethical 
foundations. 
Associated with this criticism is Baudrillard's assertion that Marx incorporated another 
Victorian value within his work, that of utility; humanity creates itself through socially 
useful labour. For Marx we begin to transform nature in order to satisfy basic human 
needs, "it is obvious that man, by his activity, modifies the forms of natural substances so 
as to make them useful to himself' (Marx 1957: 44). Herein lies the source of use-value 
for "the utility of a thing makes it a use-value" (ibid: 4) and use-value can only be realised 
in consumption. Baudrillard therefore accuses Marx of naturalising use-value, it is seen as 
unproblematic as it is intrinsically tied to pre-determined natural and stable human needs. 
The relationship between person and object is, then, objective and straightforward. 
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Consequently, what Marx overlooks by following this line of thought is, in Baudrillard's 
words, "the entire ideological and historical labour process that leads subjects in the first 
place to think of themselves as individuals, defined by their needs and satisfaction, and so 
ideally to integrate themselves into the structure of the commodity" (Baudrillard 1988: 71- 
2). Now whatever the validity of these claims, and they have by no means gone 
unchallenged, they do provoke a need to question the role and nature of labour and its 
relationship to its products. The first tentative steps towards analysing the consequences 
of the artefact's physicality shall therefore be taken through a discussion of labour. One of 
the most interesting and idiosyncratic studies of labour has been carried out by Hannah 
Arendt and it is to her work that we shall now turn, because it is via a critique of labour 
that she comes to assess the quality of `durability'. Durability, a corollary of an objects 
material nature, has a number of important repercussions for Arendt and these are highly 
relevant to our own project, most especially to this section. 
Arendt on activity 
Are ndt's `The Human Condition' is, as its title implies, an attempt to come to some kind 
of understanding of the condition in which humanity presently finds itself. In her opinion 
these circumstances are far from ideal and she illustrates this assertion rather dramatically 
at the veiy beginning of her book. She argues that the launch of the first satellite in 1957 
was accompanied by a sense of joy that was not triumphal in nature, but was instead 
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characterised foremostly by a feeling of relief, relief because we had moved closer towards 
freeing ourselves from our `imprisonment' on earth. The task Arendt set herself was, 
therefore, to try and explain how the human condition had become so detestable that 
escape from the world appeared to be such an inviting alternative. At the heart of this 
analysis, argues Arendt, must lie an investigation into the nature of our activities, because 
it is precisely through our actions that the world has become as it is - in human activity lies 
the origins of human sorrows. 
According to Arendt there are three fundamental human activities, "fundamental because 
each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given 
to man" (Arendt 1989: 7). Firstly there is labour, an activity that relates directly to our 
immediate survival as living creatures. Secondly there is work, this includes the production 
of a world of things that are distinct from nature and which out-live us. Finally there is 
action which, unlike the previous two activities, occurs directly between people without 
the mediation of the material world. As our study is essentially concerned with objects we 
shall not trouble ourselves with this third type. The distinction between labour and work is 
one that has rarely been made by those concerned with human activity, yet, for Arendt, 
"the phenomenal evidence in its favour is too striking to be ignored" (ibid: 79). 
An important clue to understanding the difference between labour and work is provided by 
language. What appears to be true for all European languages, both ancient and modern, is 
that "the word 'labour', understood as a noun, never designates the finished product, the 
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result of labouring, but remains a verbal noun to be classed with the gerund, whereas the 
product itself is invariably derived from the word for work" (ibid: 80). In Arendt's opinion 
this etymological distinction does reflect actual circumstances, labour does not result in 
the production of durable things whereas work does. "Labour", according to her, "is the 
activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose 
spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities 
produced and fed into the life process by labour" (ibid: 7). The products of labour 
"have a very brief existence in the world as they are consumed almost 
immediately after they are made". She goes on to elaborate that "after a 
brief stay in the world, they return into the natural process which yielded 
them either through absorption into the life process of the human animal or 
through decay; in their man-made shape, through which they acquired their 
ephemeral place in the world of man-made things, they disappear more 
quickly than any other part of the world. Considered in their worldliness, 
they are the least worldly and at the same time the most natural of all 
things. Although they are man-made, they come and go, are produced and 
consumed, in accordance with the ever-recurrent cyclical movement of 
nature" (ibid: 96). 
The most obvious example of such a product is food, its growth, preparation and 
consumption, but other labour activities include things such child bearing and rearing 
whose end result would be hard to define as a product. Labour can, therefore, be 
described as `unproductive' in the sense that there is no end to the labour process, no 
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ultimate, permanent product just the perpetual cycle of life itself; life is the product. 
Consequently, labour by itself does not distinguish us to any great extent from animals. 
In the chapter concerned with labour in `The Human Condition' Arendt makes one of her 
most striking propositions, that Marx's political philosophy is flawed because he 
overlooks this schism between labour and work. While a discussion of the political 
implications that ensue from this position is not within our remit the charge itself is worthy 
of comment. Basically it states that Marx conflated the activities of labour and work "by 
misrepresenting the labouring, non-productive activity in terms of work and fabrication" 
(ibid: 306). Now, whatever the adequacy of Arendt's own position, and this has been 
questioned (see Jay 1978: 348-68), her basic criticism does appear to have some validity. 
As we have already seen, in Marx's view, humans create themselves through labour, they 
distinguish themselves from other animals the moment they `begin to produce their means 
of subsistence'. This is labour in Arendt's sense of the word, the activity necessary for 
life's continuation. However, this specific form of activity in Marx's view does not 
constitute a positive process with respect to humanities development, but rather one from 
which we must be liberated as much as possible. As he states; 
"the realm of freedom actually begins only when labour which is 
determined by necessity and mundane conditions ceases ... 
Freedom in this 
field can only consist of socialised man, the associated producers, rationally 
regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common 
control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and 
achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions 
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most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless 
still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of 
human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, 
however, can blossom forth only with the realm of necessity as its basis" 
(Marx 1978: 441). 
The labour prevalent in the realm of necessity appears far removed in its nature and 
consequences from the form of labour we encountered Marx elaborating earlier in this 
study. Instead of acting as a process for self-realisation it is seen as a type of activity to be 
avoided or, more realistically, ameliorated if possible. What seems to distinguish this kind 
of labour from the more positive sort Marx usually describes, apart from its inevitability, is 
that it does not finish with the appearance of a product, a physical object. This does not 
epitomise the vast majority of his theoretical work in this area, however, where "the 
labour process ends in the creation of something", and this `something' is necessary for 
our objectification - and our alienation for that matter (Marx 1957: 170). Labour, for 
Marx, is essentially productive labour or, in Arendt's terms, work. 
What Arendt's criticism highlights, therefore, is that much of our activity "leaves nothing 
behind", there is no remaining residue (Arendt 1989). Because of this and due to its 
incscapability labour has been perceived throughout time as futile, delegated to those parts 
of society who traditionally occupy positions of little status, something to be transcended 
in order that activities of more consequence can be engaged in. In sum, labour is by 
definition laborious, it is also natural and necessary. 
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Work, like labour, is also a process, but beyond this not only does it have a beginning it 
has an end as well signalled by the appearance of an object. To have such a definite 
starting point and a definite, predictable terminus signifies a far greater degree of control 
in that, whereas labour is driven by natural necessity, work involves a mastery over nature. 
Our relationship with nature is viewed by Arendt as essentially a violent one, because in all 
acts of fabrication nature is in some way destroyed. This control over nature also implies 
self-control so that "homo faber is indeed a lord and master, not only because he is the 
master and has set himself up as master of all nature but because he is master of himself 
and his doings" (ibid: 144). 
Arendt on artefacts 
However, the essential difference between labour and work does not lie in the nature of 
the activity undertaken, but primarily in its outcome, indeed that it has an outcome. When 
work has ended "an entirely new thing with enough durability to remain in the world as an 
independent entity has been added to the human artifice" (ibid: 143). The products of 
labour are transient, decaying or being consumed rapidly after their appearance. The 
products of work, on the other hand, are not consumed but used. It is, of course, possible 
to use up' a product of work, but this does not occur immediately, it is a long term 
process due to the object's physical nature, its solidity. Such objects can also decay, but 
: again this will happen over a relatively long period of time and there is always the 
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possibility that such an object can be mended or restored. What Arendt lays particular 
stress upon, therefore, is the durability of works product. Artefacts are transience captured 
and transformed into a permanent object, what she terms reification. The evanescent 
realms of nature and human thought are combined and modified through work into a 
lasting form. This does not happen without penalty as 
"reification and materialisation ... is always paid 
for, and ... the price 
is life 
itself: it is always the `dead letter' in which the `living spirit' must survive, 
a deadness from which it can be rescued only when the dead letter comes 
again into contact with a life willing to resurrect it, although this 
resurrection of the dead shares with all living things that it, too, will die 
again" (ibid: 169). 
What interests us more is not the nature of this process, something Arendt accuses Marx 
of being overly preoccupied with (see ibid: 108), but with the objects themselves and, 
more specifically, their ability to cxist unchanged through time. The durability of artefacts 
ensures "their relative independence from men who produced and used them, their 
`objectivity' which makes them withstand, `stand against' and endure, at least for a time, 
the voracious needs and wants of their living makers and users" (ibid: 137). This quality 
thus ascribed to durable objects does not inevitably lead, as it does for Hegel and Miller, 
to them being perceived as in some way alien to humanity, instead it has intrinsically 
positive consequences. Artefacts act to ground human life, they offer it stability. In fact, 
our very identity, according to Arendt, rests not on our own being, which like all other 
aspects of nature is open to tlu\, but on the objects surrounding us. Due to the their 
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immutability we can retain or `retrieve' ourselves by relating to "the same chair and the 
same table" (ibid: 137). Without them human existence would be characterised by an 
imposing ephemerality commanded by nature's relentless biological current, whereas "the 
human artefact bestow[s] a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of 
mortal life and the fleeting character of human time" (ibid: 8). 
An obvious consequence implied by this stance is that a reciprocal relationship exists 
between us and our creations, each affects the other. It goes without saying that artefacts 
owe their very existence to human endeavour, but once produced they "constantly 
condition their human makers" (ibid: 9). Our creations thus constitute much of what 
Arendt defines as `the human condition'. As she explains at the beginning of her work; 
"whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life 
immediately assumes the character of a condition of human existence. This 
is why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings. 
Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by 
human effort becomes part of the human condition. The impact of the 
world's reality upon human existence is felt and received as a conditioning 
force. The objectivity of the world - its object- or thing-character - and the 
human condition supplement each other; because human existence is 
conditioned existence, it would be impossible without things, and things 
would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the 
conditioners of human existence" (ibid: 9). 
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As we have already noted in the world-of-things Arendt places most importance on those 
that we manufacture through work rather than on those of purely natural origin. The 
human world, civilisation, the whole assemblage of human works, ultimately composes the 
objective realm against which human subjectivity stands and it is only after we have 
created this realm that we can also experience nature as objective; "without a world 
between man and nature, there is eternal movement, but no objectivity" (ibid: 137). 
Aligned with this is the fact that artefacts can not only be perceived by individuals over 
time, but also simultaneously by a number of different people. This shared experience also 
guarantees the objectivity of our existence; it is not a common nature which ensures this, 
but a common world. "Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects 
without changing their identity", Arendt writes, "so that those who are gathered around 
them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably 
appear" (ibid: 57). Consequently, she believes that artefacts play an essential role in our 
activities with others in that this common world both "gathers us together and yet prevents 
our falling over each other" (ibid: 52). As she explains; "to live together in the world 
means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a 
table is located between those who sit around it; the world like every in-between, relates 
and separates men at the same time" (ibid: 52). The importance placed upon manufactured 
objects by Arendt is clear to see, combined they form an essential aspect of the human 
condition. However, the part they play has not remained fixed throughout history and like 
many social theorists before her she perceives crucial differences between, for want of 
better terms, traditional and modern society. Human products have effected and have been 
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affected by the transition from the former to the latter. Arendt's account of this process is 
far from clear, however what is certain is her belief that within contemporary society 
labour activity has all but replaced work activity. Consequently, in Ronald Beiner's words, 
"a modern society is distinguished by the singular fact that the principal energies of that 
society are monopolised by the universal collective enterprise of production and 
consumption" (Beiner 1990: 360). Contemporary life is thus reduced to the level of a 
pseudo-natural, futile and cyclical process which can be defined as, after Marx, 
"consumptive production / productive consumption" (Marx 1974: 93). If work is now the 
only form of manufacture the objects thus produced can only be transient things, 
consumable, consumer goods. Therefore, whereas in previous societies tables and chairs 
were the products of work and so solid and stable, today's object's `natural fate' is to be 
consumed "almost as quickly as food" (Arendt 1989: 124). This is an all embracing 
process which means that "eventually no object of the world will be safe from 
consumption and annihilation through consumption" (ibid: 133). 
Not only does the fact that consumer goods come to possess such a quality through their 
creation through work, but their sheer abundance also exaggerates this situation. The 
quantity of these items is, of course, necessary as they have but the briefest of lives. 
Ultimately, 
"the objective difference between use and consumption, between the 
relative durability of use objects and the swift coming and going of 
consumer goods, dwindles to insignificance. In our need for more and more 
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rapid replacement of the worldly things around us, we can no longer afford 
to use them, to respect and preserve their durability; we must consume, 
devour, as it were, our houses and furniture and cars as though they are the 
`good things' of nature which spoil uselessly if they are not drawn swiftly 
into the never-ending cycle of man's metabolism with nature" (ibid: 125-6). 
The consequences for humanity that follow on from these changes can be easily 
conjectured. A world filled with transient objects, where "permanence, stability, and 
durability, have been sacrificed to abundance" is a world characterised by "universal 
unhappiness" (ibid: 126). For Arendt the lack of permanent objects denies the possibility 
of contrasting them with the evanescence objects of nature, all objects are now natural or 
pseudo-natural in that their primary quality is ephemerality. This absence of comparison is 
especially important with respect to ourselves, with no stable objects to set against our 
own transitory being a vital aspect of what it is to be human is refused us, our existence 
has, literally, no structure and no objectivity. This is one of the major sources of 
humanity's discomfiture with the modern world, why it is experienced as alienating and 
why the possibility of fleeing from it altogether appears so attractive. 
Conclusions 
Arendt's theoretical investigation concerning the nature of artefacts must be applauded 
not only for its originality, but also for the very fact that she attempted to tackle such an 
overlooked topic in the first place. Not surprisingly for this novel position there are 
94 
elements of Arendt's work that do present certain problems with respect to its general 
consistency and by discussing these briefly we shall be able to distinguish those aspects of 
her thought that offer most to our own understanding of artefacts. Some major problems 
arise from the discrimination she makes between work and labour. This dichotomy rests 
on a fundamental premise, that there are essentially two distinct types of human product, 
those that are immediately consumable and thus impermanent and those that are useable 
and stable. Consequently, the nature of the activity is determined by the outcome. If 
objects are forever being consumed replacements must be forever being made, whereas, of 
course, when objects are not expended in this way but instead used there is no such need 
for their continual production and hence no more activity is required. The distinction 
between work and labour, therefore, rests upon an objective criterion, upon the physical 
nature of the object produced and thus upon whether it is durable or not. It will be 
remembered that Arendt criticised Marx for not distinguishing between work and labour 
and this reproach can be logically extended so as to include a lack of concern over the 
character of the resultant objects. This latter criticism is valid, but one which Marx would 
see as insignificant compared to the relationship between the worker and their product. As 
Jennifer Ring points out, 
"he and Arendt are both concerned about what happens to the objective 
world, but Marx believes the question of who has access to the goods pre- 
enlpts the question of whether or not the goods last ... The difference 
between well-made furniture, a pair of shoes, and a loaf of bread is 
insignificant to the worker, especially if he can afford none of them" (Ring 
1989: 437-s). 
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For Marx there must exist the possibility of the producer interacting with their product in 
order for anything positive to result, i. e. for objectification to occur. Yet, under capitalism, 
of course, this is denied - the product is always, even during its creation, detached from its 
maker. Therefore, modern artisans are reduced to labourers, not because the qualities of 
the object or our attitudes towards them have changed, but because they are transient 
things in the sense that they disconnected during manufacture and literally separated from 
their makers at the moment of completion. That being said, Marx does not, of course deny 
the possibility of the proletariat acquiring goods, modern societies being characterised by 
44 an immense accumulation of commodities" (Marx 1957: 3) the majority of which must 
necessarily be taken up by this class. It is only capital which the proletariat, by definition, 
do not possess. In Marx's view, then, the fact that the world does or does not contain 
durable human products is of no immediate consequence and the presence of concrete 
objects does not inevitably produce beneficial effects. 
However, Arendt's emphasis on the durability of certain objects should not be ignored. 
Whilst accepting the importance of Marx's views regarding the circumstances surrounding 
the production and ownership of artefacts, the fact that many of them do exist for a 
considerable amount of time, some for generations, should be taken into account. Arendt 
herself is less concerned over whether the objects we use are of our own making or the 
products of others and the question of possession k really for her a question of' access. As 
both Arendt and Marx point out modern economies are entirely dependent on both 
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production and consumption, the purchase of goods is a absolutely necessary for 
capitalism existence. It is an inevitable aspect of capitalism, therefore, that the vast 
majority of people, including the more deprived sections of society, are surrounded by 
artefacts, whether they actually possess them or not. To emphasise this point we need only 
go back a few centuries and look at the amount of objects possessed by the majority of 
households at that time. Inventories made after the death of day labourers and small 
farmers in eighteenth century Burgundy list: 
"`the pot-hanger, the pot in the hearth, the frying pans, the quasses 
(dripping pans), the meix (for kneading bread) ... the chest, the 
bedstead 
with four pillars, the feather pillow and guedon (eiderdown), the bolster, 
sometimes a tapestry (cover) for the bed, the drugget trousers, the coat, 
the gaiters, a few tools (shovels, pickaxe)'. But before the eighteenth 
century, the same inventories mention only a few old clothes, a stool, a 
table, a bench, the planks of a bed, sacks filled with straw" (Braudel 1985: 
283). 
Modern life is thus characterised by the profusion of artefacts that surround each one of us 
of which all but a very few are made by other people. The nature of these objects, of 
which their durability, their physicality, is one of the most important qualities, can not but 
have important repercussions for human life. Whether these repercussions are as extensive 
as Arendt belicvcs now needs to be addressed. 
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The Language of Artefacts 
Introduction 
In the conclusion of the chapter centred around Popper's distinctive epistemology the 
statement was made that artefacts, as conveyors of meaning, differ radically from 
texts or speech; the purpose of the following section is to justify this claim. A 
characteristic of twentieth century thought has been its concern with language and the 
social sciences have not been immune from this trend, the application of 
methodologies whose roots are planted firmly in the linguistic tradition is widespread. 
However, it can be argued, as Christopher Gosden does, that "the moves towards 
language and then text represent a progressive loss of subtlety in handling people's 
relationship with the world" (Gosden 1994: 38-9). Specifically, with respect to the 
study of material culture, this practice has often resulted in the neglecting of the fact 
that artefacts may possibly constitute a unique field of meaningful activity as the 
inimitable qualities of such objects are reduced to merely imitating word-like 
properties. Consequently, as Miller rightfully points out, attempts to distinguish the 
distinctive qualities possessed by material objects have been few and far between, 
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confined to a small number of works on architecture and aesthetics and, it should be 
added, archaeology (Miller 1993: 96). This chapter will attempt to show, in the light 
of the previous section, how the physicality of material culture entails major 
differences between it and language. Furthermore, it will try and demonstrate how 
these differences result in artefacts possessing distinctive communicative qualities 
which make them simultaneously both better and more restricted at conveyers of 
knowledge. 
Saussurian linguistics 
To comprehend the persuasiveness of the linguistic approach we must first come to 
some basic understanding of its central features. The origins of semiology are to be 
found in the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure, particularly in his Course in General 
Linguistics. Saussure, unlike his contemporaries who were preoccupied with the rules 
of grammar, began his investigation from the premise that language is a system of 
signs, therefore, the sign constitutes the first object of inquiry. The sign has an 
arbitrary nature and it is this principle which "dominates all the linguistics of language; 
its consequences are numberless. It is true that not all of them are equally obvious at 
first glance; only after many detours does one discover them, and with them the 
primordial importance of the principle" (Saussure 1974: 68). What does Saussure 
mean by the arbitrary nature of the sign? In his eyes the sign contains two mutually 
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dependent elements, the signifier and the signified; the signifier being the phonological 
or graphological form of the sign, an acoustic or written image, and the signified being 
the related meaning or concept. The relationship between these two elements is neither 
inevitable nor natural, instead it is the outcome of cultural convention and as such is 
arbitrary. A common example used to illustrate this conventional association is that of 
the sign dog. There is no reason why the signifier dog, either in speech or writing, 
should better represent the concept `dog' than any other signifier, they do not 
resemble a dog in sound or sight. Therefore, not only are the signifiers chien or Hund 
equally adequate, but tod or blot would also be acceptable if they were approved by a 
particular speech community. This is one aspect of the sign's arbitrariness; however 
there is another less obvious one for not only are signifiers noises or marks taken from 
an infinite amount of such items, the concepts they refer to are also carved out from 
the infinity of experience. That is, reality does not present itself to us in pre-determined 
blocks to which we then apply signifiers, it is people who divide up reality and this can 
he done in countless ways. Therefore, whereas different languages can have similar 
signitieds as in the case of the concept 'dog' in English and French this need not 
necessarily be the case. A good example is provided by Jonathan Culler: 
"It is obvious that the sound sequences of Heure and riviere are 
si znifl rs of French but not in English, whereas river and stream are 
English but not French. Less obviousl y but more significantly, the 
organisation of the conceptual plane is also different in English and 
French. The signified 'river' is opposed to 'stream' solely in tern, " of 
life, whereas a 'tlcuvvc' diffe rs from a `riviere' not because it i` 
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necessarily larger but because it flows into the sea, while a `riviere' 
does not. In short, `fleuve' and `riviere' are not signifieds or concepts 
of English. They represent a different articulation of the conceptual 
plane" (Culler 1985: 23-4). 
A further consequence is hinted at in this quotation for, if both signifier and signified 
are arbitrary, if the sign has no direct relationship with the world, where does language 
gain its meaning from? The `value' of signs, argues Saussure, emerges solely from 
their alliance with other signs which together constitute a system, a totality that he 
terms langue. As he explains, "instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find ... values 
emanating from the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is 
understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive 
content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most 
precise characteristic is in being what the others are not" (Saussure 1974: 117). 
Saussure provides a famous illustration to help us understand this notion which Culler 
summarises as follows; 
"we are willing to grant that in an important sense the 8: 25 Geneva-to- 
Paris Express is the same train each day, even though the coaches, 
locomotive, and personnel change from one day to the next. What gives 
the train its identity is its place in the system of trains, as indicated by 
the timetable. And note that this relational identity is indeed the 
determining factor: the train remains the same train even if it leaves half 
an hour late. Indeed, it might always leave late without ceasing to be 
the 8: 25 Geneva-to-Paris Express. What is important is that it be 
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distinguished from, say, the 10: 25 Geneva-to-Paris Express, the 8: 40 
Geneva-to Dijon local, etc. " (Culler 1985: 27). 
Ultimately, then, Saussure argues; "in language there are only differences. Even more 
important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is 
set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms" (Saussure 
1974: 120). 
One final aspect of Saussure's work which needs to be addressed concerns his views 
on temporality and language. Due to the arbitrary nature of the sign he argues that the 
primary method for understanding language must be synchronic; signs are defined, not 
through historical analysis, but by their relations within langue at a particular point in 
time. However, this is not to say that the synchronic approach by being ahistorical is 
totally atemporal. In all languages signs are necessarily arranged sequentially, language 
therefore operates through time in a linear fashion. 
Now it was Saussure's contention that his own studies in linguistics constituted but 
one part, though the most important part, of a general investigation into the nature of 
signs, a single area within semiology. Although he did not extend his work beyond 
linguistics many others have done so, taking up his ideas and employing them in a 
number of disciplines, anthropology and psychoanalysis for example. Yet there are 
certain problems in applying Saussure's thoughts to phenomena beyond the realms of 
linguistics especially, if we take his work on language as paradigmatic. With respect to 
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material phenomena a particular difficulty arises for, as we have seen, emphasis is 
placed upon langue, upon the association between signs, rather than upon how signs 
relate to reality. How, then, does language refer to objects and events in the material 
world? Unfortunately, Saussure does not say. One implied explanation, in Giddens's 
words, "is that it is not the word or sentence which `stands for' objects or events in the 
world, but rather that the whole system of langue `lies parallel to reality itself. 
However, in what sense langue might `lie parallel to reality' is not at all clarified in 
Saussure's analysis (Giddens 1990: 16). One source of this difficulty is that both 
signifier and signified are purely cultural phenomena as is their relationship with each 
other. Any idea of the importance of humanity's relationship with the physical world is 
ignored due to the arbitrary nature of the sign (Gosden 1994: 48). Giddens emphasises 
another related problem: 
"The identity of the `Geneva-to-Paris train' cannot be specified 
independently of the context in which the phrase is used; and this 
context is not the system of differences themselves, such as Saussure 
mentions, but factors relating to their use in practice. Saussure 
implicitly assumes the practical standpoint of the traveller, or the time- 
tabling official, in giving the identity of the train; hence the `same' train 
may consist of quite distinct engines and carriages on two separate 
occasions. But these do not count as instances of the `same' train for a 
railway repair engineer or a train-spotter" (ibid: 16). 
«'hat this criticism illustrates is that no system can be completely self-referential, it 
only gains meaning through association with circumstances external to it. Saussure is 
therefore caught, on the one hand, formulating a theory which in essence has no 
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relation to the real world and is thus inherently idealistic, yet, on the other hand, 
cannot but help include, however implicitly, the world of objects and events if it is to 
mean anything. This last point is particularly true in the case of artefacts of a 
predominantly functional nature. Their meaning is intrinsically tied to the practices 
with which they are associated, with their interaction with the material world. These 
are, then, some of the problems confronted if we attempt to extend Saussure's 
approach to help us understand the artefact, obstacles which emerge both from the 
analysis of language itself and its relationship to the world. Yet, moving away from 
Saussure's work in particular, we continually discover that any method based on the 
explication of language encounters major complications when it is used to interpret the 
artefact, complications that arise due to fundamental differences between language and 
material human products. Even those theorists that do see material culture as in some 
sense a text to be read admit that there are limits to this analogy. To understand the 
specific nature of these difficulties let's now proceed to discuss the thoughts of those 
who have confronted the issues in this area. 
The Aesthetics of Architecture 
As was pointed out at the beginning of this section some work on the differences 
between language and material objects has been undertaken within the field of 
architecture and among the most notable is that of Roger Scruton. In his Aesthetics of 
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Architecture Scruton argues that all aesthetic experiences are centred around 
processes of imaginative attention, processes that begin with our confrontation with 
the artistic object. Consequently imaginative attention is intrinsically linked to and 
determined by the object in hand and must, therefore, be understood in these terms. To 
substantiate these claims Scruton spends some time analysing the inadequacies of 
applying modes of understanding that originate outside this context, most especially 
psychoanalysis and Marxism. Ultimately he implies that aesthetic experiences are self- 
referential in character and each art form brings with it its own type of imaginative 
attention, architecture being, of course, one such art form. For Scruton "the `meaning' 
of architectural forms [is] somehow `immediate', involved in the perception of the 
building, and intrinsic to the object of that perception" (Scruton 1979: 157). Yet if this 
assertion is true, he asks, "do not words have meaning precisely in [this] way, 
intrinsically, a meaning which is grasped in hearing and understanding them, and which 
is not reducible to any unconscious origin or to any effect towards which their 
utterance is a means'. '" (ibid: 157). After a lengthy discussion, however, the notion that 
architecture constitutes a language is firmly rejected - why? 
Scruton begins his argument by explaining how such a misconception has come about. 
To begin with lie believes that due to the presence of certain similarities between 
. arc hitectuii and lan`uua', c some theorists have taken the unwarranted step of , eein, 
till's as evidence of a close tic between the two. Foremost among, these language-like 
t'CatUFCS Is the OCCurrcncc: in architecture of conventions and rules. Sermon argues that 
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architecture does indeed appear to have a `syntax' so that a building whose details are 
correct in themselves can even so form a disjointed whole. However, in certain cases 
departures from the maxims of composition need not result inevitably in `nonsense' as 
they would do in language, they can lead to aesthetically meaningful outcomes; "the 
departure becomes meaningful because of the order against which it is set. It is in the 
context of rules and conventions that such `free gestures' are able to convey 
expressive intentions" (ibid: 172). Consequently, "the meaningfulness of architectural 
forms cannot be explained merely through the obedience to rule, and that the 
importance of rules is misrepresented by the linguistic analogy" (ibid: 172). But he 
goes on to say that; 
"it is important to see that... `meaningfulness' ... 
is a quality which may 
attach not just to the whole of an architectural composition, but also to 
its parts, and that there is often a dependence of meaning between part 
and whole and between whole and part which is not unlike the semantic 
dependences observable in language ... The 
details themselves impose a 
possibility of organisation" (ibid: 173). 
Therefore, "this mutual dependence between part and whole, and the sense that a 
`significance' might arise from its operation, is the single most language-like feature of 
architecture" (ibid: 173). Yet, states Scruton, what many people have conceptualised 
as architecture's language is in fact its `style', the two are quite distinct "for `style' 
connotes an order which is not the order of `syntax'. A style creates harmony where 
no syntax could apply" (ibid: 174). He illustrates this point by proposing that meaning 
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is conferred by syntax with respect to wholes, whole structures, an incomplete 
structure is meaningless. The same is not true of an "incomplete building [which] can 
manifest stylistic unity and all the meaning which derives from that" (ibid: 174). 
The force of Scruton's assertions is somewhat weakened by his rather confused 
approach to language generally and to semiology in particular. As Michael Rustin 
points out, at the beginning of the Aesthetics of Architecture Scruton acknowledges 
both the representational and expressive aspects of language, but later, when he is 
explicitly contrasting architecture with language, language is viewed only along 
referential lines (Rustin 1985: 25). However, as we have already seen, Saussure 
approached meaning through difference not representation. Therefore by making the 
rather obvious point that buildings are not propositions, that they cannot be `true' or 
`false', Scruton does not instantaneously negate the theory of architecture as language. 
Concomitantly, by denying the validity of methodologies that have their origins beyond 
architecture Scruton is forced back into taking a self-referential stance towards 
architectural understanding. Consequently, not only are other disciplines denied an 
input into our knowledge of buildings, but the reverse may also be inferred - both 
positions seem equally nonsensical. 
An altogether more coherent case stressing the limitations of applying a semiological 
methodology to architectural structures is put forward by Alan Colquhoun in his 
Essaus in Architectural Criticism, in particular with regards to Saussure's notions of 
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synchrony and diachrony. To this end Colquhoun lists four distinctive properties 
intrinsic to aesthetic systems, but not to language: 
"1. In language, change occurs in one part of the system at a time. In 
aesthetic systems, change often occurs in the whole system, e. g., the 
change from Gothic to classical architecture, or from eclecticism to 
modern. 
2. In language, change is always unintentional. In aesthetic systems, 
change is always intentional (though the intention may not be 
rationalised). 
3. In language, the existence of precise perceptual degrees of difference 
in the phonic object is relatively unimportant, since it is sufficient for 
one word to be different from another for differences in meaning to 
adhere to those two words ... 
In aesthetic systems, however, precise 
degrees of difference are important - the difference between the interval 
of a third and a fifth in music, for example. In music, the ability to 
distinguish degrees of difference is noted to make a structure which is 
interesting in itself and to create meaning ... 
What are interesting in 
language are the meanings that are attached tö phonic objects, not 
those objects themselves. 
4. De Saussure discusses language as being analogous to economic 
exchange: `It is not the metal of a piece of money that fixes its value'. 
But in an aesthetic system using metal, it is precisely the intrinsic 
quality of the metal that is important" (Colquhoun 1991: 130). 
It can be seen that it is the first two points in particular which have the most direct 
implications with regards to synchronicity as a methodological approach. Now, 
whatever the adequacy such a position holds in relation to the investigation of 
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language, Colquhoun believes firmly that it is not sufficient by itself with regards to an 
understanding of aesthetic systems. As he explains; "because the changes which occur 
in aesthetic systems are revolutionary and intentional, these changes are directly 
related to ideology, and ideology can only be understood in a historical context" (ibid: 
131). Consequently, diachronic modes of inquiry cannot be overlooked according to 
Colquhoun, a proposal that appears entirely justified. 
The latter two of the points quoted above, though not given as much attention by 
Colquhoun, are, to my mind, as significant if not more so than the former two. Here 
we find the assertion that, because of their sensual existence, aesthetic systems are 
interesting in themselves. Not only have they the capacity to refer beyond their own 
circumstances, that is act as a signifier, they also possess inherent qualities which can 
be acknowledged due to their very constitution. A related aspect is that in many cases 
we find that specific parts of a building, together with the building as a whole, are 
constrained by functional and structural factors. Consequently, as signifiers their 
arbitrary nature is in some way compromised, the assertion that the medium is not the 
message cannot go unchallenged. We shall return later to this important question, that 
is what role does the physical make-up of an artefact play in its possession and 
transference of meaning? 
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Langer on language 
The final study that we shall now turn to is that undertaken by Suzanne Langer. 
Langer's overall project appears to revolve around an attempt to extend the bounds of 
rationality beyond the confines of discursive practice, beyond language, to those areas 
that have traditionally been perceived of as primarily emotive and therefore irrational. 
Despite the presence of some questionable assertions concerning the nature of 
language she does make a few obvious, but nevertheless important, distinctions 
between what she terms discursive and presentational symbolism. All forms of 
symbolism are by their very nature unlike the objects they stand for and Langer 
highlights a distortion which is often overlooked with respect to language. To illustrate 
this point she uses the statement `A killed B' and explains that; 
"the event which is `pictured' in the proposition undoubtedly involved a 
succession of acts by A and B, but not the succession which the 
proposition seems to exhibit - first A, then `killing', then B. Surely A 
and B were simultaneous with each other and with the killing. But 
words have a linear, discrete, successive order; they are strung one 
after another like beads on a rosary; beyond the very limited meanings 
of inflections, which can indeed be incorporated in the words 
themselves, we cannot talk in simultaneous bunches of names" (Langer 
1967: 80). 
Therefore, "all language has a form which requires us to string out our ideas even 
though their objects rest one within the other; as pieces of clothing that are actually 
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worn one over the other have to be strung side by side on the clothesline" (ibid: 81). 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter Saussure recognised that even within a 
synchronic framework time is not absent due to language's sequential character; here 
Langer is emphasising a related notion. 
To complement this sphere of discursive symbolism Langer also proposes one of 
presentational symbolism. This, she believes, has its origins in our organs of perception 
which act so as to impose an order upon the chaos of sense-impressions that we 
continually receive. This Kantian line of argument, (one that, incidentally, bears a 
striking resemblance to that of Scruton's some forty years later), develops as follows: 
"the abstractions made by the ear and the eye - the forms of direct perception - are our 
most primitive instruments of intelligence. They are genuine symbolic materials, media 
of understanding, by whose office we apprehend a world of things, and of events that 
are the histories of things" (ibid: 92). It is at this point that we confront the major 
distinction between these two types of symbolism. Langer goes on; 
"visual forms - lines, colours, proportions, etc. - are just as capable of 
articulation, i. e. of complex combination, as words. But the laws that 
govern this sort of articulation are altogether different from the laws of 
syntax that govern language. The most radical difference is that visual 
forms are not discursive. They do not present their constituents 
successively, but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual 
structure are grasped in one act of vision. Their complexity, 
consequently, is not limited, as the complexity of discourse is limited, 
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by what the mind can retain from the beginning of an apperceptive act 
to the end of it" (ibid: 93). 
It is this non-discursive symbolism which creates order from the `blooming, buzzing 
confusion' that confronts us every second of our waking life and in so doing provides 
a conduit for the expression of ideas which are not readily translated into linguistic 
terms. 
The sequentiality of discursive symbolism brings with it another consequence. Speech 
and writing are formed out of signs, the signifiers of which are separated by time and 
space. A painting, for example, can also be said to be composed of elements 
distinguished by light, colour, tone, line, hue, etc., but if these are seen as signifiers 
what are their associated signifieds - what do the dark bits of paint mean in an abstract 
painting? The very possibility of identifying distinct elements is often denied - where 
do the yellow areas of Turner's later paintings `begin' and `end'? This form of 
reasoning is extended by Langer to cover all non-discursive objects of experience, 
(although her examples are exclusively aesthetic), to further her case that `intuitive' 
knowledge "is itself perfectly rational, but not to be conceived through language -a 
product of that presentational symbolism which the mind reads in a flash, and 
preserves in a disposition or an attitude" (, bid: 98). 
Furthermore, according to Langer presentational symbolism "never breaks faith with 
logic in the strict sense" for "rationality is the essence of mind, and symbolic 
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transformation its elementary process. It is a fundamental error, therefore, to recognise 
it only in the phenomenon of systematic, explicit reasoning. That is a mature and 
precarious product" (ibid: 97 & 99). This is a bold stance to take and, as Martin Hollis 
indicates, "logic in the `strict sense' (whatever that may be) requires the notions of 
well-formed formula, truth and falsehood, contradiction, and so forth which are 
notably absent in music", paintings, sculpture, etc. (Hollis 1986: 39). Langer's theories 
cannot, therefore, be accepted wholesale, but Hollis' criticism should not discourage 
us from acknowledging the importance of much of what is discussed above and these 
aspects will be re-evaluated in the penultimate chapter. 
Before moving on let's take this opportunity to highlight those ideas that have so far 
emerged in this chapter which may be of some relevance to us in our inquiry into the 
artefact. 
1. Both Scruton and Langer make the point that our understanding of non-discursive 
objects is in some sense immediate; our perception of them is not, as it is with writing 
and speech, directed in a linear fashion starting at one particular spot and ending at 
another. Perception and thus understanding has no predetermined course along which 
to move. 
2. Both these theorists dismiss the notion that a rigid syntax exists with regards to 
non-discursive phenomena, although for different reasons; Scruton, because deviations 
from the rules and conventions of composition within architecture can still be 
114 
`meaningful'; Langer, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the separate 
units to be ordered. 
3. Here we encounter a further issue, the actual nature of the object being analysed. 
Certain human products can be dissected into specific constituent parts, buildings 
being an obvious example, but also many artefacts such as staplers, paintbrushes and 
sunglasses. However, as we have seen, the same cannot be said of some complex 
objects like paintings or of simple things like bricks. Any investigation of the artefact 
must, therefore, allow for this diversity in the actual form of the object. 
4. Related to this last point is the fact that, as all three theorists recognise, both parts 
and wholes can be important in themselves, it is not just their difference from other 
parts or wholes that is of significance as Colquhoun illustrates with the example of 
music. 
5. The material or materials used in the making of the artefact have a role to play; a 
cup made of china may be seen to possess a different meaning from a similar vessel 
made from silver. 
6. Artefacts may have several `levels' of meaning beyond the symbolic; the structural 
and functional being the most obvious. Consequently, as Langer emphasises, artefacts 
may be able to convey meanings that cannot be expressed in language. 
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The Archaeological Record 
The last area that we shall look at with respect to the relationship between artefacts 
and language is archaeology. The theoretical debate over the nature of this association 
has recently expanded quite dramatically, therefore we shall confine ourselves to 
discussing some of the most representative and, I believe, fruitful contributors. 
Archaeology, probably more than any other discipline, confronts the need to interpret 
material culture as a matter of course, there often being very little else remaining of 
previous societies to investigate. This physical evidence lends itself to being compared 
to linguistic phenomena, especially text, and archaeologists often refer to it as the 
archaeological record. The way in which the problems of viewing material objects 
along linguistic lines have already been seen from the perspective of those occupied 
with essentially aesthetic considerations, let us now see how archaeological theorists 
approach this complex issue keeping in mind the points we have already made. 
Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley are among the leading lights in recent British 
theoretical archaeology, establishing their credentials with two books originally 
published in 1987, Re-Constructing Archaeology and Social Theory and Archaeology. 
In the latter we come across the assertion that material culture can be viewed as a type 
of writing; 
"in an oral Culture", they argue, "it would seem to be quite plausible to 
regard material culture as a communicative medium of considerable 
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importance for transmitting, storing and preserving social knowledge 
and as a symbolic medium for orientating people in their natural and 
social environment because of the relative permanence of material 
culture vis a vis speech acts. So material culture can be regarded in oral 
societies as a form of writing and discourse inscribed in a material 
medium in just the same way as words in chirographic and typographic 
cultures are inscribed on a page" (Shanks & Tilley 1987: 96-7). 
After proposing that material culture is akin to writing Shanks and Tilley take the 
obvious next step and propose that it acts as communicative structured sign system. 
However, the acceptance of the semiological model is not immediate and total for they 
question to what degree material culture and language are alike, whether material 
culture is a supplement to language and if material culture constitutes a purely self- 
referential system. 
To the first of these questions they suggest that "it would seem best to regard material 
culture as forming a system of discourse which has a relative degree of autonomy from 
language, a second order type of writing which shares some essential features with 
linguistic systems while at the same time not being directly assimilable to, or reducible 
to, language" (ibid: 99). What, therefore, are the similarities and differences between 
material culture and language according to Shanks and Tilley? A major distinction that 
they stress ensues from the materiality of artefacts; as physical objects the processes of 
production and consumption are logically implicated. As such, it is argued, they are 
involved in a distinct form of practice and thus occupy a unique place in the overall 
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symbolic system. Consequently, material culture cannot be said to merely reflect the 
significative structures of language in another form for it literally constitutes a reified, 
objectified signifying medium and this shift into the physical realm entails particular 
factors. 
Up to this stage Shanks and Tilley have operated within an essentially Saussurian 
framework, but they then move on to incorporate the work of Jacques Derrida, 
especially his extension of Saussure's ideas concerning the ambiguity of the sign. As 
we noted earlier Saussure believed that this ambiguity is established in a system of 
difference and Derrida merely extends this argument to its logical conclusion; if 
meaning is a matter of difference rather than identity then language cannot not be said 
to form a closed system, therefore the meaning of a sign is not fixed. Consequently, 
Shanks and Tilley propose, through their reading of Derrida, that a sign can possess "a 
plenitude of meaning by virtue of its relation to other signs - [hence] we arrive at what 
might be termed the metacritical sign: the sign whose meaning remains radically 
dispersed through an essentially open chain of signifieds-signifiers" (ibid: 102). The job 
of the archaeologist, then, is to uncover the structures within which the metacritical 
signs are embedded, material culture being the embodiment of such signs. Artefacts 
are, therefore, a collection of observable presences, visible indicators beneath which 
lie; 
"the absences, the co-presences and co-absences, the similarities and 
the differences which constitute the patterning of material culture in a 
118 
particular spatial and temporal context. The principles governing the 
form, nature and content of material culture patterning are to be found 
at both the level of micro-relations (e. g. a set of designs on a pot) and 
macro-relations (e. g. relationships between settlement and burial), but 
they are irreducibly linked, each forming a part of the other" (ibid: 102- 
3). 
But what is it that is actually being signified? Ultimately, because the production, use, 
exchange and consumption of artefacts occurs within a social matrix it is social 
relations that material culture signifies and; 
"the form of social relations provides a grid into which the signifying 
force of material culture becomes inserted to extend, define, bolster up 
or transform that grid. The social relations are themselves articulated 
into a field of meaning partially articulated through thought and 
language and capable of reinforcement through the objectified and 
reified meanings inscribed in material culture" (ibid: 103). 
However, this should not be taken to mean that material culture just provides a 
different manner of expressing that which could be said through language. For Shanks 
and Tilley "the importance of material culture as a signifying form is precisely its 
difference from language while at the same time being involved in a communication of 
meaning. Material culture forms part of the social construction of reality in which the 
precise status of meaning becomes conceptually and physically shifted from one 
register to another: from action to speech to the material" (ibid: 104). Shanks and 
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Tilley's views on the relationship between language and material culture are summed 
up in this final quotation: 
"Conceived as a form of communication [material culture] constitutes a 
form of `writing' and is located along structured axes of signification. 
We are not attempting to argue that material culture, in a manner 
analogous to language, directly represents things, features or concepts 
in the social world, but that it is ordered in relation to the social. The 
structure of this ordering is of vital significance, material culture is 
polysemous, located along open systems of signified-signifiers or 
metacritical signs. This means that we can never exhaust or pin down 
its meaning once and for all" (ibid: 117). 
How, then, does this aspect of Shanks and Tilley's work relate to the points already 
raised in this chapter concerning material culture's relationship to language? What has 
emerged, hopefully, from the prior explication is a perception of material culture as 
composing one of a number of symbolic fields which together combine to form a 
meaningful social reality. As such it shares a number of similarities to language, but 
also some distinct characteristics; it can be viewed as simultaneously simpler and a 
more complex than language. Specifically, following Saussure, the meaning of an 
artefact emerges from its position within paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, yet, 
furthermore, these are themselves embedded within spatial and temporal systems. 
Therefore, material culture can only be understood once it is `contextually situated' 
within two related frameworks: 
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"First, explanations must be related to the field of internal relations of 
individual social totalities, and this invalidates cross-cultural 
approaches. Second, they must be contextually situated in the spatio- 
temporal moments of the totality ... Material culture only has 
significance within the context of a particular social totality and the 
structures, structuring principles, conditions for social action and the 
nature of social practices which will differ from one particular case to 
another" (Shanks and Tilley 1994: 132). 
Meanings are then fixed in this respect, but not immutably so as these totalities or 
systems are open-ended; there are no permanent one-to-one relations between 
signifiers and signifieds, between artefacts and meanings. This instability ensures that 
change is forever a possibility, meanings as well as artefact design are open to 
transformation, although they are more usually reproduced. What does not follow, 
Shanks and Tilley believe, is that they are proposing an essentially relativistic theory - 
open-ended systems allow slippage, but not a free play of meanings. Artefacts 
therefore form "a network of resistances to theoretical appropriation" (ibid: 250). 
The importance of semiological insights for Shanks and Tilley is obvious; while 
acknowledging that material culture possesses qualities not found in language the 
similarities they do share appear to be of more consequence so justifying such an 
approach. How, then, do they carry out an analysis of material culture based upon 
semiology? The first obstacle to be overcome is the one recognised by Scruton and 
Langer, what constitutes the signs to be investigated? In their two most notable pieces 
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of research they attempt to master this problem by concentrating upon the patterns 
inscribed on artefacts, rather than upon the artefacts per se. So in one project they 
analyse the marks found on pot shards around the mouth of a Swedish megalithic tomb 
and in the other they compare the designs found on contemporary Swedish and British 
beer cans (ibid: 155-71 & 172-240). Both sets of designs, because of their non- 
discursive nature, have to be broken down into distinct units, into signs that can be 
studied. With respect to the pots two overall types of designs are distinguished to be 
of significance; bounded, "having lines or boundaries on all sides with or without 
internal infill, e. g., lozenges", and unbounded, one that "serves to break up the 
continuous or empty space of the vessel surface without entirely enclosing any area of 
it, e. g., zig-zag lines" (ibid: 157). For the beer cans seven major variables are 
distinguished including those such as colour, surface division and field orientation of 
words. However, in both cases the justification for the choice of these aspects is not 
established, the reasons why the categories of bounded and unbounded, for example, 
are seen to be of importance are not made explicit. Of course, this is not to deny that 
such an approach can be fruitful and indeed Shanks and Tilley's results are interesting, 
yet the somewhat arbitrary nature of the first step of their procedure cannot be 
ignored. On the other hand such a method does allow room for the founding of a 
multiplicity of meanings, an outcome prescribed by their theoretical writings. 
However, this does lead on to a particularly important problem. While agreeing that 
artefacts can possess a plethora of meanings there has to be a limit to their 
interpretation yet the only such restriction Shanks and Tilley provide is the rather 
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vague notion of a `network of resistances'. Consequently, it is difficult to see how 
comparisons between the fit and unfit interpretations can be made, how we can 
identify the most appropriate. 
Such difficulties are due, in a large part, to the apparent preoccupation with the 
semiological aspects of the artefact and the problems encountered in trying to break 
down non-discursive objects, presentational forms, into carriers of discrete signs. 
Concomitantly, this occurs at the expense of other qualities; functional and structural 
characteristics, for instance, which are seemingly eclipsed by this concentration on 
symbolism. One of Shanks and Tilley's main aims is to overcome established analytical 
traditions within archaeology which err heavily towards a form of functional 
determinism with regards to the interpretation of artefacts. As they rightly point out 
function can never determine the final form of an artefact, there are always an infinite 
variety of possible shapes that an object can take, therefore choice is always involved 
in its production. However, Shanks and Tilley appear in danger of swinging the 
pendulum to the other extreme, stylistic considerations becoming paramount and 
unconstrained by non-socio-cultural factors. What we are encountering here is one 
element of the style versus function debate, one that, being outside the scope of this 
chapter, we will return to later. What can be noted at this stage is that an extreme 
reading of Shanks and Tilley, with its emphasis on symbolism, is endangered by the 
more material qualities of the artefact. Such qualities, for example the possession of 
sharpness, seem to ground the artefact beyond its symbolic context. Therefore, the 
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multiplicity of meanings applicable to an artefact goes beyond those provided by the 
symbolic so that our understanding of them will need to draw on techniques other than 
those of a semiological ilk, (this assertion will be substantiated shortly). 
Ultimately it seems that Shanks and Tilley seem to be caught within an approach 
determined by the analogy of material culture as writing, an outlook directed by their 
emphasis on surface design. Whilst they readily acknowledge that other factors are at 
play other than the symbolic these are overshadowed by a preoccupation with 
semiological concerns. Two important consequences emerge from this aspect of their 
work. Firstly, we must appreciate the complex nature of the artefact, its meaning lies 
on a number of different levels the symbolic being just one. Secondly, a fuller 
understanding of the network of resistances is required so that our interpretations can 
be better focused. 
Hodder 
So far in this chapter we have defined some of the factors which appear to distinguish 
language from material culture. In the work of Shanks and Tilley a number of these 
were acknowledged, but were eventually seen to be of insufficient importance to deny 
the efficacy of an essentially semiological or post-structuralist approach. However, in 
consequence, what transpired was a procedure placing such an emphasis on the purely 
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symbolic that other characteristics were to all intents and purposes neglected. A more 
adequate strategy has to give due consideration to the diverse aspects contained within 
the artefact, those that follow from its materiality, which conspire to create its unique 
nature. One theorist that has made a move to accommodate these aspects is Ian 
Hodder. 
Hodder has written extensively on many aspects related to material culture and 
because a discussion of his work will constitute a major part of the following chapter 
we shall restrict ourselves to looking at just a few of his observations here. At the 
beginning of his paper Material Practice, Symbolism and Ideology he writes that "if 
there is indeed a close relationship between linguistic and material culture signs, then 
we might expect a correspondence of the following sort" (Hodder 1995: 201). 
signifier signified referent 
language pot (word) 
0 
concept 
0 
material 
Q [cooking] concept cooking 
culture 
We have already noted that for Saussure at least such a clear link between sign 
(signifier/signified) and referent is not so straightforward; Hodder's scheme comes 
closer to reflecting the semiotics of Charles S. Pierce. Be that as it may, such a 
correspondence between linguistic and material culture signs can be seen to form the 
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basis of many post-structuralist archaeological theories including that of Shanks and 
Tilley. However, argues Hodder, although some similarities do exist between these 
two types of sign there are also some important differences. Primarily, whereas the 
association between signifier and signified is arbitrary in language the same cannot be 
said to occur in material culture for, "in the latter case, the pot in its materiality and 
use participates in the construction of the signified (the cooking concept). The material 
culture references are motivated and non-arbitrary" (ibid: 201). Therefore, whereas in 
language a word is seldom both sign and referent with respect to material culture this 
is often the norm, so, to carry on the pot example; 
"it can be referred to as an object at the same time as having sign 
functions. It is an object with functional, material and technological 
constraints and characteristics. Hardness, porosity, friability and so on 
exist and cannot be seen as entirely independent of the sign properties. 
The objective, non-arbitrary characteristics of the signifier impinge 
upon and contribute to its reference potential" (ibid: 202). 
Other `impingements' arise, not so much from the make-up of the artefact, but rather 
from its final form. Pierce proposed a generally accepted three-way typology of the 
sign. Firstly, we have the sign proper which corresponds to Saussure's ideas, the 
relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary and conventional. Next there is 
the icon where there exists an actual resemblance between signifier and signified, the 
most obvious example being representational art, a portrait say. Another illustration, 
drawn from ethnography by Hodder, describes how "the orientation of the h-: ad and 
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metal decoration on male and female ears is represented iconically in the angle of the 
lugs (handles - `ears') on two types of pot ('male' and 'female')" (Hodder 1989: 259). 
The icon is, therefore, a mixture of both conventional and `natural' connections 
between signifier and signified; icons contain a necessary non-arbitrary associations 
with what they signify. 
The relationship between signifier and signified within the index, the final type of sign, 
is a causal one whereby "daily practice or a pragmatic understanding of the material 
world creates meaning through experience rather than through cultural codes" 
(Gottdiener 1995: 12). For example, smoke means fire due to fire usually being the 
cause of smoke. In many cases, however, the non-arbitrary index can become 
appropriated by a culture and used as a conventional sign, e. g. a smoke machine can 
produce smoke in order to signify fire in a play without the causal presence of a fire. A 
more relevant illustration to our study is the `status symbol'. In Culler's words; 
"as the name itself suggests, these are not just indices of status but 
symbols of status; though they have some causal or intrinsic relation to 
the status they signify, they have been promoted by the conventions of 
a society to the rank of symbol and carry more meaning than their 
causal or indexical nature would entail. Thus a Rolls-Royce is certainly 
an index of wealth in that one must be wealthy to own one, but social 
convention has made it a symbol of wealth, a mythical object which 
signifies wealth more imperiously than other objects which might be 
equally expensive, Among the many objects which are indices of wealth 
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in that they are all expensive, it has been singled out by social usage as 
a symbol of wealth" (Culler 1985: 98-9). 
Therefore, if we perceive artefacts as either icons or indices we must acknowledge that 
they possess elements which are arbitrary and non-arbitrary, conventional and non- 
conventional; they are, to varying degrees, motivated signs. Even where signs, of 
whatever type, are seen to be purely arbitrary it is sometimes possible to trace back 
their origins to physical or biological characteristics of the environment. Hodder's own 
example is that; 
"in a region in which there is a strong genetic tendency for people to be 
right-handed, it is likely, but not necessary, that `right' will be 
associated with `strength' and 'dominance'. And since we have only 
two hands which are opposed to each other on our bodies, it is likely 
that `left' will be associated with opposite characteristics. Individual 
cultures may disregard right/left symbolism and others may invert the 
meanings. But there is liable to be a tendency to incorporate 
characteristics of the environment in which we live into the fabric of 
our cultural framework of meanings" (Hodder 1989: 258). 
A similar process, it can be argued, may occur with respect to social circumstances. A 
sexual division of labour could possibly lead to `inside', `domestic' and 
`mill: -' to 
signify woman and `outside', `wild' and `blood' to signify man. Hodder 
is at pains to 
point out that; 
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"there is no necessary determinism being suggested here. The 
association in practical activity can become codified into abstract 
conceptions. The structured system of meanings affect the uses to 
which objects are put. Ultimately it becomes difficult to disentangle 
whether the sexual division of labour comes before or after the 
symbolic division between inside and outside. Rather, meaning and use 
are inextricably linked so that one cannot be studied without the other" 
(ibid: 259). 
The arbitrary nature of the material sign is, therefore, open to compromise in a variety 
of ways and to varying degrees in both their origins and implementation. There are a 
number of other distinct differences between language and material culture that 
Hodder indicates, but for the time being I shall refer to just two more as they relate to 
certain points already made in this chapter. Firstly, in a similar vein to Langer, Hodder 
notes that texts are ordered and read in a linear sequence. There is no such order or 
procedure when dealing with material culture, there are no specified starting points 
and much of what we sense we do so concurrently. Consequently, in a similar vain to 
Shanks and Tilley, Hodder believes that; 
"material culture often is not a good mechanism for expressing complex 
and clear messages. It is not a good medium for developing complex 
abstract arguments. On the other hand, much material culture has 
obvious functional significance. It is these contexts of use, rather than 
abstract communication codes, which inform its meanings most 
immediately" (ibid: 260). 
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Secondly, material culture can involve the use of the five senses as opposed to just 
those of sight and sound applied to text. This, again, creates a greater degree of 
uncertainty in understanding material culture; for example, is the colour of an artefact 
of greater significance than its texture? However, these three factors, arising 
essentially from the materiality of artefacts, do not act to limit what we can say about 
the past. Ambiguity is far from annulled, yet neither is there such a free-play of 
signifiers and signifieds as was implied in the work of Shanks and Tilley. Ultimately, 
therefore, Hodder warns that; 
"symbolic archaeologists may do themselves a disservice by 
emphasising the language analogy ..., words have to be read and 
interpreted but they are organised in such a way as to limit the range of 
meanings that can be `read into' the text. [But, ] in relation to many 
natural objects, the meanings that can be derived from them are even 
more highly constrained and non-arbitrary than are meanings in 
language" (ibid: 266-7). 
Hodder's work, I believe, provides an interesting combination of the points previously 
made in this chapter whilst simultaneously acknowledging the benefits and limitations 
following on from the linguistic analogy. 
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Gosden 
Before drawing any conclusions from the work of Hodder and the other theorists 
mentioned above I would like to return briefly to some comments made by the person 
from whom we quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, Christopher Gosden. 
Gosden is particularly wary of applying semiological procedures to the study of 
material culture, his critique of this approach being situated within a wider debate 
over, to his mind, the pernicious modern preoccupation with meaning and the 
simultaneous disregard of our physical involvement in the world. This bias is due to 
our perceiving humanity as in some way distinguished by our capacity to create and 
communicate meaning through symbolism, "our humanity is bound up with our 
meanings" (Gosden 1994: 37). It is not Gosden's desire to dismiss the meaningful 
qualities of human life as promoted by structuralism, post-structuralism and 
hermeneutics, but rather to stress that such approaches cannot provide a full picture of 
human action in the world. For Gosden, therefore, "in the twentieth century, meaning 
and symbolic forms have supplanted attempts to create a balanced model of life and 
thought" ... and 
"language has become the quintessential symbolic form, providing the 
model for understanding all forms of meaning" (ibid: 38). 
Heavily implicated in this movement has been structuralism in general and Saussurian 
linguistics in particular and according to Gosden there has transpired two far from 
beneficial effects from this tradition. Firstly, there is what he terms the "internal view 
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of meaning: meaning derives from the relationship between words and concepts rather 
than the link between people and the world" (ibid: 45-6). Secondly, as already stated, 
language has become the main paradigm through which all types of meaning are to be 
understood. The proposal that language is purely self-referential excludes the 
possibility of understanding how it relates to the external world. However, even if we 
accept this idea Gosden argues that we cannot extend it to the realm of material 
culture as artefacts are real rather than ideal; "once symbolic forms are embodied in 
things they open up new areas of cause and effect from which it is impossible to 
exclude the external world and concentrate solely on the human mind" (ibid: 49). 
Similar problems arise in the work of Derrida, meaning is internal to language although 
constantly in a state of flux ensuring the existence of no final meaning. This applies not 
only to signs within a text, but to texts themselves for they too gain meaning from 
their relations to other texts. They do not, however, gain it from referring to the 
external world. Gosden acknowledges that such approaches, the post-structuralist in 
particular, provoke the investigator to accept that there are inevitably a number of 
different interpretations applicable to their objects of study, but more interestingly, he 
also believes that the extension of this argument to exclude the relevance of the 
material world is based on a fear of this world; "a fear that meaning will be grounded 
in the concrete in the same sense that a ship becomes grounded on a sandbank, that the 
rolling swell of signification will cease" (ibid: 59). This, to me, is the most important 
point that Closden makes with reference to language. His criticisms of seeing material 
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culture as analogous to language are ones that we have come across before, rather it is 
his plea never to exclude the implications following on from the physicality of our 
environment that must be heeded. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed the work of a number of theorists whose concerns 
are somewhat varied yet they all share a specific characteristic, physicality. The degree 
to which these phenomena can be studied through an essentially linguistic paradigm 
can be seen to be dependent upon the amount of importance placed upon physicality 
by each of these thinkers. Each one acknowledges that, to greatly varying extents, 
language and material culture share certain similarities, but none go as far as to 
propose that they are in all respects identical for the materiality of the latter brings 
with it unique implications. Both language and material culture are viewed as 
meaningfully constituted and meaningful to those that come into contact with them, 
but the nature of this meaning is seen as somehow affected by the medium in which it 
is embedded. To extend Gosden's analogy our ship may be thought of as running 
aground in different seas. As Shanks And Tilley point out, "all communicative media 
from the patterns on a pot to television and video not only transmit information but 
also form, package and filter it. If the medium doesn't actually constitute the message 
it certainly alters it" (Shanks & Tilley 1987: 96). So the same message is in some way 
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modified as a consequence of how it is represented, however, material culture should 
not be viewed as just another medium for the transference of meanings which could 
just as adequately be expressed in language. Rather, it should be seen to offer a 
distinct channel for communication that can both transmit certain information more 
effectively than language and offer a means that can handle forms of meaning that 
language cannot. 
If this is the case then an argument which asserts that literate cultures are by 
implication more dynamic than non-literate ones becomes questionable. This is, of 
course, the position taken by Claude Levi-Strauss who makes the distinction between 
`cold' oral cultures and `hot' literate cultures. Yet is such a scheme possible, have 
there ever been purely oral cultures? Homo Sapiens have always enjoyed the use of 
objects of their own making, objects that have meaning for them and so, consequently, 
such an assertion appears misplaced. Related to this is the fact that the possession of 
literacy does not by itself assure an increase in the rate of development of a society or, 
at least, there is no absolute correlation between levels of literacy and degrees of 
development. Since the thirteenth century the most literate country in Europe has been 
Iceland -a state that today can boast the highest ratio of 
bookshops to citizens in the 
world - yet it would be difficult to argue that Icelanders 
have been happier and more 
prosperous than their fellow Europeans for the past eight hundred years (Clanchy 
1993: 9). The superiority of the written word should not, therefore, be taken for 
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granted and, concomitantly, neither should the artefact be under-estimated as a 
medium of communication. 
What, then, are the important aspects possessed by material culture which have 
emerged as a consequence of its comparison to language in this chapter? One of the 
most significant factors is also one of the most obvious; artefacts confront us in their 
totality, we perceive them in one moment. Furthermore, we can gain awareness of a 
great many of them through a number of senses simultaneously -I can see, touch and 
smell a carved piece of wood all at the same time. This evident truth entails important 
consequences. The possession of multiple dimensions engenders the possibility that 
meanings can be embedded within each one, a variety of meanings may, therefore, be 
held synchronically, and these may be complementary or contradictory. It is this aspect 
of the artefact which ensures its more complex nature over and above speech and 
writing. The problem which confronts the person trying to come to grips with the 
artefact is which, if any, of its characteristics is the most significant with respect to its 
meaningfulness, (not forgetting the difficulties encountered in distinguishing between 
each characteristic). We have seen that Shanks and Tilley dealt with this uncertainty 
through their choice of surface patterns as the object of study, yet, and they may not 
be the last to deny this, what of, say, the significance of the beer cans shape, size, the 
materials used in its construction or the methods of production? However, not only do 
we find difficulties in assessing the relative importance of an artefact's different 
qualities we may also find problems in the assessment of a single characteristic. In both 
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cases there exists no pregiven order through which an analysis can proceed - neither a 
point from which to start an investigation nor a point at which it is to be terminated. In 
essence artefacts are not sentences or texts, they do not present meaning in the form of 
distinct units laid out in a sequential, linear fashion. 
Returning to the relationship between medium and message we noted above that 
different media can either change the nature of the message or have the ability to carry 
unique forms of meaning. In language the actual character of the signifier is of no real 
importance as long as it is recognisably different from the other signifiers within its 
system. Artefacts, on the other hand, especially those that can be classed as iconic or 
indexical, may depend heavily on representation rather than difference. Their meaning 
is reliant on their similarity to other phenomena in the material world so that artefacts 
as signifiers are, therefore, in certain instances, of a far less ambiguous character than 
`pure' signs. Also, the materials from which the artefact is made and the method of 
construction can have significance in relation to the meaning of an artefact. Another 
form of constraint on the signifying potentiality of the artefact can ensue from its 
capacity to act functionally, an object's ability to be used in a particular way helps to 
limit the amount of interpretations that can be applied to it and as such may act as an 
aid in this process. 
These, then, are some of the restrictions on meaning, but whose meaning is it that 
emerges from an investigation of the artefact? In the earlier chapter concerned with the 
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concept of objectification the argument was forwarded that in the act of manufacture 
humans incorporate an element of their own social being into the product. 
Consequently, if we are to recapture anything at all it will be the social aspects 
involved in the artefact's production and use, not an individual's idiosyncratic thought 
processes. In any case, the possibility of realising such an enterprise with respect to 
non-contemporary objects is far more realistic than any investigation to uncover the 
original thoughts of an individual artisan. This is because, while the `author' will quite 
literally be dead, there exists the likelihood that other material evidence will remain so 
helping the reconstruction of the social context within which the artefact was used. 
However, even when dealing with recently made artefacts the intentions of the maker 
are but one aspect in the constitution of its meaning as the interpreter's own intentions 
and practical contexts are necessarily involved -a contemporary act of distanciation 
occurs once the object enters into common currency. 
However, two points need to made. Firstly, this process is not one of 
`decontextualisation', but rather one of recontextualisation; it is nonsense to talk of 
anything being decontextualised as nothing exists in a vacuum. Secondly, the meaning 
of an artefact can never be freed totally from the social circumstances of its 
manufacture and, by implication, its makers/designers for it is they which helped in the 
formation of the object and, of course, it is the object which plays a central role in the 
act of interpretation. Consequently, the moorings are never quite broken, but the 
painter can be exceedingly long. What now needs to be assessed, therefore, 
is the role 
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played by context in the formation of meaning and this will be the task of the next 
chapter. 
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Artefacts in [Con]text 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we highlighted a number of qualities exhibited by material 
culture which distinguish it from language. These unique characteristics have 
repercussions for all investigations into how meaning is carried by artefacts and the 
consequent interpretation of this information. The major obstacles that prevent any 
one to one comparison between material culture and language were seen to emerge 
mainly from the physical nature of the former, the ramifications of the materiality of 
manufactured objects are profound. Yet these obstructions do not add up to a 
complete denial of some common ground existing between these two phenomena and 
an exploration of this area that will constitute the main part of the first section of this 
chapter, concentrating specifically on the role of context in the production of meaning. 
To this end an assessment of the part played by context in the works of Levi-Strauss 
and Ricoeur shall be undertaken as the implications that flow from these have greatly 
influenced the ideas of the final theoretician to be discussed in any detail in this study, 
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Ian Hodder. The notion of context is of prime importance to Hodder in his analysis of 
material culture, so much so that he calls his method `contextual archaeology'. 
In a sense", proposes Hodder, "archaeology is defined by its concern 
with context. To be interested in artefacts without any contextual 
information is antiquarianism, and is perhaps found in certain types of 
art history or the art market. Digging objects up out of their context, as 
is done by some metal detector users, is the antithesis in relation to 
which archaeology forms its identity. To reaffirm the importance of 
context thus includes reaffirming the importance of archaeology as 
archaeology" (Hodder 1993a: 123). 
The main purpose of returning to Hodder's work is to appraise how well it can act as 
a theoretical device in the analysis of material culture as a whole, not just artefacts 
produced hundreds of years ago. Let's begin this process, then, by looking at how 
significant context is to Levi-Strauss. 
Levi-Strauss out of context 
In our look at the work of Saussure we noted how a sign's value was believed to 
eineroe as a consequence of its position within a structure, individual items possess 
value only by virtue of their relations to others inside a system, value only exists 
contextually. For Saussure this system is, of course, langue and it is the systematic 
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quality of langue that marks its essential difference from the more disparate side of 
language, parole. These can be seen as analytically independent entities, the form and 
content of language, and it is by distinguishing between these two aspects that 
Saussure is able to provide a suitable object of study; semiology can concentrate on 
the analysis of a static, synchronic and systematic entity which is langue, rather than 
upon the diverse phenomena of individual speech acts that constitute parole. But 
what, exactly, is the nature of this system? We have already noted that a language is 
composed of distinct signs of an arbitrary character which are constituted through 
difference; a sign's value depends upon its difference from other signs within the 
system of which it is a part, it does not relate to anything outside the system. 
Consequently a language system constitutes a hermetically sealed structure, they are 
self-contained, a distinct context. 
Now one obvious question that springs to mind is to what do these systems and the 
rules governing them owe their existence, from where do they originate? 
Unfortunately Saussure is none too sure as to the answer, apparently being split 
between two possible solutions. 
"The dominant view", explains Simon Clarke, "is the mentalist one 
according to which language is a psychological reality, seated in the 
brain, and the linguist explores psychological connections. Linguistics is 
thus an autonomous branch of psychology. The other view is that 
language is a collective institution, and so a social reality, and the 
linguist therefore explains functional connections. In the former case 
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the linguist is concerned to discover psychological relations between 
the elements of language, in the latter case the linguist is concerned to 
discover linguistic relations" (Clarke 1981: 123). 
Of those theorists that have followed Saussure down the first of these paths probably 
the most prominent are the structural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and the 
linguist Noam Chomsky. Levi-Strauss' justification for extending the semiological 
approach to his own discipline is that, ultimately, linguistics and anthropology are 
studying the same thing. As Jenkins describes it; 
"if the `source' of the type of order manifested by language is also at 
the basis of the type of order present in the rest of culture and if this 
`source' has a constant mode of effectivity, then we are justified in 
investigating culture as a whole with methods which have been so 
successful in linguistics, as we expect both language and other sectors 
of culture to be similarly structured" (Jenkins 1979: 12). 
The source referred to here is what Levi-Strauss terms the unconscious. 
Unfortunately, he is rather vague as to the exact nature of the unconscious, but the 
view most often inferred from his work is that it has a natural foundation in the 
physiology of the brain. The actual relationship between the unconscious and the brain 
is another unclear aspect of Levi-Strauss' theory, although he does seem to suggest 
that they are structurally similar and, together, operate so as to impose order upon 
reality, because, after Saussure, phenomena only become meaningful as elements 
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within a system established via reciprocal relationships of opposition. As he explains 
further; 
"the unconscious ... is always empty - or, more accurately, it is as alien 
to mental images as is the stomach to the foods which pass through it. 
As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious imposes structural 
laws upon inarticulated elements which originate elsewhere" (Levi- 
Strauss 1968: 203). 
The repercussions of this position are as follows: 
"If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind 
consists in imposing forms upon content, and if the forms are 
fundamentally the same for all minds - ancient and modern, primitive 
and civilised (as the study of the symbolic function, expressed in 
language, so strikingly indicates) - it is necessary and sufficient to grasp 
the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each action, 
in order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other 
institutions and other actions, provided of course that the analysis is 
carried far enough" (ibid: 21). 
The method by which form is given to content is through the application of binary 
mechanisms, a notion Levi-Strauss imported from the linguistic research of Roman 
Jakobson who believed that all languages are organised around systems of difference 
and opposition. Through uncovering these binary mechanisms, by discovering which 
are being applied in the composition of a particular cultural system, a greater 
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understanding of such systems is achieved together with a more comprehensive 
knowledge of the human mind. Therefore it is not so much the actual units of a system 
which interests Levi-Strauss, but the way in which the system is structured, the logic 
behind all cultural phenomena. Ultimately; 
"any culture can be considered as a totality of symbolic systems, the 
most important of which are language, rules of alliance, economic 
relations, art, science, religion. All the systems seek to express certain 
aspects of physical reality and of social reality and, furthermore, the 
relations between these two types of reality and between the symbolic 
systems themselves" (Levi-Strauss in Jenkins 1979: 9). 
What is immediately noticeable here is the similarity of Levi-Strauss ideas to those of 
Emile Durkheim, both view symbolic systems or collective representations as central 
to the constitution of society. In their eyes; 
"social action is the result of externally constraining rules that are 
mobilised within collective systems of representations and that impose 
themselves on the individual. The task of sociology is to study the 
collective systems which mediate between the individual and the world 
by orientating and giving meaning to the actions of the individual. For 
both Durkheim and Levi-Strauss this meaning is an objective meaning, 
inherent in the systems of representations, and quite different from the 
individual's conscious apprehension of the meaning of the actions in 
question" (Clarke 1981: 98-9). 
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However, whereas Durkheim believed that these systems formed a sui generis reality 
over and above the individual Levi-Strauss, as we have recognised, saw them as 
having their basis within individual's unconscious. Clarke goes on to explain that the 
implication of Levi-Strauss' position; 
"is that the social structure is only an expression of the systems of 
representation, for the social structure is simply the product of a series 
of individual actions which are orientated and given meaning by the 
systems of representations. The social structure is thus a projection of 
the symbolic systems embedded in the individual psyche and has no sui 
generis reality. It is therefore impossible to attempt a sociological 
explanation of symbolic representations since there is no society outside 
such representations". Consequently, "if society is a symbolic order 
then there can be no reality beyond the symbolic systems which give 
meaning to social existence. This meaning must therefore be inherent in 
such symbolic systems, an objective meaning that cannot be related to 
anything external to those systems, whether to an external nature or an 
external social structure, on the one hand, or to a conscious 
apprehension of these systems, on the other" (ibid: 99-100). 
What Levi-Strauss is proposing, among other things, is that context is irrelevant with 
respect to the meaning of a symbolic system, all circumstances exterior to it can have 
no bearing upon its meaning, at most all they can do is pollute or distort it. 
So we return, again, to a fundamental criticism of the structuralist approach; that in its 
endeavour to provide a strictly objective procedure it isolates the article of study from 
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its surroundings to such a degree that we are obliged to see it as intrinsically idealistic 
in nature. Correspondingly, in Levi-Strauss' case, the aspiration is to strip away all 
external factors, the contents of a system, so all that remains is a purely formal 
structure and it is this which constitutes the objective meaning imminent within the 
system, being independent of any specific interpretation or utilisation of it. Yet, as we 
recognised with Saussure's work with regards to his distinction between langue and 
parole (a distinction that Levi-Strauss is essentially applying here), no system can be 
understood as pure form, defined without reference to elements external to it. That is 
to say the meaning of any word, of any cultural phenomenon, cannot be circumscribed 
autonomously of the context within which it occurs and is used; and this context is not 
just the system of differences themselves, as Levi-Strauss often proclaims it to be, but 
rather includes all those elements associated to the item's use in practice. Ultimately, 
structuralism can be seen to "spring from the ironic act of shutting out the material 
world in order the better to illuminate our consciousness of it" (Eagleton 1986: 109). 
We are, therefore, left with a choice, either to reject the structuralist procedure 
wholesale or attempt to modify it by acknowledging and incorporating the criticisms 
we have highlighted. A number of theorists concerned with material culture have, 
following Ricoeur, attempted the latter. Ricoeur believes that structuralism provides a 
rigorous methodology but that is all, for it is when it is extended beyond this level to 
that of a general philosophy that problems arise. Structuralism offers an explanation of 
how mewling is possible, it does not explain the nature of meaning. Ricoeur argues, 
147 
therefore, that it should be integrated within a broader outlook and the outcome is a 
structuralist methodology assimilated within a hermeneutic philosophy. We have 
already come across a number of theorists agreeing in principle to such an approach, 
i. e. Shanks and Tilley, so let us turn to the work of Ricoeur and discuss how it applies 
to the analysis of material culture. 
Ricoeur in and out of context 
Ricoeur draws a distinction between a concern with language systems and discourse, 
the former being confined to the analysis of signs, in other words semiology or 
semiotics. This constitutes a legitimate area of research providing valid results, but it 
leaves untouched a large part of language which Ricoeur labels discourse. The 
fundamental unit of discourse is the sentence which, though composed of signs, cannot 
be analysed in the same way for as a synthesis of signs the sentence acquires unique 
characteristics: 
"The sentence is not a larger or more complex word, it is a new entity. 
It may be decomposed into words, but the words are something other 
than short sentences. A sentence is a whole irreducible to the sum of its 
parts. It is made up of words, but it is not a derivative function of its 
words. A sentence is made up of signs, but is not itself a sign" (Ricoeur 
1976: 7). 
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One distinctive feature of the sentence, and discourse in general, is its dialectical 
nature, its form as a concrete polarity of event and meaning. In speech the sentence 
has a temporal, evanescent quality, it exists only at the moment of utterance, as an 
event it is ephemeral. However, this is not the whole story as an act of discourse "may 
be identified and reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words. 
We may even say it in another language or translate it from one language into another. 
Through all these transformations it preserves an identity of its own which can be 
called the propositional content, the `said as such"' (ibid: 9). It is the meaning that 
endures. As Thompson further explains, "the meaning of a sentence is a product of a 
complex operation constituted by the predicative act. A sentence has a synthetic 
structure in which a quality, a relation or some other aspect is predicated of a subject. 
The predicative act endows the sentence with a specific meaning" (Thompson 1990: 
176). Ricoeur then makes an additional distinction as he argues that the notion of 
meaning allows two particular types of interpretation which mirror the main dialectic 
between event and meaning. Associated to the event side of the equation is the 
`subjective' aspect of meaning, what the speaker means or intends to say. On the other 
side we find the `objective' element of meaning aligned with what the sentence itself 
means, its propositional content. However, Ricoeur still does not think that he has 
exhausted the meaning of meaning and argues for yet another dialectic within the 
objective side of discourse. After Gottlob Frege he distinguishes between sense and 
reference; 
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"we may mean the `what' of discourse or the `about what' of 
discourse. The `what' of discourse is its `sense', the `about what' is its 
`reference ... 
It is a distinction which can be directly connected with our 
initial distinction between semiotics and semantics. Only the sentence 
level allows us to distinguish what is said and about what is said. In the 
system of language, say as a lexicon, there is no problem of reference; 
signs only refer to other signs within the system. With the sentence, 
however, language is directed beyond itself. Whereas the sense is 
immanent to the discourse, and objective in the sense of ideal, the 
reference expresses the movement in which language transcends itself. 
In other words, the sense correlates the identification function within 
the sentence, and the reference relates language to the world. It is 
another name for discourse's claim to be true" (Ricoeur 1976: 19-20). 
Reference is, therefore, in an important way defined contextually for language only has 
reference when used - "to refer is what the sentence does in a certain situation and 
according to a certain use. It is also what the speaker does when he applies his words 
to reality" (ibid: 20). 
Circumstances, however, change dramatically in the transition from discourse-as- 
dialogue to discourse-as-text, a transition characterised, as we have noted before 
briefly, by distanciation. Distanciation revolves around a particular state, one only 
nascent in dialogue, the detachment of meaning from event, and it is effective on a 
number of different levels. The most obvious quality of text, the fixation of discourse 
in a material medium, is the most significant and impacts upon all the other aspects of 
distanciation. According to Ricoeur, "what writing actually does fix is not the event of 
150 
speaking but the `said' of speaking, i. e., the intentional exteriorization constitutive of 
the couple `event-meaning'. What we write, what we inscribe is the noema of the act 
of speaking, the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event" (ibid: 27). Yet 
this is not to imply that text is merely the fixation of speech, the link between thought 
and writing can be immediate in the same way as it can be between thought and 
speech. What are, then, the repercussions of fixation? 
One major effect is that the relation `writing-reading' does not mirror the relation 
`speaking-hearing' as the "dialogical situation has been exploded" (ibid: 29). In spoken 
discourse the subjective intention of the speaker and the meaning of their conversation 
overlap to such an extent, due to their simultaneous presence, that the understanding 
of one is to all extents and purposes an understanding of the other. "With written 
discourse, however, the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to 
coincide" as the text, as a distinct material reality, escapes the presence of its maker 
(ibid: 29). Consequently, inscription becomes synonymous with the semantic 
autonomy of the text, "the text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. 
What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every 
exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken 
its moorings to the psychology of its author" (Ricoeur 1971: 534). Ricoeur is careful, 
though, not to commit what he calls the `fallacy of the absolute text', viewing a text as 
an author-less item. As he says, "it is impossible to cancel out this main characteristic 
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of discourse without reducing texts to natural objects, i. e., to things which are not 
man-made, but which, like pebbles, are found in the sand" (Ricoeur 1976: 30). 
Just as there is a change in the relationship between the speaker and discourse so there 
is a comparable change between discourse and hearer: 
"Whereas spoken discourse is addressed to someone who is determined 
in advance by the dialogical situation - it is addressed to you, the 
second person -a written text is addressed to an unknown reader and 
potentially to whoever knows how to read. This universalization of the 
audience is one of the most striking effects of writing and may be 
expressed in terms of a paradox. Because discourse is now linked to a 
material support, it becomes more spiritual in the sense that it is 
liberated from the narrowness of the face-to-face situation" (ibid: 31). 
This `liberation' of the text from the dialogical situation and the related eclipsing of the 
author places a heavy emphasis on the association between text and reader and it is the 
convergence of these two elements which generates the dynamics of interpretation. 
What transpires as a consequence of the text's universalisation is that it opens it up to 
an infinite number of explications. Another aspect peculiar to the text is that, as a 
totality, it is irreducible to its constituent sentences. There are, however, different 
ways of combining sentences, different modes of writing, different forms of literature. 
There fore, "language is submitted to the rules of a kind of craftsmanship, which allow, s 
us to speak of production and works of art, and, by extension of works of discourse. 
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Poems, narratives, and essays are such works of discourse. The generative devises, 
which we call literary genres, are the technical rules presiding over their production" 
(ibid: 33). Finally there is, to Ricoeur's mind, the most complex change that occurs in 
the movement from speech to text. 
"Spoken discourse", as Thompson explains, "always contains some 
reference to the shared situation of the interlocutors and always offers 
the possibility of clarifying, by pointing or some other gesture, the 
referential import of what is said. This link between discourse and 
ostensive reference is shattered by writing. A text does not refer to 
features of the situation in which it was produced, but opens up a world 
and projects a way of being. To unfold this referential dimension of the 
text, and to relate it to the subject who is `metamorphized' by the text, 
is the task of the theory of interpretation" (Thompson 1990: 180). 
Another element of Ricoeur's work that needs to be addressed briefly, therefore, is his 
interpretation theory, a theory influenced by the aspects of distanciation just outlined. 
One aspect of Ricoeur's approach is that the objective meaning of a text is distinct 
from the intentions held by its author for, as we have seen, the meaning of what is 
written eclipses the event of writing and so breaks free of the moorings to the 
psychology of its author. Concomitantly, this objective meaning cannot be ascertained 
by an analysis of individual sentences, a text is a structural totality and its meaning is 
aligned to this whole. Semantics, therefore, offers an inadequate method of 
interpretation, what is required is a form of hermeneutics. One particular component 
of this approach Ricocur calls a 'guess', "a naive grasping of the meaning of the text 
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as a whole", and, due to the plurivocity of written works, many different guesses of 
the meaning are possible, a plurality of constructions can occur (Ricoeur 1976: 74). 
However, although there are no rules for making good guesses there are methods for 
validating those that are made. As Ricoeur states, "it is always possible to argue for or 
against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to 
seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our reach" (ibid: 79). This is a 
criterion for assessing the most plausible exposition as "an interpretation must not only 
be probable, but more probable than another interpretation", the aim is to validate 
rather than verify (ibid: 79). 
A further repercussion of distanciation on interpretation is that the text can be 
approached in two specific though mutually dependent ways. Firstly, it can be judged 
as `worldless', a self-contained unit analogous to the closed system of signs Saussure 
termed langue, a method exemplified by Levi-Strauss' analysis of the Oedipus myth. 
For Ricoeur such an approach can provide us with an explanation of the sense of a 
text, the logic behind the arrangement of the elements which constitute it. 
Nevertheless, a text is not only a logical set of propositions picked out at random for 
always implied, even in the work of Levi-Strauss, is the fact that propositions are 
meaningful, pointing to circumstances beyond the text. What is required, then, on top 
of the explanations offered by a structuralist methodology, is a mode of understanding; 
"what we want to understand is not something hidden behind the text, 
but something disclosed in front of it. What has to be understood is not 
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the initial situation of discourse, but what points toward a possible 
world. Understanding has less than ever to do with the authors and his 
situation. It wants to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the 
references of the text. To understand a text is to follow its movement 
from sense to reference, from what it says, to what it talks about" 
(Ricoeur 1971: 557-8). 
What Ricoeur calls for, consequently, is a depth interpretation. As Thompson 
elucidates; 
"in undertaking a depth interpretation the reader enters the world of the 
text, following the movement from sense to reference, from its internal 
structure to the world which it projects. The reader thereby 
appropriates the world of the text, where by `appropriates' Ricoeur 
understands, not an act of possession by an autonomous ego and even 
less a return to the intentions of the author, but rather an act of 
dispossession through which one may relinquish a prior self and deepen 
one's understanding of oneself and others by virtue of the meaning 
inscribed in the text. Explanation and understanding are then two 
phases of a process of interpretation which, while avoiding 
subjectivism, does not dispense with the subject" (Thompson 1990: 
183). 
The final aspect of Ricoeur's work which needs to be confronted due to its impact 
upon Hodder's is the former's extension of his theory to the social sciences. Ricoeur 
contends that "meaningful action is an object for science only under the condition of a 
kind of objectification which is equivalent to the fixation of a discourse in writing" 
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(Ricoeur 1971: 537). This objectification is made possible through the possession by 
meaningful actions of certain attributes which correspond to those found in speech 
acts, attributes of distanciation. Therefore, just as the event of dialogue is out-lived by 
its meaning so the event of doing is out-lived by the significance of what is done. 
Concomitantly, "like the speech-act, the action-event (if we may coin this analogical 
expression) develops a similar dialectic between its temporal status as an appearing 
and disappearing event, and its logical status as having such-and-such identifiable 
meaning or `sense-content"' (ibid: 539). The meaning or `sense-content' of an act can, 
then, become independent in the same way as a text acquires semantic autonomy. 
Furthermore, an action can become detached from its agent in a comparable way to a 
text becoming separated from its author, that is it can have consequences, unintended 
consequences, unbeknown to those who performed it. Consequently, the meaning of 
an action is cut loose from the intentions of the acting subject and is thus free to leave 
its `marks' on time, to bequeath an impression on the flow of events which constitutes 
human history. "Moreover", as Thompson explains, "just as the inscription of 
discourse shatters the narrowness of the dialogical situation, so too action is an `open 
work': it is there to be interpreted and judged by anyone who can `read', not only by 
those individuals who witnessed its performance" (Thompson 1990: 184). As Ricoeur 
himself puts it, "the judges are not the contemporaries, but ... history 
itself' (Ricoeur 
1971: 544). Finally, action, like a text, transcends the social condition of its production 
because it too is freed from the restrictions of ostensive reference, its importance '`may 
go beyond its relevance to the circumstances in which it occurs. Hence an action ... 
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may open up new worlds through the actualisation of possibilities which it bears within 
itself' (Thompson 1990: 184). 
Hodder's acceptance of Riceour's work is not indiscriminate and rightly so for it 
would be most optimistic to believe that a theory of the text can be carried over and 
applied to another discipline unchanged. As mentioned earlier, Hodder notes a number 
of specific qualities possessed by artefacts which distinguish them markedly from 
written works, such as their presentational form and their functionality, that make such 
a transference less than straightforward. However, I would want to go further and 
suggest that Ricoeur's position is more problematic than Hodder believes. What now 
needs to be tackled, therefore, are the shortcomings of Ricoeur's work, specifically as 
it is applicable to an understanding of material culture and the implications this has for 
Hodder's approach. Hodder terms his own procedure `contextual archaeology' due to 
the heavy emphasis placed upon context in the interpretation of material culture. The 
importance of context in Hodder's work will be discussed shortly, but what of its role 
with respect to Ricoeur? 
This section is entitled `Ricoeur in and out of context' due to the variable amounts of 
emphasis placed upon this phenomenon depending on whether it is the sign, the 
sentence or the text that is being discussed. In relation to the sign the context can be 
seen to be synonymous with the system of language, a purely formal, closed and 
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autonomous structure of internal dependencies. Context in this sense provides the 
conditions for meaning, but not the meaning itself, form not content. 
When we move on to the next level of language, the sentence, matters change 
dramatically. The context of a sentence in the act of speech appears to have two 
dimensions. Firstly, the sentence itself can be viewed as a context within which the 
sign is situated. Secondly, and more significantly, in dialogue language can be said to 
go beyond itself and relate to the world. Dialogue occurs at a specific moment in time 
and in a specific place, it is a fleeting event involving interlocutors and a message. As 
discourse the latter possesses reference, "to speak is to say something about 
something" and; 
"the ultimate criterion for the referential scope of what we say is the 
possibility of showing the thing referred to as a member of the situation 
common to both speaker and hearer. This situation surrounds the 
dialogue, and its landmarks can all be shown by a gesture or by 
pointing a finger. Or it can be designated in an ostensive manner by the 
discourse itself through the oblique reference of those indicators which 
include the demonstratives, the adverbs of time and place, and the 
tenses of the verb. Finally they can be described in such a definite way 
that one, and only one, thing may be identified within the common 
framework of reference ... 
There is no identification which does not 
relate that about which we speak to a unique position in the spatio- 
temporal network, and there is no network of places in time and space 
without a final reference to the situational here and now. In this 
ultimate sense, all references of oral language rely on monstrations. 
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which depend on the situation perceived as common by the members of 
the dialogue. All references in the dialogical situation consequently are 
situational" (ibid: 87 & 34-5). 
The meaning of any dialogue, therefore, is reliant upon the context within which it 
occurs, the context functions in such a way as to screen the polysemy of words and so 
reduce the plurality of possible interpretations. 
However, "it is this grounding of the reference in the dialogical situation that is 
shattered by writing" (ibid: 35). The text, as fixed discourse, immediately outlives the 
event of its production, the event is left behind, and, as a physical object, a written 
work can be removed from the presence of its author. As such the text's career 
escapes the finite horizon which constitutes its creator's milieu, it becomes detached 
from the social, cultural and historical circumstances surrounding its production. The 
text, unlike speech, does not refer to a common situation shared by both writer and 
reader for they are no longer co-present; rather it refers beyond this `narrow' boundary 
to the world. In fact it is "thanks to writing man and only man has a world and not just 
a situation", a world that is not described directly but alluded to (ibid: 36). 
"For us", Ricoeur argues, "the world is the ensemble of references 
opened up by the text. Thus we talk about the `world' of Greece, not 
to designate any more what were the situations for those who lived 
then, but to designate the non-situational references which outlive the 
effacement of the first and which henceforth are offered as possible 
modes of being, symbolic dimensions of our being-in-the-world. For 
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me, this is the referent of all literature; no longer the Umwelt 
[environment] of the ostensive references of dialogue, but the Welt 
[world] projected by the non-ostensive references of every text that we 
have read, understood, and loved" (Ricoeur 1971: 535-6). 
Here we have, therefore, three attitudes towards context which are allied to the three 
levels of language. The context of a language system is the system itself, one that is 
virtually present and has no exterior affiliations. In speech the context as the situation 
of dialogue is implicit in the event and plays a central role in meaning and 
interpretation. At the level of written discourse, however, the text can be said to be 
`decontextualised' - context is surpassed and replaced by the world as the central 
concern. Such a seeming dismissal of context at this `upper' level makes one wonder 
why Ricoeur's work is viewed by Hodder as of interest in relation to the latter's 
contextualist approach. When Ricoeur dismisses the idea that in reading Greek texts 
we do not "designate ... what were the situations 
for those who lived then" the value 
of his work, to archaeology in particular, becomes questionable. 
Before following up these queries a number of related difficulties need to be discussed, 
difficulties which emerge as a result of Ricoeur's assertion that action can be treated 
like a text due to the fact that both can be viewed apart from the social circumstances 
of their production and their producers. This is of particular importance to Hodder in 
that he belie\'cs that the formation of material culture is an action, a material action as 
he calls it, like any other human action so that "the forming of a pot or the discarding 
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of an artefact has a `propositional' content which can be identified and reidentified as 
the same" (Hodder 1989: 257). Ironically Ricoeur's proposal that action can be 
perceived as a text can be seen as an example of a practice that he himself criticised, 
for just as he saw structuralism as promoting a form of linguistic imperialism, 
erroneously extending its sphere of influence to areas in which ultimately it was of 
little or no use so that language became seen as paradigmatic of all human life, this is 
precisely, in essence, what he himself does. He pushes his analogy too far, action 
becomes a text not like a text, so that when we come to cash this metaphor in we are 
confronted with certain problems. 
Thompson argues that Ricoeur's proposal is; 
"based on a conflation of `action' and `action-sentences', such that 
certain features of the latter are misleadingly ascribed to the former. 
The result is that `the meaning of an action' is transformed into an 
ethereal essence, a `sense-content' which is there and waiting, as it 
were, to be picked up and re-presented by the interpreter. Ricoeur 
thereby obscures the extent to which `the meaning of an action' 
depends upon the way in which it is described; and it is these 
descriptions (or these creative interpretations) which are transmitted, 
transcribed and contested in the trace-ridden process of history" 
(Thompson 1990: 190). 
Thompson follows up this criticism by pointing out that if "the meaning of an action 
depends on how it is described, then it cannot be considered in isolation from social 
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context, since how an action is described is deeply affected by contextual 
considerations" (ibid: 191). It does appear questionable that any action or text can be 
interpreted adequately without any reference to the circumstances surrounding its 
production as neither are spontaneously created in a vacuum. One aspect of Ricoeur's 
argument in support of his position is that whereas in dialogue discourse is addressed 
to a specific person this is not so with a text, discourse as text is thus emancipated 
from the conditions of its of creation. But how true is it to contend that texts are not 
addressed to anyone in particular, that the author, if not writing for a specific person, 
does not have a certain audience in mind? As such the reception of a text plays a 
significant role in what is written and how it is written; the audience is perceived to 
possess certain expectations that need to be met, expectations that are to a large extent 
shaped by the socio-cultural environment. 
Yet this is far from the whole story for texts are not just objects to be read, they are 
also, in the vast majority of cases, things to be consumed and, it could be argued, only 
really become texts through this very act. "For example", writes Marx, "a garment 
becomes a real garment only in the act of being worn; a house where no one lives is in 
fact not a real house; thus the product, unlike a mere natural object, proves itself to be, 
becomes, a product only through consumption. Only by decomposing the product 
does consumption give the product the finishing touch" (Marx 1974: 91). Most 
present day texts owe their existence to this ability to act as a commodity, from the 
most obvious e xanmple of weekly magazines to more `highbrow' literature. Texts, 
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because of their physical nature, can be repeatedly consumed over long periods of time 
and far from their place of origin, a fact Ricoeur incorporates within his notion of 
distanciation. This is an important idea to acknowledge, but it in no way prejudices our 
original point, that texts are written with an audience in mind. Neither does the fact 
that certain texts may indeed reach outside the immediate circumstances of their 
production, this is not a limiting criterion, they can at the same time point to the world 
beyond. 
Finally, there is in Ricoeur's work the premise that the adequacy of each interpretation 
emerges as a consequence of rational argument, the most analytically strong will be 
commonly accepted as the most valid. But this is to assume that all interpretations are 
put forward on an equal basis and ignores the fact that just as texts are not produced in 
a vacuum so too interpretations are not affected by the social circumstances 
surrounding their elaboration. As Moore explains; 
"interpretation is always bound up with social inequality and with 
domination. Discrimination in society prevents many groups from 
making an interpretation, either because they are directly denied a 
platform or because they are debarred from access to the resources - 
notably education - which would equip them to make interpretations. In 
many instances, even when they make interpretations they are not 
heard, they lack an audience" (Moore 1992: 116). 
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Where do these criticisms leave Hodder, is his work so dependent upon that of 
Ricoeur that it is undermined by the problems that we have just outlined? 
Hodder on context 
It can be seen that there are a number of ideas within Ricoeur's work that would 
readily appeal to a theorist concerned with the investigation of historical artefacts, for 
example, the notion that a product's separation from its maker and original 
environment is inevitable yet does not present insurmountable obstacles to their 
interpretation. But how does Hodder incorporate Ricoeur's theory when there exist 
such difficulties as have just been outlined, especially the latter's ambivalent attitude 
towards context? 
As was hinted at earlier, although influenced by Ricoeur, Hodder does not accept 
entirely his views; in fact it could be argued that in his selection and use of ideas he 
actually confuses or misrepresents Ricoeur's position. However, in doing so, I want to 
argue, Hodder actually overcomes many of the problems we saw emerging from 
Ricoeur's enquires. One of Hodder's most frequent remarks with reference to Ricoeur 
is that artefacts can be seen as analogous to texts. In Hodder's own words; 
"the notion of `text' is more appropriate than that of language in the 
consideration of material culture in its dual role as object and as sign or 
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symbol. In much structuralist application in archaeology the material 
sign has meaning only by being similar or opposed to other material 
signs in some abstract code or structure, as words have meaning in 
language. Ricoeur, on the other hand, argues that human action is best 
discussed by reference to text rather than language. A text is a concrete 
product written to do something. It is the product of discourse - 
situated communication. The meanings of a text derive from the 
contextualisation of abstract principles in the practices of daily life. The 
meanings may become distanced from the situation of the `writer' of 
the text and may depend very much on the context in which the text is 
'read'. The meaning of material culture often depends on the context of 
use rather than solely on the context of production or on the 'author'. 
Even more than a written text, material culture meanings embody 
pragmatic and functional concerns. Text, rather than language, is thus 
an appropriate metaphor for the dual nature of material culture (as 
technological and functional object and as sign)" (Hodder 1993a: 153- 
4). 
This passage helps emphasis the similarities and differences that exist between the two 
theorists. Following Ricoeur, Hodder believes that structuralism offers an adequate, 
but far from exhaustive, method for analysing certain aspects of material cultures 
meaningfulness. We noted a few of the shortcomings he saw with it in the previous 
section, however, there are other problems which arise out of a criticism made by 
Pierre Bourdieu, namely that structuralism lacks a theory of practice (Bourdieu 1993: 
24 passim). By separating langue from parole one distinguishes between a formal set 
of relationships and the practice of use, consequently it is difficult to conceptualise 
how actors can make any impact upon linguistic structures. Therefore, not only does 
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structuralism have difficulty in comprehending how change occurs, the very notion of 
change can not be addressed in the first place due to the stress placed on synchronic 
systems. Another difficulty, which Eagleton points out, is how does a structuralist 
"identify the various `signifying units' of the text in the first place? How [does] he or 
she decide that a specific sign or set of signs constitute such a basic unit, without 
recourse to frames of cultural assumption which structuralism in its strictest forms 
wish[es] to ignore? " (Eagleton 1986: 122). Concomitantly, Hodder asks, how are we 
to recognise a valid interpretation of a structure if it is so disconnected from reality? 
"Structures, because they are organising principles, are not observable 
as such ... they can only be reached by reflective abstraction. Thus, 
structures of particular kinds could be said to emerge because the 
analyst is looking for them, trying to fit the data into some expected 
and hypothetical structural pattern. But how can such hypotheses ever 
be falsified? For structuralism to be a worthwhile pursuit, it must be 
possible to disprove a weak hypothesis" (Hodder 1995: 106). 
This being said, such complications are superseded by taking up Riceour's approach, 
cspecially his concept of the text, although Hodder's use of it is not straightforward. 
To bcgin with, as he states in the above quotation, a text `is written to do something', 
by which I take him to mean that it is produced to have an effect on a specific audience 
towards which it is directed. However, as we have already noted this characteristic of 
the text is of little consequence to Ricoeur; due to the influence of distanciation the 
text is severed from its original social circumstances together with its original 
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audience. Ricoeur limits his discussion of the impact of a text to the here and now. 
Hodder goes on to say that a text is `a product of discourse - situated communication'. 
Both these statements would be true if he were discussing Ricoeur's ideas about 
speech, but they are not applicable to his notion of the text. For sure, texts are a form 
of discourse, but they are not in Ricoeur's eyes situated discourses. In fact they are the 
opposite, one of their chief qualities being their non-situatedness, they are 
decontextualised, again due to distanciation. What Hodder appears to be doing is 
conflating discourse-as-text with discourse-as-dialogue, the latter being the only one 
characterised by being directed to a particular audience and performed in a specific 
context, according to Ricoeur. Yet Hodder's act of conjunction, whether intentional or 
not, flags a real difficulty in Ricoeur's work, how plausible is the distinction between 
dialogue and text? For example, in recent years `talking books' have become very 
popular, are they dialogue or text? What is the nature of a tape-recorded private 
conversation? A clear-cut separation of dialogue from text seems to be difficult to 
sustain, maybe the best option would be to perceive them situated on a continuum 
with their `pure' forms at either end. This being the case we may argue that the 
majority of discourse involves varying degrees of the qualities attributed to both forms, 
a stance that Hodder appears to take. 
Returning to the quotation above, Hodder pushes his own interpretation further by 
asserting that it is the context of production, the `practices of daily life', that provide 
the sources of meaning found in a text. However, in a step back in Ricoeur's direction, 
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he goes on to elaborate that the situation within which the text is read or used can also 
play a significant role in the constitution of its meaning. Again this is an aspect of 
distanciation, yet distanciation does not result, as it does for Ricoeur, in a seemingly 
complete detachment of meaning from the context of a text's origins. At the same time 
Hodder also believes that within a text, and more so an artefact, are incorporated 
meanings that are `pragmatic and functional', qualities which can impinge on the 
meanings an artefact can carry and thus provide fresh channels for its interpretation. 
Conclusion 
Hodder's theoretical position has shifted over the years and the majority of critiques 
aimed at his work refer mainly to that period when his emphasis on the `material 
culture as text' analogy was at its height, a position which offered something of an 
easy target. These critiques can be divided into roughly three camps, those who agree 
with Hodder, those who disagree with him and those occupying a middle ground 
between the two. The first, exhibiting a favourable attitude towards his writings, is 
exemplified by Susan Pearce whose own work is explicitly Saussurian. She argues that 
Hodder's emphasis on the symbolic qualities of artefacts has been generally accepted 
by those studying material culture (Pearce 1994: 12). Her views on Hodder's more 
recent work may be somewhat different. 
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At the other extreme lies a group, best termed as post-structuralists, who view 
Hodder's ideas as basically misguided. A member of this group who has given some 
thought to Hodder's ideas is Whitney Davis who, following Deridda's deconstructivist 
approach "denies the autonomous, transcendent reality, stability and retrievability of 
logoi [words or meaning] lying beyond or behind material cultural forms" (Davis 
1992: 335). As a consequence Hodder's work is viewed as suffering from a disabling 
form of logocentrism, material culture cannot be perceived as the representation of 
meanings immediately present to the artefact's maker because thought itself is a form 
of `writing'. Therefore, both thought and material culture occupy similar ground, both 
can be seen as a material mediation either in the supposed privacy of the stream of 
consciousness or in the production of inscriptions or artefacts. For Davis meanings 
"are made, `written', by the makers neither before nor after but only always in the on- 
going, temporally and spatially ramified structure of making, `writing', as such" (ibid: 
336). Consequently, archaeologists should resist the apparently futile task of 
uncovering the traces of intentionality believed to exist `beneath' their physical 
expressions, they should concentrate purely on the expressions themselves, artefacts as 
such 
At the same time, Davis argues that many of our actions, and thus their consequences, 
are frequently meaningless to the extent that they are non-intentional, they lack an 
aboutness, (intentional here being used in its broad, technical sense as appertaining to 
mental direct<dness). When we study an action or object it is impossible to distinguish 
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which elements of it are due to intentional thought and which are not, i. e. which are 
due to habitual actions for instance. With respect specifically to Hodder, Davis views 
his work as an eventually failed attempt to incorporate these deconstructivist ideas. 
What Davis finds as particularly erroneous is the association of meaning with context, 
that context provides a structure within which meanings are established. For Davis 
contexts are ultimately extremely diffuse phenomena, an infinite number of them can 
exist at any one point in time and space resulting in the continuous displacement of 
meaning. There is never just one meaning to be revealed, because there is never just 
one context, there is always differance. 
Such criticisms cannot be accepted wholesale for two related reasons. Firstly, Hodder 
himself believes, and did so though to a lesser degree in his middle period, that it is all 
too easy to formulate misguided notions of meaning by relying solely on the 
application of structuralist oppositions. Meanings always possess the potential for 
change; they are, to greatly varying degrees, open to negotiation. A single object can 
have a multiplicity of concurrent meanings within the same society because of the 
diverse nature of all societies, not to mention the diverse nature of the artefact itself 
(Hodder 1993b: 232). Secondly, however, and unlike Davis, Hodder does not push 
this line of argument to its extreme so that meanings appear to take on a totally 
evanescent quality; he does not evince that disquiet seen in post-structuralist works by 
Gosden which ensues from the possibility that meanings may be grounded in the 
concrete. Contexts can act as brakes on the free-play of signifiers, yet, concomitantly, 
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they do not constitute absolute parameters within which meanings are established 
authoritatively. Contexts themselves always possess a degree of openness, thus they 
are both limiting and limited in nature, influencing but not determining meaning. 
To follow this middle road is not, despite appearances, an act of expediency, but one 
of necessity, for the adoption of either of the extremes results in a position where 
meaningfulness is denied. At one end of the scale, where contexts have at most an 
ephemeral existence, meanings float free, it becomes all but impossible to attach 
meanings to signifiers. At the other extremity, where contexts are perceived as rigid, 
closed and self-defining structures, a similar conclusion is reached. If meaning exists 
purely as the consequence of a context then a position is quickly reached where the 
problem of relativism looms large. We have already encountered this scenario in 
relation to the work of Saussure, langue being analogous to context in this instance, 
yet there are many other examples where aspects of knowledge are heavily reliant on 
their position within an enclosed system. The works of Thomas Kuhn, Peter Winch 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer all exhibit varying degrees of relativism due to what can be 
seen as an over-reliance on context - or paradigms, world-views, traditions, etc. - and, 
interestingly, these often have their basis in language. Together with the relativism that 
such closed systems tend to inspire there often come other associated difficulties, most 
notably an inconmunensurability between different structures and an unreflecting 
acceptance that they do not contain any conflictual elements which mutually conspire 
to annul the possibility of change from external or internal sources. These problems are 
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sometimes acknowledged by the proponents of such systems resulting in certain 
modifications; i. e. Winch's introduction of three limiting notions', birth, death and 
sexual relations. 
The incorporation of one or more external factors within a system of meaning is, 
therefore, of some importance for the very validity of that system. Furthermore, no 
system or context is ever self-circumscribed, its parameters are always dependent to a 
degree on the interests, questions and prejudices of those interested in it. What these 
points conspire to show is that in the specific case of material culture, as in other 
areas, distinct elements apart from context need to be addressed and accommodated if 
an adequate level of understanding is desired. This is one of the most important issues 
raised by Hodder, (and, to be fair, one that is recognised by Davis as well), one which 
the former has come to place ever more emphasis on over the years. Artefacts can not 
just be viewed as ciphers, as merely expressions of meaning, they are `beings in 
themselves', objects in their own right. They do not only refer to something outside 
themselves, they also refer to themselves. As Hodder puts it, "material culture both 
represents and is" (Hodder 1995: 205). An inordinate amount of work has been 
carried out concerning the nature of representation and we have spent a considerable 
amount of time discussing the ways in which artefacts can act as signifiers and the 
problems this notion involves. What has attracted little attention is in what way 
material culture is. This general question has been recognised by the third, `middle' 
group of Hodder's critics who saw his then overtly structuralist approach as offering 
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only a partial view of material culture, one that lacked a real confrontation with the 
repercussions ensuing from the physicality of the artefact. After this oversight was 
acknowledged by Hodder attempts have been made to rectify it as we saw in his more 
recently devised third scheme where some tentative steps are taken to establish a 
theoretical model which can accommodate, not only material culture's `culturality', 
but also its 'materiality'. A substantial proportion of the following chapter will, 
therefore, be concerned with an extensive elaboration of the brief comments made by 
Hodder with respect to this largely overlooked aspect of social life. That is, the 
implications that flow from the physical characteristics of the artefact, particularly 
those concerning the forms of knowledge involved when we interact, both physically 
and mentally, with the object. Of course, much of the previous study has, to varying 
degrees, touched upon this area, but what is now required is the provision of a 
coherent picture. Such a picture must, by implication, be distinct, but not divorced 
from, those associated with the elaboration of what is most usually thought of as the 
`cultural domain', (i. e. those theoretical perspectives which place particular emphasis 
on the ideational aspects of social life), for our dealings with them can be of a radically 
different nature. We cannot see a belief, taste an idea, touch a value or smell a theory. 
Our physical involvement with artefacts has significant consequences for us, both 
materially and, in the non-pejorative sense of the word, ideologically. 
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Agents and Artefacts 
Introduction 
Up to this point our discussion has drawn upon a number of diverse works in order to 
form the basis of a conceptualisation of the artefact. It is the objective of this chapter 
to bring together the diverse ideas so far encountered so that a more complete picture 
can emerge of how artefacts become meaningful to us. To this end a tripartite scheme 
will be proposed, three forms or dimensions of meaning shall be discussed as being 
relevant to our understanding of the artefact. However, it should be kept in mind 
throughout this chapter that what is being dealt with here is just one aspect , one side 
of our relations with artefacts. Consequently, the emphasis shall be placed on humans 
as the active participants in our dealings with artefacts, the latter will be treated as 
pa'sive objects. Such a perspective is a distorted one and is only being used for ease of 
explanation; a more balanced view will be presented in the penultimate chapter. 
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A cursory distinction 
In a similar vein to Hodder, I want to begin by arguing that our relations with artefacts 
are of a heterogeneous nature involving different aspects of consciousness and thus 
diverse forms of knowledge. In drawing up a typology of these aspects of 
consciousness we will start with a distinction found at the heart of Giddens' 
structuration theory between discursive and practical consciousness. From the outset it 
should be made clear that although this differentiation is in my view very helpful, 
ultimately it cannot account for the diverse character of our cognitive activity, 
especially towards artefacts. 
According to Giddens there are, in fact, three levels on which human cognition occurs, 
the one we have not so far mentioned being the unconscious. Therefore, we are 
presented with a three dimensional view of personality which, as Giddens 
acknowledges, bears some resemblance to Freud's ideas. However, for the former the 
unconscious impinges on our actions only indirectly, it is not the powerful motivating 
force that the latter believed it to be. Rather, the unconscious is seen as a `basic 
security system' whose role is to guard against anxiety-producing stimuli, that is it is 
perceived as a system of unconscious mechanisms promoting the maintenance of an 
individual's ontological security. Ontological security is first and foremost 
accomplished through our participation in routine activity, through the predictable, 
repetitive nature of our day-to-day social life. "Routine", writes Giddens, "Is- integral 
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both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the 
paths of daily activities, and to the institutions of society, which are such only through 
their continued reproduction" (Giddens 1991: 60). However, the actual performances 
of routine activities are not unconscious, but are due to the knowledge held within 
practical consciousness. The unconscious and practical consciousness share a degree 
of similarity in that both are not immediately open to elucidation by the individual, yet, 
while for the former this is permanently the case, for the latter there always exists the 
potential that such a outcome may occur. The incapacity of the unconscious to be 
brought within discursive consciousness is due to two factors: "first, since the earliest 
experiences of the infant, shaping the basic security system whereby anxiety is 
canalised or controlled, predate differentiated linguistic competence, they are likely to 
remain thereafter `outside the bounds' of discursive consciousness. Second, the 
unconscious contains repressions which inhibit discursive formulation" (ibid: 49). The 
unconscious is, therefore, `unknowable', a form of knowledge which "cannot be 
translated into discourse without the influence of some kind of distorting mechanism" 
(Giddens 1988: 63). 
However, for Giddens, we are all extremely knowledgeable beings; we possess an 
extensive understanding of our involvement in the world and the social world in 
particular. In his well known phrase, "every social actor knows a great deal about the 
conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member" (Giddens 
1990: 5). Furthermore, "all actors have some degree of discursive penetration of the 
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social systems to whose continuation they contribute" (ibid: 5). It is this portion of our 
knowledge, that which we can express verbally, which is designated discursive 
consciousness. Yet Giddens pays relatively little attention to this form of 
consciousness. As he explains; 
"human agents or actors ... 
have, as an inherent aspect of what they do, 
the capacity to understand what they do while they do it. The reflexive 
capacities of the human actor are characteristically involved in a 
continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the contexts 
of social activity. But reflexivity operates only partly on a discursive 
level. What agents know about what they do, and why they do it - their 
knowledgeability as agents - is largely carried in practical 
consciousness" (Giddens 1991: xxii-iii). 
Unlike the distinction between the unconscious and both forms of consciousness there 
is no absolute schism between practical and discursive consciousness - this "division ... 
can be altered by many aspects of the agent's socialisation and learning experience. 
Between discursive and practical consciousness there is no bar; there are only the 
differences between what can be said and what is characteristically simply done" (ibid: 
7). For Giddens "the notion of practical consciousness is fundamental to structuration 
theory" because so much rests upon it (ibid: 6). In essence it "consists of all the things 
which actors know tacitly about how to `go on' in the contexts of social life without 
being able to give them direct discursive expression" and, as such, it exhibits 
Similarities with the Wittgensteinian formulation of knowing a rule (ibid: xxiii). This 
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division of consciousness is not unique, resembling one formulated by Alfred Schutz 
(and subsequently used by Berger and Luckmann) and, it could be argued, Max 
Weber's differentiation between the rational and irrational orientations towards social 
action. Giddens illustrates his own conceptualisation of practical consciousness by 
using the example of language: 
"Many most subtle and dazzlingly intricate forms of knowledge are 
embedded in, and constitutive of, the actions we carry out. They are 
done knowledgeably, but without necessarily being available to the 
discursive awareness of the actor. To speak a language, an individual 
needs to know an enormously complicated range of rules, strategies 
and tactics involved in language use. However, if that individual were 
asked to give a discursive account of what it is that he or she knows in 
knowing these rules etc., he or she would normally find it very difficult 
indeed" (Giddens 1988: 63). 
Now, although Giddens' central concerns relate to the interaction between co-present 
agents, the notion of practical consciousness can, I believe, be taken up to facilitate 
our understanding of the relations between people and artefacts. The vast majority of 
our dealings with artefacts involve the application of practical consciousness; however, 
Giddens' notion of this phenomenon in its present state is unable to deal with the 
complexities of such encounters. One difficulty in particular which needs to be 
addressed is the proposal, only touched upon by Hodder, that many aspects of our 
relations with artefacts are devoid of meaning in the conventional sense; that is, 
because of their very nature they are incapable of being expressed linguistically. In 
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other words, certain aspects of our knowledge can never be stated verbally, but this is 
not because they lie beyond consciousness in some kind of unconscious and thus 
inaccessible realm. If this is true an adequate concept of practical consciousness needs 
to be able to encompass both linguistic and non-linguistic elements, a position which is 
thus different from Giddens'. 
The notion that practical consciousness incorporates knowledge which is non- 
linguistic in character needs substantiating. Ultimately what has to be proved, 
therefore, is that there can be any forms of knowledge that are intrinsically non- 
linguistic. A great deal has already been written on this subject so to prevent ourselves 
becoming embroiled in a protracted debate we shall limit ourselves to just one line of 
argument loosely based around a paper by Maurice Bloch (Bloch 1990). Bloch begins 
his contention that a large proportion of our knowledge is of a non-linguistic nature by 
looking at the qualities of concepts and classificatory concepts in particular. Basically 
speaking, concepts are seen as mental representations of classes (e. g. one's beliefs 
about the class of dogs or tables), "to have a concept of X is to know something about 
the properties of X's instances. Hence, the knowledge contained in a concept describes 
properties" (Smith 1991: 21). The classical view perceives that the elements which 
constitute a concept are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for its definition. 
However, this proposal has been shown to be untenable, a major problem being the 
difficulty in actually specifying what the defining properties of many everyday concept,, 
are, e. g. what is a defining aspect of the concept `furniture"' The now more `generally 
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accepted view is that concepts are established with reference to properties that are 
seen as `typical' or `representative' and a great many of these may not be necessary. 
e. g. the property `has a back' for the concept furniture (ibid: 22). Bloch offers his own 
example; 
"the concept of a house is not a list of essential features (roof, door, 
and so on) which have to be checked off before deciding whether or 
not the thing is a house. If that were so we would have no idea that a 
house which has lost its roof is still a house. It is rather that we 
consider something as `a house' by comparing it to a loosely associated 
group of `houselike' features, no one of which is essential, but which 
are linked by a general idea of what a typical house is" (Bloch 1990: 
185). 
Therefore, as Smith explains; 
"instead of offering defining conditions, the properties of a ... concept 
are assumed to occur in some instances, not all, and to be perceptually 
salient. A collection of such properties is called a prototype, for it 
accurately describes only the `best examples' of a concept. According 
to this prototype view, the content of a concept is its prototype; an 
object will be categorised as an instance of a concept if it is sufficiently 
similar to the prototype, similarity being determined in part by the 
number of properties that the object and prototype share" (Smith 1991: 
25). 
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Now what appears to be the case is that prototypes are not ideal, abstract 
representations, but instead relate to actual physical instances so that an individual's 
representation of the concept bird relates to their best examples of this concept, e. g. 
the robin and the sparrow. This being so; 
"the typicality of any other instance could then be determined by its 
similarity to the best examples, and categorisation would be a matter of 
ascertaining whether an item had some critical level of similarity to the 
best examples. Furthermore, an exemplar representation provides the 
most straightforward explanation of why we often think of concrete 
cases when dealing with concepts -a concept is simply a set of 
concrete cases" (ibid: 42). 
It seems fair to suggest, therefore, that many classificatory concepts emerge as a 
consequence of our active involvement in the world, and, this being the case, this 
process may begin from the very moment of birth. Whenever the actual starting point 
is it appears safe to assume that it occurs some time before the acquisition of language 
so supporting the notion that there is no mandatory link between concepts and words 
(Brown 1973). Bloch extends this line of argument by introducing the work of Melissa 
Bowerman (1977) who demonstrates that once language has been acquired there 
begins "a continual back and forth movement between aspects of classification which 
are introduced through language and mental concepts, as the child learns to express 
these concepts through words. This dialectical movement ... suggests a much more 
general process ... 
by which originally non-linguistic knowledge is partly tran`formcd 
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as it becomes linguistic. " (Bloch 1990: 186). Bloch at this stage outlines three 
provisional conclusions: 
"(1) that much of knowledge is fundamentally non-linguistic; (2) that 
concepts involve implicit networks of meanings which are formed 
through the experience of, and practice in, the external world; and (3) 
that, under certain circumstances, this non-linguistic knowledge can be 
rendered into language and thus take the form of explicit discourse, but 
changing its character in the process" (ibid: 186). 
If we accept these premises at face value it may be possible to incorporate them within 
a somewhat modified system of knowledge based upon that of Giddens. Before 
discussing the feasibility of such a proposition another aspect of Bloch's work needs to 
be addressed, one concerned with that part of non-linguistic knowledge involved in the 
learning of practical, everyday tasks. 
Many of our day-to-day skills are acquired without the use of explicit verbal 
instructions, instead they are learned very gradually through imitation and tentative 
participation. This truism and its implications have been relatively overlooked in 
cultural studies of Western, industrialised societies, probably due to the perceived 
dominance of formalised educational systems with their emphasis on linguistic, 
Socratic teaching techniques. However, this is not so with respect to anthropological 
studies where the non-verbal transmission of skills has often been noted, generally, for 
decades and, more specifically, in recent studies of textile and garment manufacture in 
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Ghana and Liberia. The importance of such investigations, for Bloch, lies in "the fact 
that the transmission of knowledge in West African weaving and tailoring [being] 
largely non-linguistic may have less to do with the culture of education in these places 
than with a general feature of the kind of knowledge that underlies the performance of 
complex practical tasks which requires that it be non-linguistic" (ibid: 187). To 
support this claim a different tack is taken. Drawing upon research outlined in Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus (1986) Bloch describes situations where the process of skill acquisition 
starts with verbal instruction, but then this knowledge is transformed into a 
fundamentally non-linguistic form as the pupil becomes ever more proficient. An often 
used example is that of learning how to drive. Here we can 'know' how to drive, 
(what the compression of the various pedals achieves, in what combinations this 
should be done, and what associations such actions should have in relation to the 
shifting of the gear-stick), through verbal instruction. However, this knowledge has to 
be converted into non-linguistic, integrated procedures before the task can be effected 
rapidly, efficiently, automatically and, we could say, properly. Usually, it is only when 
performances are carried out without thinking in words that people recognise 
themselves as competent drivers. 
What appears to happen in the process of learning is that individuals acquire not only 
specific formal rules relevant to the situation which can be readily expressed in words, 
but also what are termed particular `cognitive mechanisms' of a non-linguistic nature. 
These mental apparatuses, 'chunks' of knowledge, are established through practical 
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experience and enable us to cope with information relating to a family of related tasks 
quickly and efficiently. Concomitantly, by possessing knowledge in such units, it has 
been argued, the brain's neurological potential is greatly enlarged - if all knowledge 
was held in a language-like form our overall capacity to deal with information would 
be severely limited. 
What Bloch argues for, then, is that in our activities in the world our knowledge of it 
has a binary quality. On the one hand we have linguistic knowledge organised in a 
sentential, linear fashion which, because of its very character, can be expressed directly 
in words. On the other hand there is non-linguistic knowledge, associated more with 
everyday practical activities and cognition, which is packaged into relatively distinct 
networks appropriate to operations in specific familiar domains. Bloch sees a `fluid 
transformative boundary' between the two, we can unpack cognitive mechanisms into 
linear, sentential sequences which can then be put into words. However, "the process 
of putting knowledge into words must require such a transformation in the nature of 
knowledge that the words will then have only a distinct relationship to the knowledge 
referred to" (Bloch 1990: 192). This has important methodological implications; 
"if the anthropologist is often attempting to give an account of chunked 
and non-sentential knowledge in a linguistic medium (writing), and she 
has no alternative, she must be aware that in doing so she is not 
reproducing the organisation of the knowledge of the people she 
studies but is transmuting it into an entirely different logical form. To 
effect such a transmutation is not impossible - after all we can describe 
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things which are not linguistic. But in the attempt to evoke such 
knowledge we should avoid stylistic devices which turn attempts at 
description into quasi-theory, as was the case with structuralism ... . 
Perhaps we should make much more use of description of the ways 
things look, sound, feel, smell, taste and so on - drawing on the realm 
of bodily experience - simply for heuristic purposes, to remind readers 
that most of our material is taken from the world of non-explicit expert 
practice and does not only come from linear, linguistic thought" (ibid: 
193). 
Bloch's distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge can be seen to ally 
fairly well with Giddens' notions of discursive and practical consciousness; both stress 
the centrality of language to the first side of this dichotomy and the importance of 
practical experience to the other side. However, there are significant differences. One 
of the most serious of these is that although both see the border between their two 
forms of knowledge as open the ability to pass from the practical to the discursive 
level is much more problematic for Bloch than it is for Giddens. This variance between 
the two theorists rests on Bloch's assertion that the distinction between discursive and 
practical knowledge emerges out of a real difference between forms of consciousness, 
i. e. linguistic and non-linguistic. For Giddens, however, both types of consciousness 
are ultimately linguistic in character, and this quality is even carried over into what he 
describes as the unconscious; "it is reasonable to argue that one can at least make 
headway in understanding what the unconscious is by following the line of thought 
that the unconscious Is structured like a language"' (Giddens 1988: 63). 
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The fact that all three of Giddens' levels of consciousness should possess linguistic 
characteristics should come as no real surprise as there exists an implicit belief within 
his work that social life as a whole and language share many qualities. As he states; 
"speech and language provide us with a series of useful clues as to how 
to conceptualise processes of social production and reproduction - not 
because society is like a language, but on the contrary because 
language as a practical activity is so central to social life that in some 
basic respects it can be treated as exemplifying social processes in 
general" (Giddens 1986: 127). 
That being said we must also remember that even though the unconscious is possibly 
structured like a language Giddens views it simultaneously as non-linguistic because it 
develops, in the guise of the ontological security system, before language is acquired 
(Giddens 1991: 57). Such proposals do not lie happily together, we are left being 
directed towards a situation where the suggestion that we possess innate dispositions 
which order all levels of consciousness in a language like manner seems one of the few 
ways of explaining Giddens' standpoint. However, this is precisely the argument that 
we have just encountered Bloch disputing by asserting that, not only is a large amount 
of' our knowledge formulated outside natural language, but that it is in no way 
language like. It cannot be so if we are to deal adequately with the vast amount of 
information required to carry on our day-to-day activities. Giddens' own perspective 
implies a model of thought only really applicable to sentential, logical knowledge, to 
just his own discursive level of consciousness, to what Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe 
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as the `Hamlet model' of decision making where the actor puts his thoughts into 
words and weighs up and analyses the alternatives in a self-conscious, logical fashion 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986: 28). 
However, by pointing out the shortcomings of Giddens' work in this area we must not 
infer that Bloch's ideas provide all the solutions. Ultimately, Bloch repeats the same 
crime as Giddens by proposing a simple dualistic model of conscious knowledge, a 
position we criticised the latter for promoting earlier on in this chapter. Such a view 
brings with it certain difficulties. Whereas Giddens can be criticised for perceiving 
discursive and practical consciousness as too similar in character, Bloch proposes a 
split between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge which is too dramatic for, despite 
seeing their border as permeable, the transition from one to the other requires, in all 
cases, a dramatic transformation in the nature of the information involved. Also, 
Bloch's scheme implies that the non-linguistic realm is of a singular quality, whereas I 
would want to argue that it is, in fact, quite diverse. Consequently, while some 
knowledge will indeed be distorted by being transformed into language the degrees of 
transformation are not always of the same degree. Concomitantly, the possibility must 
be left open that some forms of practical consciousness, if this is an appropriate term, 
may never be able to be referred to linguistically. 
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Artefacts and Practical Consciousness 
To substantiate the claim that practical knowledge is of a much more complex nature 
than either Giddens and Bloch believe it may be worthwhile to approach this issue 
from a different angle. It has probably become apparent during the preceding 
discussion that the discursive/practical and linguistic/non-linguistic dichotomies bear 
certain similarities to a dualism we encountered earlier on in this study, Langer's 
distinction between discursive and presentational forms. Langer, you will recall, 
believed that our understanding of the world is achieved in two ways, via language, 
which is linear and sequential in character, and directly through our senses where 
information is received synchronically. Now, in many respects, Langer's ideas can be 
seen to mirror those of Bloch much more than they do Giddens', particularly as both 
place great emphasis on a separation between the linguistic and non-linguistic. At the 
same time both see the transition from the latter to the former as entailing a degree of 
transmutation in the knowledge involved. For Bloch this is due to the unpacking of 
chunks of knowledge and the distinct items being laid out in successive order which 
can then be expressed linguistically. For Langer the alterations occur when 
simultaneous experiences are separated and structured in a linear manner for their 
expression in language. Here we come across a fundamental difference between these 
two theorists, because whereas Bloch's scheme rests upon two different modes of 
conceptual thought, Langer's originates from a distinction between conceptual thought 
and the inherent ordering capacities of our sense organs. According to Langer; 
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"our merest sense-experience is a process of formulation. The world 
that actually meets our senses is not a world of 'things', about which 
we are invited to discover facts as soon as we have codified the 
necessary logical language to do so; the world of pure sensation is so 
complex, so fluid and full, that sheer sensitivity to stimuli would only 
encounter what William James has called(in characteristic phrase) `a 
blooming, buzzing confusion'. Out of this bedlam our sense-organs 
must select certain predominant forms, if they are to make report of 
things and not of mere dissolving sensa. The eye and the ear have their 
logic - their `categories of understanding', if you like the Kantian idiom 
.... An object 
is not a datum, but a form construed by the sensitive and 
intelligent organ, a form which is at once an experienced individual 
thing and a symbol for the concept of it, for this sort of thing" (Langer 
1967: 89). 
One peculiar outcome of this stance, Langer believes, is that each sense has a family of 
art specific to it, the arts are discrete entities resting on empirical foundations and no 
hybrid works are possible, (but what of opera, illustrated books, etc.? ). However, 
what is of greater interest to us here is her attitude towards the knowledge formulated 
by our sense organs. Langer goes on to say that; 
"a tendency to organise the sensory field into groups and patterns of 
sense-data, to perceive forms rather than a flux of light-impressions, 
seems to be inherent in our receptor apparatus just as in the higher 
nervous centres with which we do arithmetic and logic. But this 
unconscious appreciation of forms is the primitive root of all 
abstraction, which in turn is the keystone of rationality; so it appears 
that the conditions of rationality lie deep in our pure animal experience 
191 
- in our power of perceiving, in the elementary functions of our eyes 
and ears and fingers. Mental life begins with our mere physiological 
constitution" (ibid: 89). 
Now, while I would accept the last statement with certain important reservations, for 
the moment I want to concentrate on Langer's thoughts over sense data knowledge. 
From the preceding quotations we are given the impression that this form of 
knowledge is of a more basic nature than its discursive counterpart; elsewhere she 
states that "the abstractions made by the ear and the eye - the forms of direct 
perception - are our most primitive instruments of intelligence" (ibid: 92). However, 
this primitiveness should not be equated with simplicity. With specific reference to the 
visual forms the relations between different aspects of the objects of vision are more 
complex than those existing between words in a sentence, for in the former case the 
elements are experienced simultaneously while in the latter case they occur 
sequentially. This being so the complexity of an idea expressed in discourse is limited 
by what the mind can retain from the beginning of an apperceptive act to its end. 
Hence; 
"an idea that contains too many minute yet closely related parts, too 
many relations within relations, cannot be `projected' into discursive 
form, it is too subtle for speech. A language-bound theory of mind, 
therefore, rules it out of the domain of understanding and the sphere of 
knowledge. But the symbolism furnished by our purely sensory 
appreciation of forms is a non-discursive symbolism, peculiarly well 
suited to the expression of ideas that defy linguistic `projection'. Its 
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primary function, that of conceptualising the flux of sensations, and 
giving us concrete things in place of kaleidoscopic colours and noises, 
is itself an office that no language-born thought can replace. The 
understanding of space which we owe to sight and touch could never 
be developed, in all its detail and definiteness, by a discursive 
knowledge of geometry" (ibid: 93). 
According to Langer, therefore, non-discursive or presentational knowledge is 
simultaneously both potentially more primal and more complex than discursive 
knowledge. A similar point concerning the elaborate character of visual forms has been 
noticed by Nelson Goodman. He asserts that "non-linguistic systems differ from 
languages, depiction from description, the representational from the verbal, painting 
from poems, primarily through lack of differentiation - indeed through density (and 
consequent total absence of articulation) - of the symbol system" (Goodman 1969: 
226). Goodman's notion of density and differentiation are best illustrated by his own 
example of the contrast between a graduated and an ungraduated thermometer. As 
Mitchell helpfully explains; 
"with a graduated thermometer every position of the mercury is given a 
deterministic reading: either the mercury has reached a certain point on 
the scale or it is read as being closest to that point. A position between 
any two points on the scale does not count as a character in the system: 
we round off to the closest determinate reading. In an ungraduated 
thermometer, on the other hand, no unique, determinate reading is 
possible at anY point on the thermometer: everything is relational and 
approximate, and every point on the ungraduated scale (an infinite 
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number, obviously), counts as a character in the system. Every tiny 
difference in the level of the mercury counts as a different indication of 
the temperature, but none of these differences can be assigned a unique, 
deterministic reading. There is no possibility of finite differentiation or 
the `articulation' of a single reading" (Mitchell 1986: 67). 
Now, for Goodman, a visual image or, more specifically, a painting is 'read' in a 
similar way to an ungraduated thermometer. 
"Every mark", Mitchell continues, "every modification, every curve or 
swelling of a line, every modification of texture or colour is loaded with 
semantic potential ... . The 
image is syntactically and semantically dense 
in that no mark may be isolated as a unique, distinctive character (like a 
letter of an alphabet), nor can it be assigned a unique reference or 
`compliant'. Its meaning depends rather on its relations with all the 
other marks in a dense, continuous field. A particular spot of paint 
might be read as the highlight on Mona Lisa's nose, but the spot 
achieves its significance in the specific system of pictorial relations to 
which it belongs, not as a uniquely differentiated character that might 
be transferred to some other canvas" (ibid: 67). 
Whereas Langer's system has its basis in Kantian thought, Goodman's is markedly 
conventionalist in character, yet both stress a similar point. Namely, that in the case of 
the visual arts the perception of distinct symbolic elements, (i. e. equivalent to letters or 
words in a language), is all but impossible. Consequently, meaning cannot be seen as 
being transferred by paintings in the same way as it is by language - there is no linear 
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sequence of characters to be followed from the beginning of a sentence to its 
predetermined end, there is just a vast array of indistinct patches of pigment that are 
taken in and understood more or less simultaneously. 
This set of circumstances is, of course, of a far greater complexity if we extend it 
beyond the parameters of the two dimensional graphic arts to artefacts in general, for 
now not only do we encounter an infinite amount of visual stimuli, but also a 
superabundance of sensations associated with touch, smell, sound and taste. These 
also exhibit a lack of natural compartmentalisation, no discrete elements are 
immediately apparent. According to Langer and Goodman their homogenous nature 
means that presentational forms are denied the ability to denote, a single splash of 
paint, for example, has no one-to-one relationship with a concept. Yet, far from 
diminishing their importance, Langer argues that they possess the potential to connote, 
to explicate "`unspeakable' things"; feelings (Langer 1967: 101). Music in particular is 
viewed as articulating and communicating emotional states at a level which language 
cannot attain. 
Langer's ideas help us to appreciate some of the complexities involved when we move 
beyond the discursive realm, highlighting a few of the problems encountered in trying 
to understand it. However, her work suffers from a marked tendency to exaggerate the 
differences between the information associated with discursive forms and that allied to 
presentational forms, a distinction even more extreme than that proposed by Bloch 
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between linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge. Not surprisingly we come across a 
similar, though more considerable, difficulty as was found with Bloch's work, 
concerning the movement from one domain to the other. However, whereas there 
always exists the possibility of such a transference between his forms of knowledge, 
this is apparently denied by Langer as presentational knowledge is based on the 
physiology of our sensory organs and is, therefore, 'unconscious'. There is thus a clear 
split between discursive forms which gives rise to knowledge of which we are 
consciously aware and can be expressed in words and presentational forms which 
result in an unconscious type of `emotional knowledge', "which the mind reads in a 
flash, and preserves in a disposition or an attitude" (ibid: 98). 
However, is this division as great as Langer suggests? Surely the portrayal of 
emotional states in words has been one of the main aims of a great many poems and 
novels, one that is often achieved. To a far lesser extent, but no less importantly, 
writers have also discussed the `dispositions and attitudes' associated with 
presentational forms, with artefacts in particular. We have already noted a few who 
have. taken a more analytical approach to this topic, Marx and Arendt whom we shall 
return to later, but there also exist more literary examples. Novelists as diverse as 
Balzac, Bennett, Perec and Baker all accentuate the relations artefacts have with 
people via attitudes and dispositions, (see especially Balzac 1968 & 1988, Bennett 
1989 & 1995, Perec 1991 and Baker 1990). Therefore, while I am not saying that 
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much of the knowledge gained from presentational objects can be expressed precisely 
in language, I would argue that it is not as difficult as Langer believes it to be. 
The difficulties we find with the work of Langer and Bloch appear to emerge partly as 
a consequence of preoccupation with overly strict typologies, with strong dualistic 
systems. Such problems can be ameliorated if we amalgamate some of Langer's ideas 
with those of Bloch. Let us assume that when we come into contact with an artefact a 
major part of our knowledge of it is constructed out of past and present experiences of 
the same or similar objects. Thus, when I drink from the glass now in front of me I 
recognise it visually, I know how heavy it is and so how much force is required to lift 
it, I know how it feels to my hand and lips, etc. Such knowledge is implicated in my 
actions towards it, as a package of information all these elements of knowledge are 
utilised simultaneously. I therefore possess chunks of knowledge concerned with, 
usually, types of artefacts which have been gleaned from my own personal experiences 
with such items, information from my own senses which enables me to interact with 
these objects in a cognisant fashion. However, the very act of my describing this 
situation, of putting it down in words, suggests that the distinction between this 
practical knowledge and discursive knowledge is not as dramatic as Langer proffers. 
Fhis is not to argue for a position similar to Giddens', the ability to describe practical 
knowledge in words does not mean that it is linguistic in nature. For sure, artefacts, 
such as a watch, can be dismantled into their component parts, but this is not the same 
as breaking a sentence down into individual words as all we are left with is a greater 
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amount of smaller artefacts. The reason we do not perceive artefacts in a language like 
manner in most of our day-to-day activity is due, as Bloch argues, to the fact that it 
would take an inordinate amount of time to do so and an excessive amount of 
neurological potential would have to be utilised. 
A final point to be made concerning both Bloch's and Langer's typologies is that by 
adhering to systems in which there exist only two elements the possibilities of 
refinement and elaboration are severely restricted. The way in which knowledge is 
acquired and processed can only be conceptualised within one sphere or the other, a 
position which entails two notable consequences. Firstly, the ability of one realm to 
affect the other and vice versa becomes a matter of some difficulty as we have already 
seen. Secondly, by denying either the possible existence of other forms of knowledge 
or variations within a form the two that are proposed must encompass a diversity of 
phenomena. This is especially the case with respect to non-linguistic or presentational 
knowledge; in the following section an argument will be forwarded in support of a 
division of this area. 
Embodied Knowledge 
The proposal that there exists a third form of knowledge, apart from the discursive and 
practical forms, takes it cue from an idea expressed by Hodder. In Theory and 
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Practice in Archaeology Hodder refers to the notion of motor knowledge, but 
unfortunately he provides us with very little to go on as to its nature. The scheme 
within which this form of knowledge is embedded takes its inspiration from an article 
by Jacques Pelegrin. Pelegrin, at first sight, appears to be yet another theorist who 
proposes a binary typology of knowledge. His notions of connaissances and savoir- 
faires reflect a distinction made by a number of psychologists (e. g. Winograd 1975, 
Anderson 1976 and Squire 1986) between two forms of memory processes or systems, 
the declarative and the procedural. This system shares many features with those 
already discussed above, but it also exhibits important differences. According to 
Squire; 
"declarative memory is explicit and accessible to conscious awareness, 
and it includes the facts, episodes, lists, and routes of everyday life. It 
can be declared, that is brought to mind verbally as a proposition or 
nonverbally as an image. It includes both episodic memory (specific 
time-and-place events) as well as semantic memory (facts and general 
information gathered in the course of specific experiences). ... In 
contrast, procedural knowledge is implicit, and it is accessible only 
through performance, by engaging in the skills and operations in which 
the knowledge is embedded" (Squire 1986: 1614). 
Thus we are presented with one more dichotomous system, but with the dividing line 
redrawn. Interestingly both linguistic and non-linguistic elements are placed within the 
same category, the declarative, the common feature being that knowledge can be 
')macht to mind', not that it can be expressed verbally. Procedural memory. on the 
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other hand, is explicitly related to the body, tied to the performance of physical 
actions. However, although Pelegrin believes that Squire's declarative/procedural 
memory distinction corresponds to his own connaissances/savoir faire distinction 
their views do differ over the character of the second form. 
No such discrepancy appears to exist with respect to the first form so, for Pelegrin, 
within connaissances "can be classed the mental representations of forms and 
materials (concepts), and a register of action modalities (brief gesture sequences 
associated to their practical result). Referring to the memorisations and mental 
representations of objects and of facts, this knowledge ensues from a memory that is 
explicit and declarative in nature" (Pelegrin 1990: 118). Yet, unlike Squire, such 
representations are implicated in the second category, in savoir-faires. This he terms 
ideational know-how and corresponds to; 
"operations - spatial and sequential transformations, comparisons - 
undertaken on the mental representations. The artisan imagines (that is, 
constructs new mental representations of) the virtual state of the object 
according to the envisaged actions, and considers their respective 
advantages and risks. These mental operations are not only spatial 
(upon forms), but they are also organised chronologically and 
sequentially ... . 
It is evident that only practical experience can enable 
one to gradually refine estimations and to optimise reasonings which 
are essentially subconscious" (ibid: 118). 
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So there seem to be two distinguishing characteristics of ideational know-how that 
ensure its separation from connaissances. Firstly, it appears to involve an active 
process; (passive? ) representations are acted upon by ideational know-how. Secondly, 
this process does not occur consciously, in the realm of connaissances, but rather 
takes place in the subconscious, (although what the term subconscious actually refers 
to is not made clear). One problem that immediately becomes apparent is how a 
process occurs in which representations, which are explicit and conscious, can be 
manipulated and refined through an action which is subconscious. 
Another form of savoir-faires, motor know-how, is described by Pelegrin in relation 
to the production of flint tools: 
It "corresponds to intuitive operations on the assessed adequacy of the 
knapping parameters invoked in the current operation. The mass and 
quality of the striking tool, as well as the mass and morphological 
characteristics of the object to be knapped, are appreciated through 
vision and tactile sensibility. Following that, the orientation and 
handling of the object by the non-dominant hand, and the strength and 
trajectory of the gesture carried out by the dominant hand are 
`calculated'. It is crucial to note here that these gestures are rapid, and 
their course cannot be appropriately controlled by vision. The eye does 
control the position and orientation of the object prior to percussion, 
but the character of the knapping gesture itself has also to be 
`programmed' prior to the movement. This means that the adequacy 
and success of the muscular execution of the knapping -sture 
necessarily relies on prior practical experience" (ibid: 118). 
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A more contemporary everyday illustration is provided by Hodder who explains that; 
"this type of knowledge involves, for example, the sense of balance and 
other skills which are used in riding a bicycle or the adjustments of 
body posture needed in order to keep upright while windsurfing. We 
can be told how to do all these things, but usually the verbal knowledge 
is insufficient for us to be able to do them. We normally need practical 
experience and training" (Hodder 1995: 206). 
Unlike ideational know-how, motor know-how can be seen to fit quite neatly into 
Squire's notion of procedural memory, being by definition tied to the body. This is the 
final dimension of knowledge which is relevant to the artefact, but although motor 
know-how is of great significance to our understanding of material culture very few 
people have attempted to try and come to some kind of understanding of it. For 
example, the above quotation from Pelegrin amounts to the sum of his descriptions of 
this phenomenon. To an extent this is understandable for it can be seen in some ways 
as lying furthest away from discursive knowledge, its very `non-linguisticality' ensures 
that descriptions of it are not to be made easily. However, that being said there are a 
few theorists that we can turn to in order to gain some insights, some indications as to 
its nature. One such person is the psychologist Jean Piaget who believes that important 
aspects of knowledge are acquired through bodily activity. 
As is well known Piaget's research is concerned with the explanation of cognitive 
development, concentrating on the dramatic changes that occur in this field during 
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childhood. His theories have attracted a great deal of attention since their inception 
and a number of limitations have be recognised; most notably concerning his research 
methodology and a general underestimation of the child's cognitive abilities. Despite 
these reservations there does appear to be a widespread recognition that Piaget's ideas 
provide the most fruitful approach to this subject. His perspective is adroitly summed 
up by Michael Eysenck: 
"At the most general level, Piaget argued that the development of 
intelligence is the highest form of adaptation of an individual to his or 
her environment. Adaptation involves an interaction between the 
individual's knowledge and the external environment, and two basic 
processes can be identified in their interaction: assimilation and 
accommodation. Assimilation occurs when there is some kind of 
cognitive structuring of an external object or event in accordance with 
the individual's pre-existing cognitive organisation. In contrast, 
accommodation occurs when this cognitive organisation is modified by 
the need to deal accurately with the requirements of environmental 
events. In other words, adaptation involves both an assimilation of the 
external environment to cognitive structure and an accommodation of 
cognitive structure to the external environment" (Eysenck 1988: 232). 
According to Piaget cognitive development progresses through four major stages, an 
epigenetic process in that each stage, rather than being substituted by the preceding 
one, incorporates the one preceding it. The first stage, the one most relevant to this 
study, is termed the sensori-motor stage which begins at birth and ends at around the 
age of two. Much of this time is taken up developing perceptual (sensori-motor) 
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categories of objects, i. e. non-conceptual categories that allow discrimination between, 
for example, male and female faces on an essentially perceptual basis, but do not entail 
conceptual knowledge about people Piaget perceived such categories, according to 
Jean Mandler, as consisting of; 
"sets of perceptual-motor schema that enable infants to recognise a 
variety of objects (and events) and to act appropriately in their 
presence. He saw no evidence that infants, during this period, have any 
conceptual representations that would enable thought about objects. In 
Piaget's analysis, concepts develop when sensori-motor schemas 
become `interiorized', `speeded up', and freed from ongoing perception 
and action. This transformation ... 
depends heavily on learning about 
objects through physical interactions with them" (Mandler 1992: 588). 
Consequently, the child is involved in a dynamic relationship with the external world, a 
relationship which is essentially physical in character, the environment being 
confronted directly. The knowledge that emerges from this process can be seen as 
quintessentially intelligence in action, concerned with actual objects and events. Reality 
is therefore understood, to start with at least, primarily through bodily activity rather 
than through mental representations or the manipulation of symbols. It is the gradual 
attainment of basic concepts which is the great achievement of the sensori-motor 
stage, the most important of which, to Piaget's mind, is the concept of object 
pci manencc, the permanence of form and substance of immediate objects. It is through 
sensori-motor intelligence that objects are eventually regarded as possessing an 
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independent existence from the child and, concomitantly, a nascent idea of the self 
begins to develop. 
As these notions originate at such an early age, before the acquisition of language, it 
does not seem too farfetched to propose that language is founded upon them. As 
Eysenck states, "thinking certainly begins at an earlier developmental stage than 
language in the human child, and it seems reasonable to follow Piaget in arguing that 
language in the young child builds on the cognitive abilities which have developed 
during the pre-language sensori-motor period" (ibid: 210). Brown holds a similar 
view; "where should the meanings of the first linguistic constructions come from if not 
from the sensori-motor intelligence which directly precedes them? " (Brown 1973: 
199). 
Piaget's ontogenetic theory, therefore, offers us some interesting insights into the part 
played by sensori-motor knowledge in the young child, helping to establish the concept 
of permanence and so space and time and, concomitantly, establishing the foundations 
for the emergence of language. Such assertions, unsurprisingly, have not gone 
uncontested. Fundamental difficulties arise in carrying out research on pre-linguistic 
children, both in the design of the experiments and in the interpretation of results. 
Whatever these problems entail we are still left with the question, how does Piaget's 
work enable us to understand the role of sensori-motor intelligence in the adult? Piaget 
". Ces striking qualitative changes in thinking during the }ears of childhood rather than 
205 
quantitative changes, the modes of thinking differ dramatically from birth to 
adolescence. It appears, therefore, that sensori-motor knowledge is subsumed within 
the latter stages of cognitive development so that the impression is given that its role, 
though vital at the outset, becomes less so as the child's mental abilities evolve. 
The implied relegation of the importance of sensori-motor knowledge seems 
symptomatic of a more general dismissive attitude towards its significance. However, 
one exception to this rule is found in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose 
work shares some similarities to Piaget's. Merleau-Ponty's writings are renowned for 
their vagueness and complexity and in order to abstract just those elements that are of 
relevance to this study I shall rely heavily on one article, Merleau-Ponty, the Elusive 
Body and Carnal Sociology by Nick Crossley. 
A major concern of Merleau-Ponty is perception; 
"perception", in Crossley's words, "is an embodied experience. It is 
sensational. But it cannot be understood as a caused effect of a world 
of physical objects upon the body (understood itself as a physical 
object). Perception does not consist in one object having effects upon 
another for Merleau-Ponty. It consists in meaning; that is, in the fact 
that something is seen or heard etc. Physiological/causal approaches do 
not and cannot account for this" (Crossley 1995: 45). 
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Merleau-Ponty establishes his distinctive views on perception via three basic 
arguments. Firstly, in opposition to a Cartesian perspective, perception as occurring 
in-the-world instead of in the mind: 
"The visual perception of an object, such as a table, for example, forms 
between the table and the body of the perceiver ... . There are not two 
tables, one in the world and one in the mind but rather one table which 
is seen. [Therefore, ] it involves one order, perception or the visible, 
which may be subdivided (by means of theoretical reflection) into two 
derived, interdependent and relational aspects (i. e. perceiver and 
perceived)" (ibid: 46). 
Secondly, Merleau-Ponty denies that the mind and body are distinct substances. 
Perception, being both sensational and meaningful, is essentially a meaningful 
configuration of sensations and these sensations belong to the body as a sentient being. 
Consequently, the body can be said to have two sides, sentient and sensible, or what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as the phenomenal body (le corps phenomenal) and the 
objective body (le corps objectif). Therefore; 
"it sees and can be seen, hears and can be heard, touches and can be 
touched. These sides are not separate from each other ... they are 
reversible aspects of one and the same being. The human body is a 
visible-seer, a tangible-toucher, an audible-listener, etc. Moreover, the 
body's visible-tangible presence is central to its perception for Nlerleau- 
Ponty 
..., one never perceives 
from nowhere ... one always perceives 
from somewhere (e. g. above, to the side, at a distance, etc. ) and it is 
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one's visible, tangible presence which provides this somewhere. The 
perceptual field, in this respect, is constituted through the articulation 
of body and world" (ibid: 46-7). 
This leads us on to the third point, perception is constituted through our active 
involvement in the world, it is based in behaviour; "that is, in looking, listening and 
touching, etc. as acquired, cultural, habit-based forms of conduct. The perceiving body 
constitutes itself, as such, he argues, by implementing acquired perceptual schemes. It 
does not passively receive messages from the world but actively interrogates the 
world, in terms of the cultural schemes which it has acquired" (ibid: 47). For Merleau- 
Ponty, then, perception's primary function is not contemplative, but practical 
involvement: 
"Perception is instrumental in relation to our on-going projects and is 
not usually a project in itself. This is reflected, moreover, in our 
experience of perception: e. g. a footballer surveying the pitch will not 
`see' grass and bodies but rather `openings' and `opportunities'. Her 
visual field will be structured through her practical involvements. 
[Furthermore, ] as such, perception is integrated with and inseparable 
from our other bodily modes of practical engagement. Action and 
perception intertwine and mutually inform each other in the context of 
a single project: e. g. the footballer moved into action by the opening 
that she sees (without any reflective process taking place)" (ibid: 48). 
In fact, Nlerleau-Ponty believes that our principle relation to the world is of this active 
and unreflective kind. Our actions are, for the most part, carried out 'unthinkingly' as 
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is the co-ordination of bodily movements which constitute such actions. This power of 
bodily co-ordination, proprioception, is the co-ordination of the body-in-the-world: 
"The body possesses a synthetic and co-ordinating power in relation to 
itself, he argues, by means of its action in the world. It `knows' itself by 
way of its active relation to its world. Moreover, in this sense, the 
body-subject [i. e. the phenomenal body] equally `knows' the world, in 
a practical way, irrespective of reflection or intellection. My fingers 
`know' the space and layout of the word-processor keyboard, `I can' 
type, for example, irrespective of the fact that I am unable to give a 
linguistic and reflective account of this layout (without looking)" (ibid: 
54). 
The boundaries of the phenomenal body can also be viewed as extending beyond the 
surface of the objective body through our use of objects. Again driving can be used as 
a helpful illustration: 
"When we drive a car ... we not only 
`know' its internal functional 
space, we tacitly incorporate its potential for motility, its size and 
acceleration potential, into our judgements. Parking, pulling out, 
overtaking, etc., all entail that we think not about the car but `from the 
point of view of' the car. Moreover, no aspect of this thought is 
reflective, reflexive or discursive (at least it need not be). It is practical, 
embodied know-how and mastery" (ibid: 54). 
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Merleau-Ponty believes that this `existential understanding' constitutes a world of 
meaningful objects which is prior to and independent of reflective and reflexive 
thought, one that only becomes `conscious' when something unexpected occurs, e. g. 
when the clutch cable snaps. The origins of this type of understanding are to be found 
in a cultural stock and is acquired, not by intellection, not by appropriating intellectual 
principles, but through doing, through repetition. It is through this process that the 
body secures a relatively flexible power of action and reaction, a modality of 
understanding. To understand, in this sense, is to act competently, the body thus acts 
meaningfully, with skill and purpose. 
To Crossley's mind this perspective entails two significant corollaries. Firstly; 
"that a sociological analysis of regimes of embodied action or of body 
repertories, should be understood as a sociology of meaning and 
understanding. To analyse the way in which a body moves and the 
techniques which it draws upon is to analyse the way in which its 
environment is made both functional and meaningful for it. Practical 
action should be understood as a way of taking up a meaningful 
position in the world. Secondly, and following on from this, Merleau- 
Ponty's position provides a corrective to the strong bias towards 
linguistic constitution in contemporary sociological understandings of 
meaning. What Merleau-Ponty effectively argues ... 
is that the world of 
shared meanings is effectively constituted, not only by speech acts, but 
by other forms of bodily action and comportment. My desk and chair, 
to use the usual example, not only exist as meaningful phenomena in 
the social world by virtue of their being named. Indeed they are seldom 
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referred to by their name or anything like it. They exist as meaningful 
aspects of the social world by virtue of the fact that I sit at them and 
write, that I (qua practical body-subject) use them in a meaningful 
way. It may only be when I misuse them that I am reminded, 
linguistically, that they are furniture and that I should be using them in 
a different way" (ibid: 55-6). 
To an extent these appeals are answered in the work of Pierre Bourdieu who proposes 
that "Merleau-Ponty, and also Heidegger, opened the way for a non-intellectualist, 
non-mechanistic analysis of the relations between agent and world" (Bourdieu 1990a: 
10). The danger with intellectualism is that it "is inscribed in the fact of introducing 
into the object the intellectual relation to the object, of substituting the observer's 
relation to practice for the practical relation to practice" (Bourdieu 1990b: 34). For 
Bourdieu much of our understanding of the world is of a kind which is entirely 
unarticulated, a mode of understanding which does not reside in thought or 
representations; rather it is embodied and finds expression in practice, a notion he 
attempts to encapsulate in the term habitus. This he defines as "a system of durable, 
transposable dispositions which function as the generative basis of structured, 
objectively unified practices" (Bourdieu 1979: vii). Habitus includes, according to 
Charles Taylor; 
"dispositions to bodily comportment, say, to hold oneself or to gesture 
in a certain way. A bodily disposition is a habitus when it encodes a 
certain cultural understanding. The habitus in this sense always has an 
expressive dimension. It gives expression to certain meanings that 
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things and people have for us, and it is precisely by giving such 
expression that it makes these meanings exist for us" (Taylor 1993: 
58). 
More accurately, embodied habitus is referred to specifically by Bourdieu as hexis. 
"Bodily hexis is political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into a permanent 
disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and 
thinking ... 
The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of 
consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, 
cannot even be made explicit" (Bourdieu 1993: 93-4). It is possible to see here the 
emergence of a similarity with the style/function dichotomy which we noted earlier in 
relation to the artefact. The vast majority of our actions cannot be perceived as entirely 
shaped by functional prerequisites, there exists a diversity of ways in which they can be 
performed, (just think of the variety of methods of walking that exist), ways that are 
open to socio-cultural manipulation. This opens up the possibility for certain actions to 
be seen as more `appropriate' than others within a culture, even though their results 
are the same. An obvious example, made explicit by Norbert Elias, is how manners 
came to shape our utilisation of cutlery. As Connerton explains; "the way in which 
knife, fork and spoon are held and moved was standardised step by step; the practice 
of using a fork was acquired slowly, as was the habit of taking liquid only with a 
spoon. By the end of the eighteenth century the French leisured upper class had fully 
elaborated the standard of table manners that came gradually to be seen as self-evident 
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in Western civilised society as a whole" (Connerton 1989: 83). Therefore, it can be 
argued, as Taylor does, that; 
"children are inducted into a culture, are taught the meanings which 
constitute it, partly through inculcation of the appropriate habitus. We 
learn how to hold ourselves, how to defer to others, how to be a 
presence for others, all largely through taking on different styles of 
bodily comportment. Through these modes of deference and 
presentation, the subtlest nuances of social position, of the sources of 
prestige, and hence of what is valuable and good are encoded" (Taylor 
1993: 58). 
As Bourdieu himself writes: 
"Adapting a phrase of Proust's, one might say that arms and legs are 
full of numb imperatives. One could endlessly enumerate the values 
given body, made body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit 
pedagogy which can instil a whole cosmology, through injunctions as 
insignificant as `sit up straight' or `don't hold your knife in your left 
hand', and inscribe the most fundamental principles of the arbitrary 
content of a culture in seemingly innocuous details of bearing or 
physical and verbal manners, so putting them beyond the reach of 
consciousness and explicit statement" (Bourdieu 1990b: 79). 
Ultimately, "what is learned in the body is not something one has, but something one 
is" (ibid: 73). Although this may sound like a rather deterministic position Bourdieu 
would deny such an accusation, he does not see us as involved in a mechanistic 
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process whereby habitus is taken up and reproduced exactly. Instead habitus `guides' 
action, they allow a degree of individual manoeuvre within limits; they are thus both 
enabling and restrictive. 
Three dimensions of knowledge 
We are now in a better position to outline a scheme of how people confront artefacts 
as meaningful objects, a scheme which can incorporate the disparate aspects of this 
process identified during the course of this study. As already implied, and in contrast 
to the majority of typologies discussed above which divided knowledge into two more 
or less distinct categories, the present system will consist of three forms or dimensions 
of knowledge which are interconnected. The nature of these connections will be 
outlined after the three forms have themselves been described. 
The first dimension of knowledge to be distinguished is that of an essentially discursive 
nature, one which corresponds to those forms described by Giddens, Bloch, Langer, 
Hodder, Squire, and Pelegrin which all share a common feature, namely consciousness 
of this type has the capacity to be made explicit by being expressed linguistically. 
Discursive knowledge includes categories, relationships, primary and secondary 
meanings about objects and their uses which can be expressed in speech or writing. 
Such symbolic or theoretical knowledge appears to rest on the brain's ability to 
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organise a proportion of the information we acquire in a linguistic fashion, thus many 
of our ideas concerning artefacts are arranged in a sentential manner, they are linear 
and sequential in character. Obviously the actual depth of such knowledge varies from 
person to person, (the amount I could say about the workings of a television would be 
pitiful in comparison to that of an electrician), but just as we have some degree of 
discursive penetration of the social systems to whose constitution we contribute, the 
same is also true of the artefacts we encounter; we understand at a discursive level 
many of the features of objects quite readily. 
This level of awareness, determined by our ability to put things into words, brings with 
it a number of important consequences. Primarily, it implies a degree of `openness' in 
the sense that the artefact's characteristics are expressed through an inherently social 
medium, consequently this form of knowledge can be shared without much difficulty 
within a linguistic culture, (not to mention the possibility that it can be translated into 
other languages). Furthermore, it possess the capacity to be recorded in various forms 
and therefore the ability to be disseminated in a variety of ways; as such, discursive 
knowledge is the most easily transmittable of the three forms described here. Another 
t'ýictor which promotes this state of affairs is that discursive knowledge, unlike the 
other two dimensions, does not rely on the presence of the artefact, its absence need 
not make such information meaningless. We can therefore be told about a specific 
object, fain an understanding of it, without it being there in front of us. 
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These can be seen as the positive aspects of discursive knowledge, yet, although it may 
be perceived as the most refined and explicit forms of consciousness with respect to 
artefacts, it comes at a price. As we discussed earlier the time and neurological 
potential required to think in this way would severely limit the amount and complexity 
of our interactions with artefacts. Consequently, in the majority of our dealings with 
these things we do not, indeed we cannot, think of them in this way. When using a 
can-opener that I am familiar with I do not think about how such a task should be 
performed in a linguistic fashion, I do not need to set out such knowledge in a 
sentential way in order to operate the utensil. Indeed, I may find certain aspects of its 
use difficult to describe in words and the same could be true of its form. This may be 
due, in part, to the limits of language; for all its refinement we encounter great 
difficulties in putting certain experiences into words. As Miller notes; 
little has been said on "the inadequacies and crudity of language when 
faced with objects in everyday interaction. This point is easily 
illustrated through a simple reflective exercise. Imagine for a moment 
attempting to describe in detail the difference in shape between a milk 
bottle and a sherry bottle, or the taste of cod as against haddock, or the 
design of some wallpaper. Clearly, compared with our ability to make 
fine discriminations of perceptual qualities and immediately recognise 
and discriminate amidst a profusion of ordinary objects, linguistic 
description may appear slow and clumsy" (Miller 1993: 98). 
Wittgenstein wrote that although we could see beyond the limits of language we could 
not speak beyond them and "what we cannot speak about we must pas,, over in 
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silence" (Wittgenstein 1988: 74). The remaining two forms of knowledge are 
essentially non-linguistic in nature, thus making them difficult to acknowledge and 
discuss, however drawing on our previous discussions an attempt will be made. 
All of the theorists whose schemes of knowledge we have discussed noted the 
presence of a type of understanding other than a discursive form and, with the 
exception of Giddens, they viewed it as being fundamentally non-linguistic. Following 
this line of thought the second dimension of knowledge to be described here, practical 
knowledge, is also to be conceived of as non-linguistic in character. Consequently, it is 
not viewed as being organised in a linear and sequential manner, but is made up of 
parcels or chunks of information which can be thought of as more analogous to an 
image rather than a piece of discourse. As such it forms a vast stock of information 
possessed by us all which is stored in a comparatively implicit form. These parcels of 
practical knowledge are applied `whole', although this does not mean that they cannot 
be `unpacked', broken up into discrete elements so that they can be discussed 
discursively. However, just as it is difficult to segregate the component parts of a 
painting, so the task of putting into words the aspects that make up a parcel of 
practical appears difficult, resulting in a degree of distortion of the information 
involved. Unfortunately, by its very nature, the actual amount of distortion is hard to 
gauge for we cannot state explicitly what in fact has been distorted. 
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Approaching these parcels of knowledge from a different angle we can see some 
similarity between them and those types of concepts discussed earlier, i. e. exemplar 
representations or prototypes. These are somewhat nebulous entities fashioned out a 
loose collection of, sometimes non-necessary, properties. Significantly, such 
prototypes are not ideal, abstract representations, but relate to real physical instances, 
concrete cases, so that if we see the chunks of practical knowledge as akin to these 
entities we can conceive them as tied to our activity in the world. This connection has 
two elements; firstly, practical knowledge is formed through our activity, the parcels 
of information are the result of our interactions with, among other things, artefacts. 
Secondly, this knowledge is applied in real situations, when we are actually dealing 
with objects. As such it can be seen to share similarities with Pelegrin's notion of 
ideational know-how which is also based firmly on practical experience. When dealing 
with artefacts, especially if they are unfamiliar to us, we imagine, (i. e. devise new 
mental representations based on previous parcels of knowledge), how our forthcoming 
actions will affect it and any other consequences that may ensue. Once applied a new 
set of circumstances will arise, a different state of affairs comes into being, and thus 
fresh mental representations occur and others can be utilised. The ease, speed and 
efficiency of this process will depend, of course, on the novelty of the situation and the 
depth of experiences held by the actor. 
Practical knowledge, being implicated with our involvement in the world, is associated 
with the acquisition of new skills and the ability to cope with novel situations, for 
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example when a mishap occurs, when we slip, when a tool breaks, etc. Our situation 
immediately comes back to our attention, we become aware of the different 
circumstances that now apply. Consequently, the object in use ceases to be 
`transparent' to us, a `gap' emerges once more between ourselves and the object. 
From such a position we may then just get back to the task in hand without giving it a 
seconds thought or, alternatively, we may begin to assess what happened, to think 
discursively about the reasons behind the error. 
The employment of mental representations or images adds further weight to the 
suggestion that practical knowledge is organised in packages of information for, as we 
have already noted, perceptions are not made up of discrete elements like words in a 
sentence, but are experienced simultaneously. However, we should not assume that, 
with all this talk of `images' that practical knowledge is somehow a purely visual 
entity; we also possess parcels of practical knowledge allied to touch, smell, taste, 
sound and proprioception. Unfortunately, sociological work in these areas is extremely 
limited, (however, see Classen et al 1994 for some interesting pieces on the cultural 
history of smell), and I have found no studies that have tackled this subject from the 
position adopted here. 
Another way of viewing practical knowledge is as a form of understanding which 
occupies a middle ground between discursive and embodied knowledge, one that 
allows movement between the two. Before entering a discussion of how this occurs a 
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description of the third and final way in which artefacts become meaningful objects to 
us has to be outlined. As already mentioned, sensori-motor or embodied knowledge is 
the least understood and most difficult to explain of the dimensions of understanding, 
yet it is essential in our everyday interactions with objects. Included in this cate`or`, 
are all those intuitive operations and habitual actions carried out with artefacts, 
performances that occur `without thinking'. After Piaget we can propose that this 
form of knowledge is the first to develop, our earliest understanding of the world is 
gained through bodily actions in and upon our environment, reality becomes known 
through physical activity before the `higher' modes of consciousness, before language, 
develops. However, embodied knowledge does not become marginalised once these 
other forms have evolved as Piaget implies, rather, following Merleau-Ponty and 
Bourdieu, it continues to play an important role in day-to-day life. The body may be 
said to possess knowledge in the form of repertoires of actions which can be applied to 
similar types of objects in similar situations, habits appropriate to artefacts of 
equivalents natures. For example; 
"to know how to type ... 
is neither to know the place of each letter 
among the keys, nor is it to have acquired a conditioned reflex for each 
letter, which is set in motion by each letter as it comes before the eye. 
We know where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where 
one of our limbs is. We remember this through knowledge bred of 
familiarity in our lived space. The movement of the typist's fingers may 
be describable; yet it is not present to the typist as a trajectory through 
space that can be described, but as a certain adjustment of the typist's 
mobility. Here a meaningful practice does not coincide with a sign; 
220 
meaning cannot be reduced to a sign which exists on a separate `level' 
outside the immediate sphere of the body's acts. Habit is a knowledge 
and a remembering in the hands and in the body; and in the cultivation 
of habit it is our body which remembers" (Connerton 1989: 95). 
Such is the depth of habitual knowledge or embodied understanding that when in full 
flow the objects in use come to be experienced, not as objects, but as extensions of the 
body. As Merleau-Ponty explains; 
"the blind man's stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no 
longer perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, 
extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel 
to sight. In the exploration of things, the length of the stick does not 
enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather aware of it 
through the position of objects than of the position of objects through 
it. The position of things is immediately given through the extent of the 
reach which carries him to it, which comprises besides the arm's own 
reach the stick's range of action" (Merleau-Ponty 1967: 143). 
This is a common experience for us all; in our knowledgeable manipulation of objects, 
a knowledge gained through repetition and practice, they become `transparent' to us. 
In the famous example of Heidegger's, when we possess the ability to hammer skilfully 
the hammer ceases to be an independent object of which we are continually aware, but 
instead becomes `ready-to-hand'. Therefore, we acquire dispositions to act with 
objects in particular ways such that they are only `brought to mind' when something 
goes wrong, when things become `unready-to-hand' in Heidegger's phrase. 
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Two final points can be made in relation to this form of understanding. Unlike 
discursive knowledge, embodied knowledge can only be instigated effectively in the 
presence of the object to which it is related. Furthermore, change in the nature of 
embodied knowledge may also be seen to be more difficult, the appropriation of a new 
skill is usually harder than changing ones mind over the meaning of an object. 
That these forms of knowledge are in some sense idiosyncratic may be argued by way 
of a couple of illustrations. Firstly, it is possible for us to operate on two levels 
simultaneously, we can apply two forms of understanding to two separate artefacts at 
the same time. Thus, we can discuss the merits of a pencil sharpener (discursive 
knowledge) while at the same time driving a car (embodied knowledge). Somewhat 
strangely it is often the case that when we apply both of these forms to the same object 
simultaneously, when we think discursively about an act that we are skilful at 
performing a kind of clumsiness ensues. As Polanyi observes, "if a pianist shifts his 
attention from the piece he is playing to the observation of what he is doing with his 
fingers while playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop" (Polanyi 1973: 56). 
This apparent friction between different forms of knowledge concerned the same 
object exhibits itself in another way as illustrated when learning how to reverse a 
trailer. We know that we must turn the steering-wheel in the opposite direction to that 
which is normal when reversing (discursive knowledge), but we `feel' that this wrong 
(embodied knowledge); we have to fight against ourselves in order to achieve our aim. 
11) 1) 
Although these examples are far from conclusive they do seem to point towards some 
kind of segregation between the three dimensions of knowledge. 
Knowledge in action 
This description of the three dimensions of knowledge portrays them in such a way 
that they come across as separate and static entities. However, this is far from the case 
for they exist in a system of dynamic relationships so that they continually effect and 
impinge upon each other. This system can be expressed in a simple diagram. 
formulation realisation 
DISCURSIVE PRACTICAL EMBODIED 
KNOWLEDGE KNOWLEDGE KNOW LEDGE 
application acquisition 
To explain this diagram let's return to the act of driving by way of illustration. To 
begin with, as a complete novice, and possibly even before getting into the car, the 
driving instructor can describe to us in words what the various controls do and the 
basic physical actions required to set the car in motion. Consequently, wie _'Mn a 
discursive knowledge of the car and how to drive it. When we proceed to the physical 
plc t of driving we practically apply this knowledge, from knowing (discursively) that to 
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get going we must release the clutch at the same time as we depress the accelerator, 
we then have to physically gauge the amount of pressure required by both feet to 
perform these operations and how they should be combined. We therefore continually 
assess our physical movements, an interplay ensues between ourselves and the vehicle 
during which representative schemes develop to cope with the vast amount of 
information involved in this process; we slowly come to terms with this new situation 
by applying practical knowledge. Gradually through practice, through repetition, we 
may come to stop thinking about our actions and just carry them out, we acquire the 
skill of driving to the extent that our body knows what actions to perform without any 
need to think about them. The car, in effect, becomes an aspect of our phenomenal 
body, an extension of ourselves. However, we may make a mistake and immediately 
our interactions with the car are brought back to our attention. The car becomes 
experienced as something separate from us as it was when we first began learning how 
to drive. For example, we could have changed from second to fourth, missing out third 
gear. We realise that we have made a mistake and once realised we can assess its 
nature and the consequences that flow from it; we can, to a degree, put into words, if 
not the reasons behind it, what the mistake was. Consequently, after some thought, we 
may come to the conclusion that this mishap is in fact a better alternative in certain 
circumstances than going up through all the gears and we may tell others of our 
discovery. Hence, we can use this new, now discursive, knowledge and, depending on 
what happens during its application when practical knowledge is utilised, we acquire 
the habit of changing from second to fourth without thinking. 
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This example illustrates the way in which a continuous process of understanding 
involving the three forms of knowledge can occur through our activity with an object. 
However, there is no necessary reason why all three need to be involved. For instance, 
we could be told how to drive, apply this knowledge and fail to gain any competence 
whatsoever; we can then formulate reasons or excuses as to why this has happened. 
Here we have just discursive and practical knowledge involved, yet this is not to imply 
that when only these two forms are involved failure is the only outcome. For example, 
an art critic may possess a great amount of discursive knowledge about a certain 
painter and, when confronted with a new canvas by the artist, applies this knowledge 
in a practical sense. Any fresh information which may result from this encounter can be 
formulated into words and so be incorporated back into discursive knowledge. 
A process can likewise occur which includes only practical and embodied knowledge, 
especially in cases where we learn by imitating other people's actions without the use 
of verbal instructions. When a child acquires the skill of using a spoon properly or 
when we learn how to play a sport this often does not and cannot, in the case of the 
child, involve discursive knowledge. It is pointless to tell a child who cannot yet 
understand language how to operate a spoon, it learns by copying the actions of others 
and by practising itself. This is not to deny that such knowledge could eventually be 
formulated at a discursive level, but I personally have not until this moment ever 
thought discursively about using a spoon. 
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Conclusion 
One of the most important points to emerge from the discussion above is the fact that 
that we literally know more than we think we know. In other words, the limits of the 
knowledge we possess go beyond those which can be thought, knowledge is not 
circumscribed by thought, the two are not coterminous. As a consequence of our 
physical activity in the world our understanding of it is conceptual, practical and 
embodied; therefore much of this knowledge occurs without thinking, without 
reflection -I know the form of the pen I use, I know how to pick it up and hold it, I 
know the amount of pressure required to write with it, etc. Without this `unthinking' 
knowledge normal life would be impossible; we shall return to this theme in the 
penultimate chapter. 
In this chapter we have discussed a tripartite scheme which attempts to provide a 
method of understanding how we act towards artefacts in a meaningful way. However, 
in an important manner this system is a falsehood, it present us with a distorted picture 
or, at best, one that lacks a vital element; this is, of course, the active artefact. As a 
result this chapter is somewhat deficient, because in the discussion above the artefact 
has, for the most part, been presented as something which we perceive, understand, 
manipulate, mould and consume without limitation, thus the impression is made that 
we are the only active participants in our relations with these objects. Concomitantly, 
the arte fact appears as a static phenomenon, passive to our whims. Our scheme, 
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therefore needs to be developed so as to incorporate the active artefact, we have to 
recognise the ways in which it can influence us, the ways in which it is a dynamic agent 
in our material relations. A discussion of how this occurs will constitute the opening 
section of the next chapter. 
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Artefacts and Agents 
Introduction 
So far we have concentrated purely on how objects become meaningful to us through 
the three forms of knowledge which we have identified. But this is, of course, only half 
the story because we have ignored the active role played by the artefact; our scheme 
has portrayed human agents as the only effective elements, consequently the 
implication is that objects are passive things. Furthermore, these forms of knowledge 
can be applied to all objects and as such no distinction emerges between the products 
of human activity and natural objects. Therefore, what needs to be addressed is how 
artefacts can impact upon us, how they are active participants in our relations with 
them and, accordingly, how this distinguishes them from natural objects. To these ends 
let's begin by explaining the ways in which artefacts `tell us how to behave'; how they 
can, usually in an implicit manner, guide our actions in the world and thus influence the 
way we come to understand the world. The methods whereby this is achieved can be 
seen to occupy a continuum, at one extreme we are influenced by properticý 
associated with the very physicality of the artefact and at the other by the relationships 
between artefacts. 
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Active Artefacts 
In the first instance one aspect of the materiality of the artefact is that our bodies must 
take on certain postures in order to accommodate them. As such the material nature of 
human products can be seen to set certain limits as to how we can physically interact 
with them, while at the same time guiding us as to the most appropriate way to 
approach them. Take the example of a screwdriver, its particular form induces us to 
shape our hand in a distinctive way in order to grasp it and then use it in a practical 
fashion. There are a number of attitudes which the hand can take, but they are limited 
by the tools' composition. In his novel The Mezzanine Nicholson Baker provides us 
with another illustration with regards to coffee cups and mugs. 
Mugs' "larger handles allow a pluralism of grasps - for instance, the 
two, sometimes three fingers around the handle (cups allow only one 
finger); or the common one finger hooking the handle and the thumb 
and other fingers tripoded onto the body of the mug; or the two-palm 
grip, ignoring the handle completely, that actresses use when they are 
playing people having real-life conversations at the kitchen table. The 
cup forced a primness and fayness to the hand and even caused some 
pain to the joint of the middle finger which at other times shouldered a 
pen or pencil, because of the exaggerated distance between the cup's 
handle and the central weight of the liquid it was supporting" (Baker 
1990: 78). 
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The form of virtually all artefacts provides clues as to how we should approach them, 
they project what Donald Norman terms `affordance' which refers to "the perceived 
and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that 
determine just how the thing could possibly be used" (Norman 1988: 9). 
Concomitantly, artefacts also offer constraints, limitations to our actions with them. 
Combined, affordances and constraints facilitate our activities with artefacts; Norman 
offers an example. 
"When we approach a door, we have to find both the side that opens 
and the part to be manipulated; in other words, we need to figure out 
what to do and where to do it. We expect to find some visible signal for 
the correct operation: a plate, an extension, a hollow, an indentation - 
something that allows the hand to touch, grasp, turn, or fit into. This 
tells us where to act. The next step is to figure out how: we must 
determine what operations are permitted, in part using the affordances, 
in part guided by constraints. " He goes on, "consider the hardware for 
an unlocked door. It need not have any moving parts: it can be a fixed 
knob, plate, handle, or groove. Not only will the proper hardware 
operate the door smoothly, but it will also indicate just how the door is 
to be operated: it will exhibit the proper affordances. Suppose the door 
opens by being pushed. The easiest way to indicate this is to have a 
plate at the spot where the pushing should be done. A plate, if large 
enough for the hand, clearly and unambiguously marks the proper 
action. Moreover, the plate constrains the possible actions: there is little 
else that one can do with a plate except push. Unfortunately, even this 
simple clue is misused. Doors that should be pulled or slid sometimes 
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have plates. Doors that should be pushed sometimes have both plates 
and knobs or a handle and no plate" (ibid: 87-8). 
Artefacts thus have the potential to `lie', they possess the potential to misdirect us in 
our actions towards them. However, for the most part, what they tell us is usua iv 
correct and so `obvious' that the actions which they inspire require no thought. An 
instance of just how profound and yet unrecognised the impact artefacts have upon us 
is afforded by Marcel Mauss. In his lecture Techniques of the Body he argues that all 
our actions are the result of a combination of biological, psychological and 
sociological factors, using walking, swimming and running as illustrations. With 
reference to walking Mauss notes that whilst ill in a New York hospital 
"I wondered where previously I had seen girls walking as my nurses 
walked. I had the time to think about it. At last I realised that it was at 
the cinema. Returning to France, I noticed how common this gait was, 
especially in Paris; the girls were French and they too were walking in 
this way. In fact, American walking fashions had begun to arrive over 
here, thanks to the cinema" (Mauss 1973: 72). 
Mauss proceeds to expand upon this idea describing how different societies and 
groups within a society acquire various forms of gait and concludes that "there is 
perhaps no `natural way' [of walking] for the adult"; although, of course, certain 
restrictions are imposed by our physiology. He then leaves us with the interesting 
thought, "a fortiori when other technical facts intervene: to take ourselves, the fact 
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that we wear shoes to walk transforms the positions of our feet: we feel it sure enough 
when we walk without them" (ibid: 74). Therefore, once shod, our actions, our 
posture is immediately affected, (we `teeter' in stilettos, `stump' in heavy boots, etc. ); 
shoes as `technical' objects impact upon us to a considerable, though largely 
unrecognised, extent. Through our repeated use of artefacts we come to assume, 
habitually, certain bodily postures and actions, thus, in Connerton's words, 
"patterns of body use become ingrained through our interactions with 
objects. There are the apparently automatic, long familiar movements 
of artisans, the way a carpenter wields a plane and the weaver uses a 
loom, so habitual that, if asked, they would say that they had a feeling 
of the proper management of the implement in their hands; there are the 
ways that working at a machine or at a desk imposes and reinforces a 
set of postural behaviours which we come to regard as `belonging' to 
the factory worker or the sedentary white-collar worker. Postures and 
movements which are habit memories become sedimented into bodily 
conformation. Actors can mimic the impressions, doctors can examine 
the results" (Connerton 1989: 94). 
The physical nature of the artefact can, therefore, be said to constitute one set of 
parameters, in a sense distinct from those defined by the forms of understanding we 
discussed previously, which help influence the ways in which we act in the world. For 
instance, if we are given the task of carrying a large object which is fairly heavy, say a 
water container, its physical characteristics limit the number of methods by which it 
can be transported by hand: we can hold it in both arms in front of the body. rest it on 
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our back and brace it with our hands or support it on our head. Each is of equal 
efficacy hence which of these is actually employed will depend on the type and content 
of understanding applied at the time. Custom may inform us, through discursive 
knowledge in the shape of verbal instructions or practical knowledge via imitation, that 
there is an appropriate way to carry heavy objects. The same may be true, but with 
custom being replaced by know-how originating from health and safety experts. In 
both cases techniques are acquired through practice, they are not naturally 
predetermined, and in both cases the method applied may be incorporated within 
embodied knowledge through continued employment. Whatever the outcome an 
interplay exists between understanding and the consequences emerging from the 
physical aspects of the object. A further illustration, again from Mauss, highlights the 
difficulties that can arise when an already acquired technique is applied to a novel 
implement. 
"During the war I was able to make many observations on [the] 
specificity of techniques. E. g. the technique of digging. The English 
troops I was with did not know how to use French spades, which 
forced us to change 8,000 spades a division when we relieved a French 
division, and vice versa. This plainly shows that a manual knack can 
only be learnt slowly. Every technique properly so-called has its own 
form" (Mauss 1973: 71). 
What Mauss's example shows is that the type of object via which a skill is learnt helps 
shape the nature of that skill. When he writes that the English troops did not know 
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how to use French spades obviously he does not mean this literally, rather he is saying 
that the technique of digging with one type of spade is not immediately transferable to 
another sort. The character of the spade, therefore, has a direct impact upon the 
technique of digging, it bears directly on the form of that technique -a novel spade 
thus requires a new technique of use. 
Another way in which the physical nature of the artefact affects our behaviour is in its 
capacity to help recall embodied knowledge. Embodied knowledge, as we have just 
seen, is tied to specific objects and a renewed acquaintance with such an object more 
often than not results in the body `remembering' particular actions. As Ellen Scarry 
explains, 
"what is `remembered' in the body is well remembered. When a fifteen- 
year-old girl climbs off her bike and climbs back on at twenty-five, it 
may seem only the ten year interval that her body has forgotten, so 
effortlessly is the return to mastery - her body, however slender, 
hovering wide over the thin silver spin of the narrow wheels. So, too, 
her fingers placed down on piano keys may recover a lost song that 
was not available to her auditory memory and seemed to come into 
being in her fingertips themselves, coming out of them after the first 
two or three faltering notes with ease, as though it were only another 
form of breathing" (Scarry 1987: 109). 
It is in the presence of certain artefacts that embodied knowledge is recalled and 
previously learned actions are once more performed. Furthermore, embodied 
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memories associated with artefacts appear quite deep rooted, it seems very difficult to 
forget how to ride a bike. 
Two other important factors arising from the artefact's physicality, which are closely 
associated to the circumstances just discussed, may be viewed as providing the basis 
for Giddens' notion of ontological security; these are the artefact's resistance to our 
actions and its capacity to exist unchanged through time. It will be recalled that, 
according to Giddens, in order to guard against anxiety-provoking stimuli (doubt, 
mistrust, etc. ) unconscious mechanisms are established to form a basic security system 
which achieves its end by promoting routine activity. The nature of these actions are 
inherently social, the first occurring between child and mothering agent, and it is only 
as a consequence of this act of primary socialisation that our knowledge of the world 
can develop. Giddens' argument runs like this: 
"Reality is not just the here-and-now, the context of immediate sensory 
perception, but identity and change in what is absent - out of sight for 
the moment or, indeed, never directly encountered but simply accepted 
as `there'. Learning about external reality hence is largely a matter of 
mediated experience. Although most of the richer textures of such 
experience depend on differentiated linguistic details, a grasp of the 
qualities of external reality begin much earlier. Learning the 
characteristics of absent persons and objects - accepting the real world 
as real - depends on the emotional security that basic trust provides. 
The feelings of unreality which may haunt the lives of individuals in 
whose early childhood basic trust was poorly developed may take many 
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forms. They may feel that the object-world, or other people, have only 
a shadowy existence, or be unable to maintain a clear sense of self- 
identity" (Giddens 1992: 43). 
Objects only become known to us, therefore, through a form of social mediation, as a 
consequence of trust: "trust in others, in the early life of the infant and, in chronic 
fashion, in the activities of the adult, is the origin of the experience of a stable external 
world and a coherent sense of self-identity" (ibid: 51). Yet this whole argument rests 
upon rather shaky foundations for how does the child first recognise this source of 
trust, the mothering agent, from all the other objects in its environment? As Margaret 
Archer states; 
"as far as babies are concerned, the experience of others is the 
experience of objects. Persons impinge from the outside world, but in a 
manner initially undifferentiated from other objects, both animate and 
inanimate, which do likewise ... 
Trust in others cannot be the source of 
experiencing the stable external world, since at the start of life other 
people can only be experienced as part and parcel of their external 
world" (Archer 1995: 123). 
Consequently, in early childhood at least, objects play as essential a part in the 
formation of the babies' identity as do people. Following Piaget we can argue that, 
through our physical contact with the objects, we acquire knowledge of ourselve,, and 
them, of self and non-self. The solidity of objects help define the boundaries of 
ourselves, it promotes the notion that we too are physical lx: ings and, to a degree, this 
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process may continue through life, we often find solid objects more `reassuring' than 
frail ones. 
This could be true in another sense, in that physical things artefacts possess the ability 
to endure more or less unchanged through time. If we accept that ontological security 
comes about to some extent through routine activity then the continued presence of 
objects can be seen to play a central role in this procedure; the familiarity of objects 
breeds contentment. Such a belief is expressed by Joseph Conrad in Under Western 
Eyes: 
"the sense of life's continuity depended on trifling bodily impressions. 
The trivialities of daily existence were an armour for the soul. And this 
thought reinforced the internal quietness of Razumov as he began to 
climb the stairs familiar to his feet in the dark, with his hand on the 
familiar clammy banister. The exceptional could not prevail against the 
material contacts which make one day resemble another. To-morrow 
would be like yesterday" (Conrad 1992: 53-4). 
We encountered a similar notion formulated by Arendt earlier on in this study, for her 
"human artefacts bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of 
mortal life and the fleeting character of human time" (Arendt 1989: 8). Later she goes 
on to state that "the things of the world have the function of stabilising human life, and 
that objectivity lies in the fact that - in contradiction to the Heraclitean , aying that the 
same man can never enter the same stream - man, their ever-changing nature 
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notwithstanding, can retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to 
the same chair and the same table" (ibid: 137). We need not go as far as this, it seems 
enough just to propose that our self-identity is supported to some degree by familiar 
objects, their invariable existence grounds our own life, they offer stability through 
their immutability by reassuring us that we too are not purely effervescent beings. 
Related to this is the notion that we are often perceived, by ourselves and others, not 
so much as individuals with distinct personalities, but as possessors of things - we are 
defined by what we own. Such an idea has a long history, in 1892 William James 
wrote that "a man's Me [i. e. self] is the some total of all that he CAN call his, not 
only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his 
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his land and his horses, 
and yacht and bank-account" (James 1984: 160). However, this reliance on artefacts is 
often seen in a negative light. Pushed to its extreme this state of affairs may result in 
the agent being identified completely with their property, whether this be due to socio- 
economic circumstances and the fetishism of commodities or to an existential desire to 
flee into bad faith by attempting to become a being-in-itself. Any subsequent loss of an 
object may, therefore, be experienced as a loss of self, a sense of alienation or a feeling 
of inauthenticity. It is interesting to note that feelings of antipathy towards artefacts 
and the material world in general stretch back thousands of ears, finding their 
expression in Gnosticism and later surfacing in Manichaeism and Albigenianism; all 
three share a belief that matter is inherently evil and the spiritual essentially `good. 
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However, in complete contrast, under certain conditions even the most meagre of 
artefacts can be experienced as embodying goodness. As Scarry writes, 
"it is almost universally the case in everyday life that the most cherished 
object is one that has been hand-made by a friend: there is no mystery 
about this, for the object's material attributes themselves record and 
memorialise the intensely personal, extraordinary because exclusive, 
interior feelings of the maker for just this person - This is for you. But 
anonymous, mass-produced objects contain a collective and equally 
extraordinary message: Whoever you are, and whether or not I 
personally like or even know you, in at last this small way, be well. 
Thus, within the realm of objects, objects-made-for-anyone bear the 
same relation to objects-made-for-someone that, within the human 
realm, caritas bears to eros. Whether they reach someone in the 
extreme conditions of imprisonment or in the benign and ordinary 
conditions of everyday life, the handkerchief, blanket, and bucket of 
white paint contain within them the wish for well-being: `Don't cry; be 
warm; watch now, in a few minutes even these constricting walls will 
look more spacious"' (Scarry 1987: 292). 
In following this line of argument we have digressed somewhat from our original path, 
returning to matters discussed in the previous chapter which related to how we impose 
meanings upon artefacts. However, we have been noting in this chapter how artefacts 
are also active participants in our relations with them, active and therefore in a sense 
'knowledgeable'. This is Scarry's contention; artefacts are knowing thin, -,,,, in that they 
are the crystallised and projected knowingness of their makers. 
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"Everyday artefacts ... are themselves usually characterised by forms of 
materialised awareness that go far beyond their most immediate use: 
the door to the boiler room that in its design a childhood latch is not 
only able to `understand' and accommodate the timing of the person's 
erratic wish that it be now- a-wall-now-not-a-wall, but is also able to 
`differentiate' small persons from persons in general, and `knows' that 
the former is a special subcategory of the latter whose wishes should 
not be accommodated" (ibid: 304). 
Scarry offers us another interesting example of the projected knowingness of the 
producer into the artefact. 
"What is it that this aspirin bottle - with its long history in the bark of 
the willow tree and the bowl of the Indian peacepipe - `knows' about 
the human world? It knows about the chemical and neuronal structure 
of small aches and pains, and about the human desire to be free of those 
aches and pains. It knows the size of the hand that will reach out to 
relieve those aches and pains. It knows that it is itself dangerous to 
those human beings if taken in large doses. It knows that these human 
beings know how to read and communicates with them on the subject 
of amounts through language. It also knows that some human beings 
do not yet know how to read or read only a different language. It deals 
with this problem by further knowing how human beings intuitively and 
habitually take caps off bottles, and by being itself counterintuitive in its 
own cap. Thus only someone who knows how to read (or who knows 
someone else who knows how to read) can take off the cap and 
successfully reach the aspirin which, because the person not only knows 
how to read but has been made to stop and be reminded to read, will be 
taken in the right dosage. It contains within its design a test for helhin 
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to ensure responsible usage that has all the elegance of a simple three- 
step mathematical proof. Civilisation restructures the naturally existing 
environment to be laden with human awareness" (ibid: 305). 
The physicality of artefacts can, then, be perceived as playing an active role in our 
dealings with them. These relationships are inherently social due to the fact that 
artefacts are the products of human industry, artefacts are the embodiment of previous 
activity which can then affect our present activity, artefacts are the result of human 
objectification. Through objectifying ourselves in our material creations we possess the 
ability to influence others far removed in time and space, we endow the artefact with 
dispositional properties which have the potential to be realised by someone coming 
into contact with it. Consequently, the possibility arises that in the case of certain 
artefacts, say those from prehistoric times, although they may be meaningless on one 
level, we possess little discursive knowledge about them, they can still inform us 
through the actions which they inspire. For example, their physical form generates 
certain bodily attitudes when approaching and handling them, the way in which an 
implement can be grasped, say. By its very nature this knowledge is difficult to 
conceptualise, but it does offer a point of entry into the understanding of an artefact 
and thus cultures separated by time and space. 
As artefacts possess the capacity to persist through time the present contains a vast 
accumulation of human products, contemporary life contains survivals from both 
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yesterday and many thousands of years ago which can guide our present activities. 
Being, in a sense, material records of the past 
"they do not", in the words of Barbara Adam, "depend on our knowing 
or remembering for their existence. As message-bearing survivals, they 
may be listened to, used, or neglected. As such they form part of the 
social inheritance of any society and constitute the condition of 
articulate, practical activity. They are utilised for action but do not in 
themselves become an object of inquiry" (Adam 1994: 146). 
Consequently, not only do artefacts act as the medium through which previous or 
distant agents affect our present actions, but they also affect our actions with other co- 
present agents; "a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table 
is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates 
and separates men at the same time" (Arendt 1989: 52). The nature of the artefact 
impinges upon the nature of the relationship between actors, (intimate meals are 
facilitated by being eaten at a small table, hindered by a large one). In certain 
circumstances they may actually constitute the relationship. Hodder provides us with 
an illustration; 
"people with severe psychiatric disorders which involve an inability to 
relate to other people are sometimes treated by standing them 
in a 
circle and getting them to throw a ball between them. The thrown 
ball 
does not represent a relationship between thrower and catcher, 
it 
creates or is a relationship". He goes on, "The basic starting point of a 
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ball linking two individuals can then be used as a metaphor for a social 
relationship. Grounded in the experience of throwing and catching the 
ball, the metaphor is based on the material likeness between exchanging 
a ball and the give and take of social relationships. At a yet more 
abstract level one could begin to categorise different types of exchange. 
The patient thus moves from the practice of throwing a ball to various 
metaphoric associations (understanding of which does not involve 
speech) and finally to the use of an abstract referential discussion using 
arbitrary signs of speech. The material act comes to refer and represent. 
Thus it comes to have language-like qualities, and yet its referential 
functions are built up from non-arbitrary associations rather than from 
abstract sets of differences" (Hodder 1995: 204). 
Artefacts can thus help define the ways in which people interact with one another and 
in particular cases actually compose the relationship. 
Artefacts can also affect how we behave as a consequence of how they themselves are 
related, the relationships between artefacts can influence our activities. Artefacts are 
always and everywhere embedded within a context, a context which they play a large 
part in forming. The formation of contexts are, to varying degrees, not random 
processes, but result from the actions of agents behaving in a knowledgeable way, that 
is through the application of discursive, practical and/or embodied knowledge. 
Consequently, the material world can, to an extent, reflect the forms of understanding 
applied to it, they both contribute to how the material world is patterned while at the 
game time being constrained by that world. Concomitantly, the way in ýý hip h ýL e 
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understand this patterning can also take place through any of the three forms of 
knowledge outlined. 
An illustration of how the relations between artefacts affect our behaviour is provided 
by Bourdieu in his study of the Kabyle people of Algeria. Bourdieu argues that much 
of the child's understanding of the social world is provided by the layout of the house 
and the placing of furniture and other artefacts (looms, water jars, kitchen utensil,. 
etc. ). Knowledge is acquired through moving through the house and by interacting 
with the artefacts, it is an embodied form of understanding. He writes that 
"the `book' from which the children learn their vision of the world [i. e. 
the house and its contents] is read with the body, in and through the 
movements and displacements which make the space within which they 
are enacted as much as they are made by it". He continues, "all the 
actions performed in a space constructed in this way are immediately 
qualified symbolically and function as so many structural exercises 
through which is built up practical mastery of the fundamental schemes, 
which organise magical practices and representations: going in and 
coming out, filling and emptying, opening and shutting, going 
eastwards and going westwards, etc. Through the magic of a world of 
objects which is the product of the application of the same schemes to 
the most diverse domains, a world in which each thing speaks 
metaphorically of all the others, each practice comes to be invested 
with an objective meaning, a meaning with which practices - and 
particularly rites - have to reckon at all times, whether to evoke or 
revoke it. The construction of the world of objects is clearly not the 
sovereign operation of consciousness which the neo-Kantian tradition 
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conceives of; mental structures which construct the world of objects 
are constructed in the practice of a world of objects constructed 
according to the same structures. The mind born of the world of 
objects does not rise as a subjectivity confronting an objectivity,: the 
objective universe is made up of objects which are the product of 
objectifying operations structured according to the very structures 
which the mind applies to it. The mind is a metaphor of the world of 
objects which is itself but an endless circle of mutually reflecting 
metaphors" (Bourdieu 1993: 90-1). 
The relationships between artefacts and their context and ourselves is, therefore, one 
of mutual construction, although to describe it as an `endless circle' may be seen to 
incite certain difficulties when we try an explain precisely what is happening. We need 
to ensure that a gap is retained between agent and artefact in order that we can 
distinguish how each affects the other. 
The degree to which artefacts are understood through their relations with other 
artefacts within a context is highlighted by `The Fountain', a work of art `made' by 
Marcel Duchamp. This object was, in fact, a urinal which Duchamp purchased and 
then exhibited unchanged, apart from being signed and dated, in a New York gallery'. 
By placing it in a different context among other works of art it was no longer 
understood as a purely functional artefact, an understanding which in all probability 
was never made explicit in everyday usage, i. e. discursive; instead it 'became' an 
aesthetic object and thus something to be understood discursively. The actions that 
it 
inspired were, hopefully, completely transformed just by moving it frone one context to 
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another. This is a somewhat extreme example, yet it illustrates how the associations 
between artefacts have an impact upon behaviour and knowledge of the «orld. 
A less unusual, though far from unrelated, case has been assessed by Stocking in 
relation to the display of artefacts in museums. According to him by being situated in a 
museum the artefact acquires four extra `dimensions' on top of the three allied to 
space. Firstly, it gains a peculiar temporality for although it is usually historical, 
relating us to the dim and distant past, it simultaneously becomes timeless; "removed 
from history in the very process of embodying it, by curators seeking (among other 
goals) to preserve objects in their original form" (Stocking 1985: 4). Secondly, the 
placement of an artefact in a museum involves the dimension of power which has two 
aspects. On the one hand the expropriation of the artefact often occurred under 
dubious circumstances when the two parties involved possessed greatly disparate 
resources, whether they be financial, military, intellectual, etc. On the other hand, 
"from the observer's perspective ... the power 
involved in that 
appropriation is largely external, since she or he neither `owns' the 
objects in a literal sense nor defines their recontextualisation. Within 
these parameters a multitude of individual recontextualisations may 
occur, but within them also the recontextualised object may be said to 
exert a power over their viewers -a power not simply inherent in the 
objects, but given to them by the museum as an institution within a 
particular historical sociocultural setting" (ibid: 5). 
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Thirdly, there is the dimension of wealth, although this could be regarded as an aspect 
of power. Thus, "even before the political processes of modern nationalism defined it 
as such, material culture was, in a limited economic sense, `cultural property*. The 
very materiality of the objects of material culture entangled them in Western economic 
processes of the acquisition and exchange of wealth" (ibid: 6). Finally, there is the 
aesthetic dimension for, as Stocking explains, 
"despite its history of exclusion from museums devoted to the fine arts, 
and of negative evaluation by universal humanistic and evolutionary 
aesthetic standards, the material culture of non-western peoples has 
undergone a process of aestheticisation since its original emplacement 
in museums ... 
Items that once had multiple functions, so that there 
aesthetic element could only be isolated by abstraction, have often had 
their functions reduced in scope by processes of acculturation, with the 
more utilitarian functions transferred to the products of Western 
technology. Insofar as they continue to be produced, items of 
traditional material culture are reconceptualised from both the native 
and the Western perspective in aesthetic terms - whether those of curio 
kitsch or fine art. Thus objects of `material culture' - which in 
traditional contexts often had spiritual value - are respiritualised (in 
Western terms) as aesthetic objects, at the same time that they are 
subjected to the processes of the world art market" (ibid: 6). 
A great deal more could be said on this specific subject, however, at this 
juncture it 
offers a good illustration of how contexts affect our attitudes and 
behaviour toward. 
artefacts. As such it can be seen to occupy one end of the continuum mentioned at 
the 
249 
beginning of this section. One final point needs to be addressed concerning the 
artefact's impact upon the agent for, if we accept this premise, then the possibility 
arises that artefacts could be used by certain sections of society to influence the 
conduct of others. That is, as Stocking acknowledged, power relations can be played 
out through the artefact and one way that this can occur is by utilising it as an 
ideological device. Its effectiveness in this role emerges from its very simplicity or 
naturalness. According to Hodder, 
"although material culture does have a referential function or can be 
given that function, its meanings are often associative, evocative and 
non-referential. Often material culture does not appear to `mean' at all. 
This self-evident quality thus hides or masks the references that are 
being made. The ideological messages are hidden behind the supposed 
non-communicative nature of material culture. The duality of reference 
and non-reference suggests that material culture, in its pragmatic 
innocence, should play a powerful ideological role. Our difficulty in 
recognising this role is the basis of its success" (Hodder 1995: 207). 
The basis of this difficulty may lie in the fact that ideology associated with material 
culture is deeply embedded in practical or embodied knowledge, it is not formulated 
discursively. Hodder cites the Kabyle's prejudice in favour of 'straightness' as 
described by Bourdieu in evidence to support such a claim: 
"we might start from the obvious point that for spears to be effective 
they must he lon, and straight. We might also add the Ie obvious 
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view that for them to be thrown with force young men need to do the 
throwing. Bourdieu shows how, in a particular cultural context, the 
notion of straightness can be linked (by metaphor) to valued notions of 
`talking straight', `being straight', as opposed to being bent over, 
submissive. Thus when men might be told to `stand up straight' and in 
this simple statement a whole cosmology, a whole political philosophy 
concerning the relations between men and women is imposed. The 
metaphor that men are straight like their spears is based on a necessary 
technological knowledge (that spears have to be long and straight) 
which we all recognise but do not articulate" (ibid: 210). 
Hodder concludes that, 
"in so far as dominant groups in society want to promote certain 
ideologies in their own interests, they will need to control training and 
enculturation of practical activities. If successful ideologies are largely 
experienced at the level of practical [and, we may add, embodied], non- 
discursive consciousness then it becomes necessary to control the 
details of bodily movements and behaviour as the cultural rules are 
internalised through repetition and constraint. Children are taught to 
hold the knife in the right hand, to stand up straight ... 
In these ways a 
political philosophy is imbued" (ibid: 210). 
2Z, l 
A dialectical relationship 
The artefact and the relations between artefacts can therefore be seen to affect us in a 
variety of ways, ways that are not necessarily easy to perceive. As such they may be 
said to constitute a distinct `realm', distinct that is from the sphere composed of the 
three forms of knowledge which can be applied artefacts. For the most part this is an 
analytical separation, the two permeate each other in our everyday activity in the 
world making distinctions difficult. Yet a characteristic quality of artefacts is that they 
can exist, sometimes for many thousands of years, completely isolated and unknown to 
any human being. Once made they do not depend on human agency for their continued 
survival. This applies not only to the artefact as a physical thing, but also to the 
relations between them as they are rarely found alone. However, when these two 
active levels, agency and artefacts, are co-present the relations between them can be 
conceptualised. Hopefully some idea of how this occurs has emerged in the discussions 
above. To make it clearer we can elaborate on our previous diagram and portray it like 
this: 
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AGENTS 
Discursive Practical Embodied 
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge 
123 11 456 Relations Artefacts between in Artefacts Themselves 
ARTEFACTS 
With respect to this figure one particular point needs to be made clear; as is the case 
with many diagrammatic representations the impression can be given that each 
`element' constitutes a discrete unit only connected to the others by formal relations 
which are symbolised by the arrows. What is lost, therefore, is the significant way in 
which all the parts are involved in a dynamic process, our interactions with artefacts 
are essentially mercurial and never static. Consequently, there is a continuous 
interplay, not only between ourselves and artefacts, but between both the three forms 
of knowledge and between the different aspects of the artefact, (i. e. those associated 
with the artefact as a singular entity and those related to the relationships between 
artefacts). By recognising these factors all we are doing is acknowledging one of the 
obvious features of our everyday life, that we are continually participating in action' 
with and upon artefacts from our birth to our death. How, then, does the diagram 
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above help us to understand this state of affairs, especially its dynamic qualities? Let's 
return to our previous example of how we learn to drive a car by way of illustration. 
Beginning in the top left-hand corner with discursive knowledge. This form of 
understanding, acquired from the driving instructor through speech, (and, possibly, 
from other sources of discursive knowledge such as books and pamphlets on road 
safety, etc. ), relates to circumstances beyond us; it is directed towards an object, the 
car, which may or may not be present, a car that may not even exist. However, 
assuming the instructor to be trustworthy, the information which they impart pertains 
to the various controls, how they relate to one another, in what positions they will be 
found and in what way our actions towards them are to be combined in order to get 
the car in motion. This explanatory process is represented in the diagram by Arrow 2, 
as such discursive knowledge is applicable to the whole artefact continuum. Therefore, 
at the one end some of the information passed on by the instructor could relate to the 
physical nature of the controls, the car may have a `heavy' clutch which requires some 
effort to depress when changing gear or it might need a little of choke, the choke knob 
has only to be extended a small distance to prevent the engine from flooding. At the 
other end of the continuum the information may refer to the positioning of the pedals, 
(the clutch being on the left, the brake in the middle and the accelerator on the right), 
the context in which they are placed and to the relationships between them, how they 
correspond to each other when the car is being driven. Arrow 2, therefore, accords to 
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discursive knowledge directed towards an artefact, the artefact constitutes the 
intentional object of discursive thought which can be expressed linguistically. 
Arrow 1 refers to the ways in which artefacts inform us at a discursive level, 
consequently, as an experienced driver, when we get into a new car for the first time 
the positioning of the controls communicates to us what they do. In the case of the 
foot pedals, as physical objects, they are usually of a very similar nature and there is 
nothing in the form (touch, smell, taste even) of the brake pedal that signifies that 
when depressed it has the capacity to slow the vehicle down. By being found in the 
same relationships in all cars, by conforming to a standard arrangement, we need not 
experiment to discover what each pedal does. However, components can inform us 
how we should approach them by their physical nature, a rocker switch invites us to 
depress it rather than twist or turn it, a lever in a groove induces us to slide it rather 
than pull or push it - we can conjecture as to how to operate an instrument 
discursively without ever touching it. Hence, in the presence of an object a process can 
be seen to occur consisting of an interplay between agent and artefact whereby 
information travels in both directions, both sides affect the other when the two are co- 
present, both are active participants in this situation. 
When a physical involvement with an artefact begins so does the involvement cat 
practical knowledge. Once in the car and attempting to set off we must, as nO%*icc.,, trY 
and operationalise the discursive knowledge we have acquired. Howevcr, for this to 
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happen it needs to be transformed into more easily manageable parcels of information, 
in coming to terms with this new situation we cannot deal with it on a purely 
discursive level. From my own experiences I can remember the confusion which 
transpired when I tried to think about each of the actions I had to perform 
simultaneously to get the car moving, to think about depressing the accelerator, 
releasing the clutch, looking in the rear-view mirror, etc. To think of all these things 
discursively at the same time only produces chaos; we have to bundle this knowledge 
up into easily tractable packages so that we can function more effectively. During the 
application of practical knowledge a `gap' seems to exist between ourselves and the 
object, the object is continually being seen in a new light as we proceed to gain a 
better understanding through our interactions with it. Once we have become familiar 
with it, once this `otherness' has been overcome, once we use it without thinking, 
practical knowledge ceases and embodied knowledge begins. This process is illustrated 
by Connerton using the example of how someone learns to play the piano. 
"Here are chord A and chord B, separated by some distance along the 
keyboard. To play A you must have a tightly compressed hand; to play 
B you need an extended spread of the hand ... 
The distance between A 
and B cannot just be crossed; it must be spontaneously traversed in a 
specific manner. If you are to go correctly from A to B, your hand, 
indeed your whole body, must be directed from the start not just 
toward where B is; your hand must be preparing along the course of 
your journey to land in the right productional shape as it arrives at B in 
correct tempo. As your hand moves from A toward Ba smooth course 
of changing hand shape must be accomplished; all the necessary minute 
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adjustments have to occur spontaneously and simultaneously in the 
appropriate reconfiguration of your hand and in a slight readjustment of 
your body. Beginners get from A to B disjointedly. They play A, and 
set out for B without going for it in the right way from the outset, 
without moving to the whole of B and in correct tempo. Before they 
have become skilled in playing scales, beginners hunt and peck at the 
keyboard, their fingers hesitate and lose their place. They continually 
sense a separation between the `it' of the piano and the `me' of the 
pianist. A more advanced pianist, playing a rapid and intricately 
winding passage and its reiteration, will frequently come close but 
slightly miss the mark; will have a sense of `struggling to make it 
happen' and will `sound like someone trying hard to say something"' 
(Connerton 1989: 91-2). 
Arrow 4, therefore, corresponds to the application of practical knowledge, yet without 
the presence of Arrow 3 this process would be meaningless, practical knowledge can 
only develop through actions in the world. The object in hand, the car's controls, 
returning to our own example, inform us as to the proficiency of our actions; a 
continuous process of self-monitoring occurs, one reliant on the vehicle's ability to 
convey to us how well we are doing. As we unremittingly note the various effects 
produced by our behaviour on the pedals, gear stick, steering wheel, etc. so the parcels 
of practical knowledge develop. The arrangement of the instruments and their physical 
qualities set limits to what we can achieve, as long as we do not go beyond these 
parameters we will progress towards our goal of driving competently. However, if we 
do go beyond these limits the car will tell us that we have made a mistake, the engine 
screams, the vehicle stalls, etc. The same also applies to the experienced motorist who 
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has to `feel' their way into driving a new car, tentatively working out ho« much 
pressure the pedals require, how sharp the steering is, etc.; again self-monitoring 
occurs informed by the controls. 
Through continued repetition and practice the learner will hopefully, but not 
necessarily, become skilful at the task of driving. We acquire the capacity to act in a 
meaningful way towards the car without reflective thought, we have an embodied 
knowledge of the layout of the controls and their physical characteristics, we habitually 
know where they are and how to operate them. This corresponds to Arrow 6, the 
application of embodied knowledge. Embodied knowledge is only realised in action, in 
our physical activity in the world; consequently, it requires the presence of a specific 
object for its operation, a specific object because embodied knowledge is formed in 
relation to that object. Therefore, when one switches between different forms of the 
same artefact, say between different kinds of can opener, either practical or discursive 
knowledge is engaged depending on the level of differentiation; if the new object is 
quite distinct from the one previous used then we may have to think discursively about 
how it should be operated, how it should be placed with respect to the flange 
encircling the tin top, how it punctures the metal, etc. If, however, it is of a relativer 
similar design then all we need account for may be slightly longer or more substantial 
handgrips, a difference in colour, etc., variations which do not require discursive 
thought just the application of practical knowledge in order to rccogni`c it as a can 
opener before embodied understanding quickly takes over. With the continued use of 
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the same object embodied knowledge is applied, thus artefacts are experienced 
prereflectively - an experienced driver does not have to think through the process of 
changing gear, the body knows how to do it 'automatically'. 
One way of distinguishing between Arrows 2,4 and 6 is to view them as exhibiting 
varying degrees of `detachment' from the artefact, this being most apparent with 
regards to Arrow 2 (the application of discursive knowledge) and least obvious or 
totally absent with regards to Arrow 6 (the application of embodied knowledge). 
Hubert Dreyfus believes that 
"traditional philosophy has, since the time of Plato, maintained that 
knowledge is gained by means of detached, disinterested inquiry. Since 
Descartes, the results of such detached inquiries are supposed to have 
consequences concerning the nature of the subject and object of 
knowledge, not just in these special circumstances but for the whole 
range of human activities ... 
If, however, we step back from involved 
activity and become reflective, detached observers, we cannot help 
seeing ourselves as subjects contemplating objects. The whole array of 
philosophical distinctions between inner subjective experience and the 
outer object of experience, between perceiving and the perceived. and 
between appearance and reality arise at this point" (Dreyfus 1994: 45). 
Embodied knowledge denies such a detachment from the world, from artefacts; much 
of our activity with things is characterised not by a sense of separation but by one of 
unity, the artefact becomes an aspect, an extension of ourselves. This immediate 
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involvement with artefacts, therefore, has important repercussions both 
epistemologically and ontologically, repercussions noted by Heidegger and Merleau- 
Ponty in particular. Heidegger argued that it is only in the use of an artefact, through 
our 4manipulation' of it, that we gain a full understanding of it, a 'primordial' 
understanding; knowledge gained purely through contemplation is second-hand. Yet 
this understanding is of a peculiar nature for, as we have just noted, the artefact is not 
consciously perceived when we are using it in the correct manner, it becomes 'un- 
experienced', transparent, it loses its identity. In Heidegger's words, "the peculiarity of 
what is primarily available is that, in its availableness, it must, as it were, withdraw in 
order to be available quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings 
primarily dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we 
concern ourselves primarily is the task - that which is to be done at the time" 
(Heidegger 1962: 99). As Dreyfus elaborates, taking up Merleau-Ponty's example of 
the blind man's cane; 
"we hand the blind man a cane and ask him to tell us ývhat properties it 
has. After hefting and feeling it, he tells us that it is light, smooth, about 
three feet long, and so on; it is occurrent [physically present, present- 
at-hand] for him. But when the man starts to manipulate the cane, he 
loses his awareness of the cane itself; he is aware only of the curb (or 
whatever object the cane touches), or, if all is going well, he i" not even 
aware of that, but of his freedom to walk-, or perhaps only what he i's 
talking about with a friend. Precisely %vhen it is most genuinely 
appropriated equipment becomes transparent. When hammering a riall, 
'The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'nianipulability' of the 
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hammer' (Heidegger 1962: 98), but I am not aware of any determinate 
characteristics of the hammer or the nail. All I am a"-are of is the task, 
or perhaps what I need to do when I finish" (Dreyfus 1994: 65). 
As such, the artefact becomes an aspect of the phenomenal body, the boundaries of the 
self are extended beyond our corporeal body. Consequently, the artefact affects us 
(Arrow 5) at the same time as we affect the artefact (Arrow 6), there exists no sense 
of discontinuity between ourselves and the object in hand. It is only when a mishap 
occurs, either on our behalf (we change into the wrong gear) or on behalf of the 
artefact (the clutch cable snaps), that this union is broken and a gap appears, 
detachment emerges; only in a state of continuous, smooth-running involvement do 
objects remain transparent. Therefore, according to Heidegger, 
"we do not always and continually have explicit perception of the 
things surrounding us in a familiar environment, certainly not in such a 
way that we would be aware of them expressly as available ... In the 
indifferent imperturbability of our customary commerce with them, they 
become accessible precisely with regard to their unobtrusive presence. 
The presupposition for the possible equanimity of our dealing with 
things is, among others, the uninterrupted quality of that commerce. It 
must not be held up in its progress" (Heidegger 1982: 309). 
When it is held up our attention is grabbed, practical and/or discursive knowledge is 
engaged depending on the severity of the problem. In fact, somet I nies it I, only when 
our absorbed, ongoing activity is interrupted that theoretical reflection on the prescrit 
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circumstances occurs - "if knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature 
of the occurrent by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in our having-to- 
do with the world concernfully" (Heidegger 1962: 88). Take, for example, the 
snapping of the clutch cable; the pedal drops to the floor offering no resistance to our 
left foot, we immediately sense a difference in our circumstances, it springs to our 
attention. We press the pedal a couple of times in an effort to understand what has 
happened and then begin to ponder about the problem and the reasons behind it, 
possibly contemplating for the first time on the nature of the clutch cable and the 
possibility that it can snap. From embodied knowledge we end up thinking discursively 
about the present situation. In the case of a relatively minor mishap, say our foot slips 
off the clutch pedal, such reflection is not required, we need not think discursively 
about how to rectify the problem. 
Ultimately, as we noted in the previous chapter, all three forms of knowledge need not 
be involved in our dealings with an object, yet, with respect to the artefact itself, all 
those aspects proposed to exist on the continuum do impact upon one another and so 
are simultaneously present. Therefore, returning to our art critic example, both the 
painting itself and its relationship to other artefacts has an effect on how the canvas iý, 
understood. Ernst Gombrich highlights the importance of the latter element hý 
describing the role played by the frame. As Miller explains, 
"following Kant, many aesthetic theories eniphasise the particular 
manner or attitude of regarding the object, for example, the way a work- 
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of art commands our concentration and consideration, producing an 
abstracted and contemplative gaze. By contrast, the definition of a 
good frame is almost exactly the opposite; it should be immediately 
absorbed without any period of consideration and, rather than being the 
focus of attention in itself, should direct our attention to the object 
within it. In short, the frame enhances, but it is not itself, the subject of 
attention. What is crucial to this argument, if extended a little beyond 
Gombrich's own assessment, is that the frame's anonymous and modest 
presence belies its significance for the appreciation of the work of art. 
It might be suggested that it is only through the presence of the frame 
that we recognise the work of art for what it is, perceiving it and 
responding to it in the appropriate way. In short, it is the frame rather 
than the picture which establishes the mode of appreciation we know as 
art. Placed in another context, such as the billboard, the work of art 
might well fail to attract either attention or interest. Where the 
conventional wooden frame is inappropriate, as in many forms of 
modem art, the gallery itself provides the larger frame which is an index 
of its contents" (Miller 1993: 100-1). 
This quotation encapsulates a number of significant issues which we have discussed 
at the paintnio involves previously. The 'abstract and contemplative gaze' directed L- 
both practical and discursive knowledge, the perception of a non-linear, non-sequential 
form and the formulation of a discursive appreciation which can be communicated to 
others. The frame is also 'absorbed' through practical understanding, we acknowledcc Lý I 
it while ignoring it on a discursive level, it orientates our attention to its 
fellow 
artefact, the painting. Therefore, the painting, the frame and the relýitjon,, hjj) 
between 
the two all play a part in our cxpcrience. The art critic, or anyone confroriting tile 
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picture, is, therefore, involved in a number of reciprocal relations with artefacts which 
combine to form a complex set of circumstances. All our associations with artefacts 
involve a similar level of complexity, yet because of the ways in which we are able to 
deal with them, through our capacity to apply different forms of understanding, these 
intricate correlative ties rarely ever become manifest. 
That it is a reciprocal relationship cannot be stressed enough, a point discussed at 
some length when we looked at the notion of objectification. Under certain 
circumstances, through a process of externalisation and sublation, humanity can be 
seen to be involved in an act of self-development, the artefact acting as a material 
device in this operation. Thus, in Scarry's work, 
"the artefact is ... called a 'lever' or 'fulcrum' in order to underscore 
that it is itself only a midpoint in a total action: the act of human 
creating includes both the creating of the object and the object's 
recreating of the human being, and it is only because of the second that 
the first is undertaken: that 'recreating' action is accomplished by the 
human makers and must be included in any account of the phenomenon 
of making. What the human maker projects into the made object may 
change from object to object (as a counterfactual perception about 
seeing is projected into the telescope while a counterfactual perception 
about skin is projected into the bandage), but what he or she ývlll have 
always projected there is the power of creating itself: the object (coat, 
telescope, bandage) is invested with the power of creating and cxl, ýts 
only to complete this task of recreating us (making us warni, extendin, -, 
N, ision, replacing absent skin with a present skin). It is preckcly becau,, c 
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objects routinely act to recreate us that the confusion arises in which 
the object is seen as a freestanding creator" (Scarry 1987: 310). 
While noting the dangers of slipping into a reification of the object, for the must part 
such a possibility goes unnoticed by the vast majority of us; artefacts help in, if not our 
4 recreation', the reproduction or transformation of ourselves as social beings. 
Conclusion 
The impact of artefacts on our lives, artefacts as active participants in oLir daily 
existence, goes largely unrecognised by laypersons and academics alike. It wa,, -, the aini 
of this chapter to high-light and explain the ways in which artefacts play a dý, nan-k role 
in our relations with them, how they cannot be viewed simply as pieces of dead matter 
with which we deal purely on our own terrns. Material culture must be acknowledgcd 
as possessing the potential to affect our activity in the world, it can 'tell us how to 
behave'. As Scarry emphasises, this is in no small part due to the artefact being an c 
embodiment of 'knowingness', what we have described as the three forms of 
knowledge. It is this aspect of material culture which distinguishes It fundamcntally 
from natural objects; whereas meanings can and are given to the latter, the former 
possess meaning from the very moment of its inception because it is the outconie of 
i-neaningful behaviour. Therefore, any further meanings applied to the artet'act, 
Ilowevcr diverse they may be, owe something to the original knowledive Ilre%'cill during 
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the products creation - there can be no escaping these original meanings because they 
are present in the very constitution of the object; natural objects, on the other hand, 
carry no constitutive meanings as they are not created through human agency. 
Therefore, with respect to human products, our understanding of them is affected on 
two levels, both by the knowledgeable activity of their makers and by the attentions of 
subsequent 'interpreters'; it is only this last factor which is relevant to natural objects. 
However, with the distribution of objects the situation is less clear-cut, because, 
obviously, both natural and artificial objects can be positioned by us - there appears no 
pronounced distinction in the process of placing furniture around a house and the 
laying out of plants and shrubs in a garden, both are knowledgeable activities, both can 
embody socio-cultural practices. Yet we can argue for a differentiation based on the 
twofold character of the artefact's meaningfulness; if the materialised knowledge of 
the artefact's maker impacts upon subsequent meanings then this is Rely to affect the 
context in which it will be placed. 
What needs to be kept in mind is that both in the production and subsequent 
encounters with artefacts up to three forms of knowledge may be applied; our 
understanding of them can thus take on various forms all of which are affected by the 
artefact itself. Our relationships with material culture cannot, therefore, be seen as 
straightforward, they are, in fact, extremely complex. However, far from viewing this 
situation as one which stands in the way of any significant 
investigation, new 
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opportunities towards understanding our interactions with artefacts emerge and a few 
of these will be discussed in the following chapter. Yet, for the most part, such 
relations with material culture go relatively unnoticed, we are unaware that these 
associations exist;: the humility of artefacts is thus ensured. 
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Conclusion 
Back to the beginning 
Finally, let's try and locate our scheme within a broader philosophical context. Turning 
full circle, how does it relate to Popper's ontological theory discussed at the very 
beginning of this study; specifically, what affinity does it have to his notion of three 
distinct worlds? Most obviously it appears that artefacts make up part of what Popper 
terms world 3: 1, "the materialised, the stored-up part of world 3" (Popper 1974: 
1050); knowledge that, once formulated and made sensuous, can exist apart froni its 
producers, thus becoming "knowledge without a knower: ... knowledge without a 
knowing subject" (Popper 1992: 109). Th-is is an important aspect of artefacts which 
we have emphasised in the preceding chapters, artefacts as physical objects have the 
capacity to exist apart from their makers, possibly for thousands of years. But what of 
the nature of the knowledge embedded in the artefact, how does this correspond to 
Popper's ideas? 
It may be recalled that for him world 3 is distinguished by its logical content and. 
though this is less clear from his writings, by its exprcssion 11, li, j,, uj, ýtj,: ionii, 
however. 
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both of these characteristics present problems to anY alignment of Popper's work with 
our own scheme. With respect to the latter attribute, as we noted at the time, his work 
exhibits some uncertainty over the role played by language. Nevertheless, for the most 
part objective knowledge is intrinsically tied to language, language is necessary for 
both the transformation of subjective knowledge into its objective counterpart and for 
its 'evolution' through description and argument. Yet, as we have explained at length, 
language does not constitute a boundary beyond which knowledge cannot exist or can 
exist but only on a purely subjective level. Obviously meaning can occur in and 
between artefacts on a level open to linguistic formulation, but it can also exist in both 
practical and embodied forms, forms that are either difficult or impossible to express 
adequately in discursive terms. 
Neither can practical and embodied knowledge be relegated to Popper's second 
division (world 2), because they cannot be understood as merely "states of 
consciousness, ... mental states, or perhaps ... 
behavioural dispositions to act" (ibid: 
106). Embodied knowledge in particular must be seen as a form of understanding 
which transcends Popper's Cartesian notion of the subject, it is an aspect of the person 
as a whole as Merleau-Ponty is at pains to stress. Yet embodied knowledge is also 
non-subjective in another sense for it also transcends the individual, having an 
essentially social character. Embodied knowledge is socially acquired, most often the 
result of the inculcation of culturally prescribed ways of acting via imitation and 
repetition. Furthermore, in the case of artefacts we are dealing with objects which are 
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themselves socially constituted, both in the sense that they are objectified social 
activity and that they are formed through the activity of other socially constituted 
objects, tools; thus other trans-individual elements comes into play when we interact 
with them. 
The difficulty of translating certain forms of knowledge into language also brings 
about problems when we try to determine their logical content. According to Popper, 
at any one moment in time there exists a single world 3 made up of all extant 
intelligibilia. For this to compose a single entity all such items must share at least one 
characteristic, they must possess the potential to be expressed in a common language 
in order that their propositional content can be acknowledged and, consequently, the 
logical relations between them may be assessed. With respect to artefacts, as Archer 
writes, "the relevant proposition is the relation asserted to hold between them or their 
parts, since sense experience alone never yields knowledge without reflective analysis, 
entailing language, of what we are experiencing. For knowledge is knowledge of 
propositions and can only be known by discriminating between abstract features which 
are aspects of the ... object" 
(Archer 1989: 320). However, as we have noted with 
respect to embodied knowledge in particular, sense experiences can yield knowledge 
without reflective analysis of a discursive nature; new knowledge and adaptations of 
previously held knowledge can occur quite apart from any linguistic process. This is, 
of course, not to deny that such propositions can be made, that relations 
between 
artefacts or their parts can be asserted, (we have noted a number of such cases 
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recently), yet they cannot by themselves constitute all aspects of our knowledge of an 
artefact. 
Mark Johnson appears to hold a similar view, arguing that 
"it is crucially important to see that balancing is an actit, ity we leam 
with our bodies and not by grasping a set of rules or concepts. First and 
foremost, balancing is something we do. The baby stands, wobbles, and 
drops to the floor. It tries again, and again, and again, until a new 
world opens up - the world of the balanced erect posture. There are 
those few days when the synapse connections are being established and 
then, fairly suddenly, the baby becomes a little honzo erectus. Balancing 
is a preconceptual bodily activity that cannot be described 
propositionally by rules. As Michael Polanyi has argued, you cannot tell 
another what steps to take to achieve the balanced riding of a bicycle 
[see Polanyi 1973: 49-50]. One can give the beginner a few more or 
less empty rules, but the balancing activity happens when the rules, 
such as they are, no longer play any role. For example, in learning the 
proper balance of forces for juggling, I might be told to throw the býdl 
in the hand under the closest ball in the air, just as it reaches the peak- 
of its trajectory. But the conscious following of rules is an impediment 
to balancing the forces in juggling. Instead, the juggler knows ývhen the 
balance is right, knows how to make adjustments, and 'has a feel' for 
the patterns of bodily movement that generate the proper patterns of' 
the balls in motion" (Johnson 1992: 74-5). 
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Yet things may be even more complicated for one cannot make a simple distinction 
between artefacts and language based on their openness to propositional formulation-, 
a general 
"difficulty arises", explains Nfiller, "when trying to assess ho%v far 
different media may be taken as propositional. That this cannot be 
assumed of language, which appears to serve such a purpose, has been 
illustrated very clearly by the linguist Lehrer in an analysis of the 
language used in the description of wines. Through her experiments it 
became evident that, despite the extensive elaboration of wine 
descriptors and the beliefs of the participants, neither lay persons nor 
experts were actually communicating knowledge about wines to their 
fellows in conversation, such that the wine referred to could be 
recognised from linguistic description alone. By contrast, many studies 
of objects such as buildings, which discuss the links between 
architectural forms and a set of ideals such as scholasticism or 
imperialism, indicate the degree to which such objects are significant as 
propositional forms, even as to the nature of the world" (Miller 1993: 
98). 
Ultimately, we must accept that language is neither a sufficient nor a nccessar-ý- 
condition for our understanding of human products and that, overall, Popper's realist 
approach does not offer an adequate philosophical framework within which we can 
placc our own ideas on material culture, it cannot accommodate important aspect,, ot 
our scheme. 
"I 
A more satisfactory theoretical structure appears to be provided by Bhaskar's critical 
realist model. At the core of his work lies a denial of what he terms the 'episternic 
fallacy', the mistaken conjunction of being (ontology) and knowledge of beein, -, L- - 
(epistemology), for "it does not follow from the fact that we can only know ui 
knowledge that we can only know knowledge" (Bhaskar 1989: 26). As Shotter 
elucidates; 
"while our knowledge of the world is a social product, produced by 
transformational social activity from previously existing knowledge, the 
being of the world must be conceived of (at least at the moment of its 
scientific investigation) as existing independently of our thoughts about 
it. For only if this is so, can we discover our theories of its nature, thus 
making a scientific investigation of its reality be a genuine possibility" 
(Shotter 1990: 444). 
Critical realism can, therefore, be seen to tread a middle path between positivism and 
constructivism, drawing upon aspects of both while simultaneously rejecting thcir 
overall assertions. Consequently, in Gosclen's words, 
"for realists the world exists independently of us and we can only 
attempt to understand the nature of the world's existence. However, 
we never apprehend the world as objective observers, as positivists 
claim that we can, but as beings involved both in the world and 
in social 
relations. Involvement sparks interest in some aspects of the world and 
not in others; it also provides us with particular forms of 
knowledge 
and modes of talking about reality. Although the world exists, we cail 
2'4 
never know it objectively, as it is. We always work from positions of 
interest determined by social and historical relations. However, our 
positions of interest are not the sole determinant of knowledge, as is 
the constructivist view ... For realists, the structure of the world limits 
what we can say, but these limits are determined not just by reality but 
also by our forms of knowing and telling. Knowledge through 
involvement in a material reality is the key to realism" (Gosden 1994: 
10-11). 
Material culture constitutes a viW element of our material reality, through our activity 
in the world we both influence and are influenced by physical objects in general and 
artefacts in particular. As Gosden goes on to emphasise, "material thiii., -,, s are at once 
the product of human action and productive of further action. We are sociallsed into 
various material settings. Buildings, rooms and furniture tell us how to behave towards 
each other and to them as material things. The clues we get from the material world 
are not so much something we know, as something we are" (ibid: 11). Perceiviii, -, I 
material culture in this way it presents certain difficulties for a number of traditional 
dichotomies, most obviously that of materialisnVideal ism. Material culture does not sit 
easily on either side of this split for it is concurrently both material and ideal, the 
I Z-Y Materialisation of the ideal, the idealisation of the material. In respect to semiologý tile 
artefact plays havoc with the distinction between abstract sIgnifiers and concrete 
signifieds, because it can function simultaneously on both levels. Througli our 
eN, eryday use of artefacts major difficulties surface for those seekin, -, to endor, "(! a 
I notion of mind/body dualism due to the presence of embodied 
knowle4c. 
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These are some of the implications which flow from the study Of material culture and 
others have been noted throughout this inquiry. So wide-ranging are they that 
disciplines as diverse as anthropology, aesthetics, archaeology, serniology, psychology, 
and sociology are directly affected. Therefore, before finishing, let's highlight a few 
important consequences which are relevant to a number of these subjects. Some of 
them have expended a great deal of time and energy discussing the problems 
surrounding the question of translating beliefs, faiths and ideologies from one culture 
to another, problems which have arisen due mainly to the application of a version of 
Wittgenstein"s notion of language games, (the works of Peter Winch and Bames and 
Bloor are probably the best known in this field). What these theorists are 
predominantly concerned with is in essence knowledge of a discursive form and, in 
particular, what they perceive as the incommensurability between distinct linguistic 
cultures. Now, we can observe, due to certain factors which have emerged from our 
own study, that this stance is far from problem free. First of all it is based on a limited 
perspective, because it concerns itself only with discursive knowledge while ignoring 
both practical and embodied forms. Surely differences between cultures can also exist 
on all three levels, a fact that Mauss noticed with respect to embodied knowledge in 
the use of spades by English and French soldiers. However, it could be argued that 
practical and embodied knowledge are just two other ways in which discursive 
knowledge is held, merely reflected forms of discursive knowledge, so that 
incommensurability itself exists on all three levels. This being the case it would, for 
example, be extremely difficult for us to acquire the skill of using a Zulu 
hand loom or 
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a French spade for that matter. If this happened to be so, would it be because of an 
incommensurability between different forms of practical and embodied knowle&e or 
because of incompetence and cack-handedness on our behalP Yet if we do become 
skilful at working with an 'alien' tool does this therefore mean that we can understand 
another culture on both the practical and embodied levels, but not at the discursive 
level - can incommensurability exist in one form of understanding, but not in the other 
two within the same individual? Commonsensically this seems unlikely and, as we have 
discussed previously, although the three types of knowledge are analytically distinct 
they impact upon and influence each other. Therefore, understanding on one level 
implies understanding on the other two even if it is of the most cursor-ý, nature. 
Sin-fflar questions can also be raised in relation to discrete 'worlds' existing xithin a 
single culture. A number of theorists, most notably Thomas Kuhn, argue that scientific 
disciplines are prone to experience violent theoretical revolutions, paradigm shifts, 
where a whole conceptual outlook is rejected and replaced by a completely different 
one. So dramatic is this change that a new world seems to open up for the scientist 
and, concomitantly, no comparison is possible between it and the old order such is 
their utter contrariety. However, here again we see priority givcri to discursive 
knowledge, it is this that undergoes a radical change. But what of changes to practical 
and embodied knowledge, do these alter at exactly the same time and in , uch an 
impressive way; If so, how? Also, what role does the artefact play in thi,, procc,,,,, are 
scientific implements only passive items exerting no influence on the tuation 
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The implications that follow on from this study can, therefore, be seen to pose serious 
problems for any theory which promotes incommensurability between cultures. Yet it 
does so in a positive way, because it opens up the possibility that understandinCTs can 
be gained on a number of levels. Furthermore, even In the absence of those people of 
which we hope to obtain information the artefact can provide us with a route to 
comprehending their world, such are the practical implications which emerge from this 
study. Yet there is still a long way to go. As Hodder points out with respect to 
archaeology; 
66we are still far from understanding how the making of a stone tool or 
ceramic pot can be both mechanism and metaphor for disciplining tile 
human body into a cultural mould. We are still far from understanding 
how knowledge about striking blades and flakes from flint nodules is 
organised, learnt and adapted. And we are far from understanding how, 
for example, the shift from knapping flint flakes to blades might be 
related, in particular social and cultural contexts, to a new bcdily 
discipline and a new political philosophy ... [W]e need to 
have the 
confidence to delve into the practical world of technological operations 
in order to build theories about the embodiment of meanings and thus 
about the relationship between material practice and conceptual 
structure" (Hodder 1995: 211). 
The same could be' said of all the disciplines listed above; xe have to come to a better 
understanding of how humanity interacts with the artefacts which it produces 
in order 
to gain a more comprehensive knowledge of our presence and activitie,, in the ýxorld. 
278 
This being the case, it is time to move on from viewing artefacts as merely 
technological objects which help us to adapt to our environment, as functional took, 
as purely reflections of human mentality, as texts, as congealed labour, as peripheral 
elements in everyday life - artefacts deserve to be addressed as fundamental physical 
aspects of social existence; hopefully this study has established why this should be so. 
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